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Abstract 
U.S. counterterrorism policy appears to be influenced by different perspectives, as 
evidenced by conflicting statements by U.S. presidents regarding the causes of terrorism. 
Academic theories are not always applied by U.S. government employees who develop, 
influence, and implement counterterrorism policy. The purpose of this qualitative 
phenomenological study was to understand U.S. government policymakers’ perspectives 
on the causes of terrorism, the influences on these views, and the impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Six theories regarding the causes of terrorism provided the 
theoretical framework. Additional theories related to individual and organizational impact 
on decision-making provided a broader conceptual framework. Data were collected from 
interviews and survey questionnaires from 31 participants. Data were coded and 
categorized for thematic analysis. Five key findings were observed: (a) Root causes 
theory was a predominant factor in participants’ understanding of the cause of terrorism, 
(b) personal experiences are a dominant influence on these views, (c) organizational 
influence on the views of terrorism varied by organization, (d) participants viewed their 
interagency colleagues as well informed regarding the causes of terrorism, and (e) 
individual views among U.S. policymakers have a minimal impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Findings may be used to influence U.S. counterterrorism 
policymakers’ views at the national policy level.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
This research study addressed the individual perspectives of U.S. government 
policymakers who work on counterterrorism policy. I identified what they view as the 
primary causes of terrorism and situated these views within the context of individual 
influences and bureaucratic, cultural, or other influences in the organizations where they 
work. Although research into U.S. counterterrorism policy exists, researchers had not 
conducted field interviews with mid-grade U.S. counterterrorism policymakers, relying 
instead on case studies or narrative methodologies. The results of this study may provide 
needed academic insights enabling a fuller understanding of not only the perspectives of 
U.S. policymakers on the causes of terrorism, but also what influences their perceptions, 
and how both impact the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy.  
The first sections of this chapter provide an introduction to the study and a 
broader background of the topic. This is followed by the problem statement and a 
description of the purpose of the study. The research questions are then outlined. The 
theoretical foundation is articulated, which is followed by a description of the conceptual 
framework. The next section outlines the nature of the study, followed by the 
assumptions made, scope and delimitations used, and limitations of this research. The 
significance of the study is then addressed and placed in the wider academic body of 
knowledge. This chapter concludes with brief summary and an overview of Chapter 2.  
Background 
The term terrorism has many definitions (Nacos, 2012). There is general 
consensus that terrorism involves extreme violence, is focused against noncombatants, is 
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conducted by subnational or transnational groups, is based on political or ideological 
objectives, and is intended to cause broad fear and panic to force a particular outcome 
(Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007; Borum, 2004; Laqueur, 
1987; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Nacos, 2012). The threat of terrorism, fueled by 
instability and active military conflict across much of North Africa and the Middle East, 
poses unique challenges to U.S. policymakers (Badea, Binningb, Verlhiaca, & Sherman, 
2018; Ramakrishna, 2017; Sandler, 2014; Steele, Parker, & Lickel, 2015; Woods & 
Arthur, 2014). This instability is periodically punctuated by terrorist attacks against 
civilian soft targets in Europe, the United States, and other locations outside of obvious 
conflict zones (Badea et al., 2018; Sandler, 2014; Steele et al., 2015; Ramakrishna, 2017; 
Woods & Arthur, 2014).  
Recommendations regarding U.S. counterterrorism policy are developed within 
select organizations of the U.S. government’s executive branch (Emerson, 2014; Jordan, 
Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; Lint & Kassa, 2015). Diverse theories regarding the causes of 
terrorism emphasize different fundamental approaches, activities, and tools necessary to 
achieve success (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; 
Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Examples of differing perspectives 
regarding terrorism are evident in statements from recent U.S. presidents and key leaders 
within their respective administrations (Emerson, 2014; Jordan et al., 2016; Lint & Kassa, 
2015). President George W. Bush and his administration used the term radical Islam 
cautiously, and also referred to terrorists as evil and dead enders (J. Phillips, 2005; 
Pilecki, Muro, Hammack, & Clemons, 2014). President Obama and his administration 
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were mostly circumspect regarding terrorism and Islam, stressing numerous causes 
depending on the particular venue being addressed (Goldberg, 2016; Stern, 2015). 
President Trump has used the term radical Islamic terrorism often in reference to its 
primary cause and motivation (Toosi, 2017). These statements reflect the dissonance in 
perspectives regarding the topic, sometimes by the same senior official articulating 
different positions at separate times (Goldberg, 2016; Pilecki et al., 2014).  
Problem Statement 
The theory a policy professional holds regarding the primary causes of terrorism 
is influenced by numerous factors, such as experience, education, profession, cultural 
awareness, and relationships (Akhtar, 2017; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Welch, 
2016). Personal views may also be influenced by broader bureaucratic cultures (Janis, 
1971; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These factors impact the development and 
implementation of U.S. national counterterrorism policies (Akhtar, 2017; Githens-Mazer 
& Lambert, 2010; Welch, 2016). Incorrectly applying tools to address terrorism based on 
one theoretical frame could be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worse (Garcia 
& Geva, 2016; Horne & Bestvater, 2016; Jackson, 2015; Lee, 2016). Effects would be 
exasperated, even incoherent, if different government organizations attempted to apply 
tools from conflicting theoretical frames simultaneously (Garcia & Geva, 2016; Horne & 
Bestvater, 2016; Jackson, 2015; Lee, 2016).  
A literature review indicated a wide body of writing and research on differing 
theories regarding the causes of terrorism and suggested approaches for addressing the 
underlying factors (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, 
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Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Researchers also examined specific U.S. 
counterterrorism policies based in large part on narrative and case study methodologies 
that addressed not only institutional factors within the U.S. policymaking bureaucracy, 
but also what appears to be some consistency among the U.S. political elite regarding 
perspectives on terrorism (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith, 2009; Jackson, 2011; Stern, 2015). 
Broader insights into senior decision-making relative to counterterrorism policy exist as 
well (Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018; Woodward, 2007, 2011). 
Although these last examples may be based on firsthand accounts and contain rich detail, 
journalistic standards are not the same as scholarly standards and do not include 
acceptable research methodologies (Kassop, 2013).  
Questions exist for scholars regarding what factors influence the development and 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011). A gap in research 
appeared to exist within the realm of U.S. counterterrorism policy at the intersection 
where academic theories on the causes of terrorism meet the reality of U.S. policymakers, 
with their individual perspectives and potential influences. Most studies in this area 
included historical archival data and little analysis of field interviews (Sageman, 2014). 
Kassop (2013) suggested that scholars need to conduct detailed research, including 
collecting data from current government counterterrorism officials, to confirm and 
explain factors that influence the decision process regarding counterterrorism policy.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to understand the link between theory and 
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories 
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regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism 
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach including 
individual interviews and participant questionnaires to analyze U.S. policymakers’ 
perspectives within organizational cultures and to assess the impacts on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  
Research Questions 
The following research question (RQ) was addressed in this study: 
RQ: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among 
U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these views due to personal factors, 
organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy?  
In addition, the following five subquestions (SQs) were used to amplify the 
central research question: 
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align 
with existing academic theories?  
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be 
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?  
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced 
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking 
organizations?  
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected 
between and among the key policymaking organizations? 
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy? 
Theoretical Foundation 
Although there are various and somewhat divergent theories on the causes of 
modern terrorism, including similarities and differences in assumptions made, approaches 
used, and conclusions drawn, they provide a useful theoretical foundation for outlining 
key factors, constructs, variables, and relationships from which to understand individual 
worldviews and broader organizational implications (Akhtar, 2017; Jackson, Jarvis, 
Gunning, & Breen-Smyth, 2011; Martin, 2017). Notable among them include the main 
terrorism theories of religious ideology (Berman, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014), 
root causes (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006), state sponsorship (Arendt, 1953; 
Byman, 2007; Sterling, 1981), failed states (Crocker; 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2004); rational choice (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2011; Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011), and group dynamics (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007).  
I made no academic assessment or research judgment regarding the soundness of 
these six theories regarding the causes of terrorism (see Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & Heath-
Kelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016). Rather, the theories were used to 
examine individual perceptions to understand the views of current U.S. counterterrorism 
policy professionals (see Jackson et al., 2011; Martin, 2017; Schroden et al., 2016; Silke 
& Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). Regardless of how these theories on the causes of terrorism 
are viewed in the academic community, they were relevant because they are routinely 
identified or alluded to in statements by senior U.S. officials or outlined in official U.S. 
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government policy documents that address terrorism (National Counterterrorism Center 
[NCTC], 2017; Office of the Director for National Intelligence [ODNI], n.d.; U.S. 
Department of State & Agency for International Development [USAID], 2016).  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework used in this study included several additional theories 
that relate to why individual policymakers may have particular perspectives regarding the 
causes of terrorism. This conceptional framework consisted of two factors: individual 
factors and organizational factors. To address possible individual factors, elements from 
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989, 2001, 2011) and cultural theory (Douglas, 1985; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987) were used to examine how individuals 
may view their surroundings, ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and make 
decisions. Regarding potential organizational factors, elements from resource dependency 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), groupthink theory (Janis, 1971, 1972), and the 
organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) were used to 
assess the individual perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism within the context of 
unique organizational bureaucracies, influences, or biases.  
Nature of the Study 
I used qualitative methodology, to explore and understand the meaning derived by 
individuals or groups associated with a social or human phenomenon (see Creswell, 
2014). A naturalistic approach associated with a social construction perspective provided 
the appropriate research design to focus on how individuals perceive the world and how 
they interpret meaning based on their experiences (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012). A 
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qualitative phenomenological research strategy of inquiry allowed me to investigate, 
analyze, and understand individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism, as well as 
personal insights regarding bureaucratic influences and broader intradepartmental unity 
of effort.  
Assumptions 
Assumptions are a necessary part of qualitative research methodology (Creswell, 
2014; Patton, 2014; Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Based on the phenomenon of interest, which 
was understanding the perspectives of current U.S. counterterrorism policymakers on the 
causes of terrorism, a number of assumptions were necessary due to the use of interviews 
to collect data (see Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). The key assumptions 
made during the course of this study were as follows:  
• U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals have individual perspectives on the 
causes of terrorism. 
• Participants are willing to participate, share their experiences, and answer all 
questions openly and honestly. 
• Information obtained from the participants provides a consistent and accurate 
representation of each participant’s point of view. 
• Selection criteria provided for suitable participants knowledgeable in 
counterterrorism policies and the organizational roles, responsibilities, 
bureaucracies, and cultural nuances of their organizations.  
• Semistructured individual interviews provided appropriate detail to describe 
and understand the perceptions of the participants.  
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• Additional background information collected in the participant survey 
questionnaire is sufficient to provide meaningful context and nuance related to 
the perceptions articulated by study participants.  
• The research questions, methodological structure, and research processes used 
in this study appropriately mitigate potential interviewer biases during 
individual interviews in the data collection process. 
• The sample size and composition of the study participants are sufficient to 
obtain reliable data and enable meaningful conclusions within, among, and 
between the four selected U.S. counterterrorism policy organizations. 
• The findings from the study may be generalized to similar populations of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy experts.  
• The results of the study will enable positive social change in the development 
and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this study addressed the who, what, and why necessary for 
comprehensively understanding the selected phenomenon of interest. The selected study 
population bound the who, which come from four key U.S. organizations whose 
employees are instrumental to the development and implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy: Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD), the USAID, 
and the NCTC. Individual interviews were conducted across all four organizations, with 
participants required to have a minimum of 8-10 years of experience, leading to a total 
study sample of 31 participants. Political appointees, as well as U.S. government 
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employees with less than 8 years of experience, were excluded from the sample because 
of their relative short-term or intermittent government experience.  
The theoretical framework for this research constituted the what and included six 
general theories regarding the causes of terrorism: religious ideology, root causes, state 
sponsorship, failed states, rational choice, and group dynamics. The why was examined 
through the conceptual framework and addressed how individual and organizational 
influencers may impact these perspectives. This focus included social cognitive theory, 
cultural theory, resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, and the organizational 
processes model. Perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism obtained from current 
U.S. government employees from the four organizations provided a useful understanding 
of the phenomenon of interest. Findings from this study were transferable for use and 
comparison with other relevant studies regarding counterterrorism policies.  
Limitations 
There were two acknowledged limitations in this study. First was the number of 
participants from a select number of U.S. policymaking organizations. Counterterrorism 
policy is addressed by, and influenced from, many U.S. departments and agencies across 
the executive branch. There are also key outside influencers, such as Congress, think 
tanks, lobbyists, and the media. The selection of study participants from four key 
organizations involved in counterterrorism policy spanning differing career perspectives 
such as diplomacy, defense, development, and intelligence was deliberate to collect a 
broad sample of perspectives on the phenomenon of interest. The number of participants 
from each of the four selected organizations was also purposeful, targeting those who 
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work in counterterrorism offices to provide a meaningful and representative sample of the 
broader bureaucracy (see Creswell, 2014; Maxwell, 2013).  
Additionally, my personal biases and those of the study participants may have 
limited the findings of the study. I am a career member of the federal civil service and 
have worked for the U.S. government in various capacities for 32 years, the last 16 years 
in defense policy organizations within the Pentagon. My participation in policymaking 
debates during the last decade and a half on the phenomenon of interest revealed differing 
worldviews from employees across the U.S. interagency counterterrorism policy 
community. I acknowledge that I have a particular worldview and perspective regarding 
the causes of terrorism, and I therefore had an inherent bias in my role as the researcher. 
The structured steps taken in the manner in which questions were developed, how 
individual interviews were conducted, the process and procedures followed to collect and 
process the qualitative data, and the approach used in the analysis of the data and 
development of findings and recommendations were assessed to have sufficiently 
mitigated the risks of my personal biases from tainting this research (see Anney, 2014; 
Shenton, 2004; Tobin & Begley, 2004).  
Significance of the Study 
This study was significant for individual American citizens and had ramifications 
for U.S. foreign policy and relationships with foreign countries and international 
organizations (see Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013, Sageman, 2014). This research was 
unique because it addressed six general academic theories regarding the causes of 
terrorism (see Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Kuzner, 
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2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981), which were derived from studying terrorists and 
their actions from an outside-in perspective, focusing on individual U.S. government 
employees currently working in the development and implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Rather than attempting to assess these individual perspectives 
through analysis of policy documents, public statements,  pronouncements, or the 
language from policy speeches, I leveraged my unique placement and access to obtain 
firsthand perspectives from U.S. counterterrorism policymakers.  
The results of this study may provide a fuller understanding of individual and 
organizational factors that influence counterterrorism policy according to personal 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism (see Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013, Sageman, 
2014). The qualitative methodology enabled me to explore and understand the meaning 
derived by U.S. counterterrorism policymakers regarding the causes of terrorism. The 
approach used in this study provided a template for other researchers interested in gaining 
a deeper understanding of significant policy issues affecting U.S. national security.  
Summary 
The threat of terrorism poses challenges for current U.S. policy. Counterterrorism 
policy appears to be influenced by individual perspectives evident by conflicting 
statements by U.S. presidents and their senior administration officials regarding the 
causes of terrorism. Differing theories on the causes of terrorism emphasize different 
approaches, which if applied simultaneously can be ineffective or counterproductive. A 
gap in research existed at the intersection where academic theories meet the reality of 
individual U.S. government employees who develop, influence, and implement 
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counterterrorism policy. The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand the 
perspectives of individual U.S. government policymakers regarding the causes of 
terrorism. The research question addressed individual perspectives on the causes of 
terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these views from 
personal factors, organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies that shape U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Qualitative phenomenological methodology was used to collect 
data from individual participant interviews and a detailed questionnaire. Research 
findings enabled strong analytic conclusions and meaningful recommendations grounded 
in solid academic research processes to strengthen U.S. counterterrorism initiatives at the 
national policy level. 
This first chapter provided a background of this study, the problem statement, 
purpose of the study, primary and secondary research questions, theoretical foundation, 
conceptual framework, nature of the study, assumptions, scope and delimitations, 
limitations, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 includes the literature search 
strategy, a general overview of U.S. policymaking and organizations, the theoretical 
foundation, the conceptual framework related to theories describing individual and 
organizational influences on perspectives, and the assessed gap in the literature regarding 
the phenomenon of interest. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The threat of terrorism poses challenges for current U.S. policy. The purpose of 
this literature review was to examine the information and research related to 
understanding the perspectives on terrorism of individual U.S. government policymakers, 
as well as determine a reasonable context for assessing possible individual and 
organizational influences on the shaping of these perspectives. An understanding of these 
perceptions may provide other researchers with valuable insights into factors that impact 
the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. In addition to 
providing the academic context for this research, this literature review also indicates how 
the resulting findings will contribute to the wider body of knowledge regarding individual 
perceptions on the causes of terrorism and how it is confronted through U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  
There exists a wide body of writing and research regarding differing theories on 
the causes of terrorism and suggested approaches for addressing the respective 
underlying factors (Fukuyama, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, 
Kuzner, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sterling, 1981). Research into specific U.S. 
counterterrorism policies exists as well, including apparent consistencies among some 
U.S. political elites regarding their perspectives on terrorism (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith, 
2009; Jackson, 2011; Stern, 2015). Firsthand journalistic accounts regarding senior U.S. 
decision-makers’ perspectives on terrorism also exist but are not based on scholarly 
approaches (Kassop, 2013; Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018; 
Woodward, 2007). Real questions still exist for scholars as to what factors influence the 
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development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011; 
Kassop, 2013).  
This literature review is organized to systematically address who, what, and why 
for understanding the selected phenomenon of interest. The scope of who is defined by 
the four selected stakeholder organizations. The theoretical framework for this research 
constitutes the what, which includes six general theories regarding the causes of 
terrorism. The why is the conceptual framework of both individual and organizational 
influencers for these perspectives. All three provide a strong research foundation from 
which to describe, assess, and understand U.S. counterterrorism policymakers’ 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism.  
The first section of the chapter provides a description of the literature search 
strategy used to gather relevant information and research. The second section provides a 
U.S. policy overview as a general foundation related to the policymaking process, how 
terrorism is defined, the primary U.S. organizations involved in counterterrorism policy, 
the individual roles and responsibilities of individual policymakers, and how policy is 
implemented. The third section provides the theoretical foundation upon which this study 
was based, which includes six general theories regarding the causes of terrorism. This is 
followed by a section that addresses some other conceptual theories used to describe and 
assess both individual and organizational influences on U.S. policymakers’ perceptions of 
the causes of terrorism. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the gap in the 
literature regarding this specific phenomenon to demonstrate how the research benefits 
the academic body of knowledge.  
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Literature Review and Search Strategy 
This literature review focused on retrieving and reviewing literature in three 
primary areas: policy development, processes, and implementation; theories on the causes 
of terrorism; and theories relative to the development of individual perspectives within 
the context of personal and organizational influences. The literature search strategy 
included the Walden University library and its linked research databases: Digital National 
Security Archive, EBSCO ebooks, Homeland Security Digital Library, International 
Security and Counterterrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, 
Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, and SAGE Journals. An emphasis was 
placed on finding peer-reviewed journals published within the last 5 years; however, this 
was not a rigid criterion to exclude relevant research, especially foundational literature 
regarding the theoretical and conceptual frameworks.  
In addition to key word searches within these specific databases, Google Scholar 
was also used to search for relevant literature from peer-reviewed periodicals or journals. 
Many of the identified articles were available in the Walden University library, which I 
linked to in Google Scholar. Google Scholar was also used to identify relevant books or 
particular portions obtained electronically. Broader Google searches were also used in a 
limited fashion to identify statements made by political leaders reported by news media 
entities, such as The Atlantic, The New Republic, and Politico, as well as by selected 
organizations such as The Heritage Foundation.  
The search strategy included a topic- or subject-based approach to identify 
potential research to inform this study. Key words used in the literature search included 
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U.S. policy process, counterterrorism policy, counterterrorism policy stakeholders, 
counterterrorism policy organizations, individual roles in counterterrorism policy, U.S. 
counterterrorism programs, counterterrorism program implementation, terrorism, 
terrorism definition, terrorism theory, causes of terrorism, cause of terrorism theory, 
terrorism religious ideology, terrorism root causes, State sponsorship of terrorism, 
terrorism and failed states, terrorism as rational choice, group dynamics and terrorism, 
U.S. government employees and terrorism, U.S. government employee terrorism 
perspectives, terrorism and social cognitive theory, organizational influence bias, 
resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, organizational process model, and 
multiple combinations of these search terms.  
Policy Context 
Before delving into the theoretical foundations regarding terrorism and conceptual 
frameworks that assist in understanding individual and organizational influence factors 
impacting how terrorism is viewed, a general background regarding the structure and 
process of counterterrorism policymaking is warranted. This is done to place the 
phenomenon of interest for this study, which is individual policymakers’ perspectives on 
the causes of terrorism, in the broader context. The information provided in this section 
includes the U.S. policymaking process and definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism 
from a U.S. government perspective. The primary U.S. organizations in the executive 
branch involved in making counterterrorism policy are then identified, as are their 
generally observed organizational cultures. The roles and responsibilities of individual 
policymakers within this environment is then highlighted, as is some of the primary 
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outside influences of policy, such as Congress, think tanks, lobbyists, and the media. This 
section ends with a summary of how U.S. policy is implemented by departments and 
agencies once decisions are made.  
Policymaking Process 
The term policy is used liberally when discussing the functions of government 
(Hoffman & Neuhard, 2016; McConnell, 2010). The term can be defined as “a definite 
course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given 
conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions” (Policy, 2018a, para. 
2.a.). In the government context, policy is focused on meeting identified goals or 
objectives (Hoffman & Neuhard, 2016; Miller, 2013; Policy, 2018b). Policy is made 
through an integrated, coordinated process across federal departments and agencies that 
work to set goals, identify courses of action, build consensus, and seek decisions by 
senior government officials (George, 2017; Gvosdev, 2017; Miller, 2013).  
The current policymaking structure is the same as that established by Brent 
Scowcroft, the national security advisor to President George H. W. Bush (George, 2017). 
The process is managed by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, which identifies 
issues and topics and brings together policy experts from across the interagency (George, 
2017; Gvosdev, 2017; Miller, 2013). The structure consists of numerous topically based 
interagency working groups or policy coordination committees, the deputies committee 
(made up of deputy secretaries and chaired by the deputy national security advisor), the 
principal committee (the cabinet secretary level, chaired by the national security advisor), 
and the full NSC (again with cabinet secretaries, but chaired by the President) (George, 
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2017; Rothkopf, 2014; Whittaker, Brown, Smith, & McCune, 2011). Only major 
decisions are pushed up to deputies or higher, or where interagency consensus at lower 
levels cannot be reached (George, 2017). The process is generally structured to centralize 
policy development, enabled and managed via the NSC staff, and decentralize policy 
execution through departments and agencies within their respective programs and 
activities. 
The interagency consists of the mid- to senior-level policy personnel from across 
all the relevant departments and agencies for a given topic (George, 2017; Hoffman & 
Neuhard, 2016; Miller, 2013). This interdepartmental enterprise includes government 
experts from both regional offices and functional offices (Gvosdev, 2017; Hoffman & 
Neuhard, 2016). Due to the span of the U.S. federal bureaucracy, coordination of effort to 
develop policy and build consensus can be difficult, with many challenges (George, 
2017). The policy experts within the departments and agencies are knowledgeable of 
their authorities, resources, and programs and are protective of their organizations’ 
prerogatives (George, 2017). These policy experts can at times resist what they view as 
undue interference by the NSC staff, crossing from what needs to be done into the details 
of how policies are being resourced and implemented (Gvosdev, 2017; Hoffman & 
Neuhard, 2016). The trend for NSC staff involvement in the details of policy 
implementation is evidenced by the growing number of NSC staff personnel over the last 
four presidential administrations (Gvosdev, 2017). The NSC staff of 50 under George H. 
W. Bush grew to approximately 100 under Bill Clinton, then doubled to 200 under 
George W. Bush and doubled again to over 400 under Barack Obama (Gvosdev, 2017). 
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This steady increase in the size of the NSC staff over time has been attributed by some to 
suspicions by presidents that the national security bureaucracy is not moving aggressively 
enough to support their policy objectives and decisions (Chollet, 2016).  
Terrorism and Counterterrorism Defined 
The term terrorism has many definitions (Nacos, 2012). Three of note follow 
from different official definitions from U.S. departments or agencies. From the 
Department of State, terrorism means “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” 
(Kraft & Marks, 2011, p. 3). The Department of Defense (2018a) defines terrorism as 
“the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, 
or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit 
of goals that are usually political” (p. 219). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.) 
distinguished between international and domestic terrorism, with international terrorism 
“perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated 
foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored)” (What We Investigate: 
Terrorism section, para. 2) and domestic terrorism “perpetrated by individuals and/or 
groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse 
extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature” 
(What We Investigate: Terrorism section, para. 3). There is general consensus across 
these and other definitions that terrorism involves extreme violence, is focused against 
noncombatants, is conducted by subnational or transnational groups, is based on political 
or ideological objectives, and is intended to cause broad fear and panic to force a 
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particular outcome (Bongar et al., 2007; Borum, 2004; Laqueur, 1987; Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2011; Nacos, 2012).  
In contrast, counterterrorism functions are the “activities and operations taken to 
neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them 
incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve 
their goals” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 55). Since the September 11 attack, 
counterterrorism policy has played an increasingly central role in U.S. government 
foreign policy (Lint & Kassa, 2015; Nacos, 2012). This is in large part due to the 
increased public perception of the terrorist threat, fueled by increasing political instability 
and long-term military conflict across much of North Africa and the Middle East in the 
last decade (Badea et al., 2018; Sandler, 2014; Woods & Arthur, 2014). The public 
concerns over terrorism are periodically punctuated by terrorist attacks against civilian 
soft targets in Europe, the United States, and other locations outside of obvious conflict 
zones (Ramakrishna, 2017; Steele et al., 2015; Woods & Arthur, 2014). The difficulty 
and complexities of the situation make it difficult for U.S. policymakers to develop and 
maintain a consistent counterterrorism policy in which they try to balance public fears, 
align suitable government programs and activities, and maintain foreign relationships 
(Crenshaw, 2001).  
Primary Counterterrorism Policy Stakeholder Organizations 
The setting for this research was U.S. government employees who work 
developing and implementing policy within the main U.S. departments and agencies 
involved in counterterrorism. The four primary organizations involved in this effort 
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include the Departments of State and Defense, the USAID, and the NCTC (Crenshaw, 
2001). In the current U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy this is commonly described as the 
‘3-D’s’ for diplomacy, development, and defense (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015; 
Kraft & Marks, 2011). These departments and agencies, along with many others, provide 
the depth of experience and expertise that influence the development of counterterrorism 
policy options, and help translate identified policy goals and objectives into language that 
drives programs, activities, and ultimately resources (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, & 
Hermann, 2001; Crenshaw, 2001; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Policymakers within each 
department or agency bring not only unique program and activity expertise to the 
counterterrorism challenge, they also bring insights gained over time, which influences 
their perspective (Keane & Diesen, 2015; Morin & Paquin, 2018). 
State Department. The Department of State is the lead Federal agency for 
advancing U.S. interests abroad (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007; U.S. Department 
of State, n.d.a.). The foreign service officers, career members of the civil service, and 
foreign national employees of the State Department do this through diplomacy, advocacy, 
and assistance (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.). The State Department employs 
approximately 66,000 people, of which about 23,000 are U.S. citizens and the rest are 
foreign national support staff (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.). 
The annual State Department budget is $22 billion (U.S. Department of State, 2018). 
Approximately 8,000 of State Department personnel, fully one-third of their U.S. citizen 
workforce, are deployed overseas, serving in U.S. embassies, consulates, or in other 
foreign capacities (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a.).  
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There is a distinctive diplomatic culture among State Department personal, which 
is generally described as having fluency in languages, extensive foreign experience, a 
broad perspective, open and tolerant, a ready sympathy for foreigners and their points of 
view, an appreciation for nuance and ambiguity, and a fondness for process and 
negotiation (George, 2017; Haass, 2017; Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007). This 
culture has its roots in the ‘balance-of-power’ system between nations, structured around 
state sovereignty, and enabled by diplomatic structures, processes, negotiation, and 
persuasion (Lauren, Craig, & George, 2007; Ross, 2007). To some in the interagency, 
State Department personnel are also viewed as having an aversion to strategic planning, 
tying goals to distinct timelines, or linking policy objectives directly to resources 
(George, 2017; Haass, 2017).  
Defense Department. The largest Federal department by far in both personnel 
and resources is the Department of Defense (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & 
Gerstein, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). Made up of civilian employees, 
military personnel, and support contractors, the mission of the Defense Department “is to 
provide a lethal Joint Force to defend the security of our country and sustain American 
influence abroad” (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d., Mission section, para. 1). The 
Defense Department employs 742,000 government civilians, 1.3 million uniformed 
military personnel (i.e., across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps), and is the 
largest employer in the world (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). It has an annual budget 
of $686 billion (with $617 billion in the base budget plus $69 billon for overseas 
contingency operations), which totals more than the defense budgets of the next fourteen 
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countries combined (Garamone, 2018; George, 2017; Taylor & Karklis, 2016; U.S. 
Department of Defense, n.d.). The sheer size of U.S. military forces, combat capabilities, 
extensive worldwide presence, and global reach of the Defense Department underpins the 
U.S. international role as a superpower (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; George, 2017; 
Rodman, 2009).  
Regarding policymaking, the culture among civilians within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense generally tends to be more conservative in approach, somewhat risk 
adverse, and skeptical of foreign government intentions or promises (Feith, 2008; Gates, 
2014; George, 2017). They tend to focus more on capabilities than intentions, viewing 
situations in many cases as risks rather than opportunities, driven in large part by the 
tendency of the rest of the interagency (and the White House) to go to the military 
solution first (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). Some of this is 
driven by the large budget and extensive resources of DoD when compared to other 
departments and agencies (Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). Unlike 
other departments and agencies, senior leadership in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense is also more political, with presidential appointees filling most of the senior 
executive positions, at numbers which are a larger percentage than that in the rest of the 
interagency (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; George, 2017; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). The 
uniformed military, represented mostly by the Joint Staff in policymaking, is also 
impacted by culture and tradition (Donnithorne, 2017; George, 2017; Golby & Karlin, 
2018; Smith & Gerstein, 2007). While military service on the Joint Staff in Washington is 
expected to be ‘joint,’ blending the capabilities of all four branches of the military, their 
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distinctive service cultures can play a role in how they view issues and present options 
(Donnithorne, 2017; George, 2017; Golby & Karlin, 2018; Smith & Gerstein, 2007)  
U.S. Agency for International Development. The USAID is the lead agency in 
the U.S. government for providing development and humanitarian assistance (USAID, 
2018a). Their stated mission is to “promote and demonstrate democratic values abroad, 
and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world,” leading U.S. Government 
“international development and disaster assistance through partnerships and investments 
that save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance, and help people 
emerge from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance” (USAID, 2018b, 
Mission, Vision, and Values section, para. 1). USAID personnel work closely with 
international and non-governmental relief organizations, as well as coordinates 
developmental and humanitarian assistance activities with other countries and regional 
entities (Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011; 
USAID, 2018a). USAID has an annual budget of approximately $15 billion, and employs 
approximately 3,100 government personnel, split between members of the USAID 
foreign service (at 1,600) and career civil service (at 1,500) (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; 
USAID, 2017; U.S. Department of State, 2018). Almost 60 percent (or 900-1,000 people) 
of USAID’s foreign service officers are deployed at regional offices overseas, as well as 
in larger U.S. embassies, and they are supported by 4,500 foreign national employees 
who assist them in managing and implementing development programs at the local level 
(Kopp & Gillespie, 2008).  
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Like the bureaucracies briefly described above, USAID also has a recognized 
culture among its personnel (Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007; USAID, 2018a). The 
relatively small size of the workforce, as compared to other U.S. federal departments and 
agencies, strengthens its employees’ sense of purpose and enhances personal 
relationships (Hills, 2006; Kopp & Gillespie, 2008; Ross, 2007). With their deep local 
roots, they can be perceived as passionate about their work, dedicated, and altruistic 
(Aldrich, 2014; Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Ross, 2007). They have keen 
individual knowledge at the local level, nuanced cultural awareness, and language skills, 
based on long term service in country- or regional-specific program management 
(Aldrich, 2014; Hills, 2006; Howell & Lind, 2009; Ross, 2007). Many of them have 
unique specialization and skills in such fields as agriculture, sanitation, health care, 
disaster relief, community development, family affairs, and conflict resolution (Kopp & 
Gillespie, 2008; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011; Ross, 2007).  
USAID personnel involvement in counterterrorism policy ebbs and flows 
somewhat depending on administration priorities, which defines how closely 
development gets aligned with diplomacy and defense (i.e., the ‘3-D’s” mentioned 
previously) (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Since 
September 11, 2001, it is generally recognized that there has been an increased 
‘securitization’ of development assistance (Howell & Lind, 2009). This has resulted in 
the use of development projects in many ways as tools for terrorism prevention (Aldrich, 
2014; Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, & Potter, 2015; Miles, 2012; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & 
Bruderlein, 2011). Some development professionals, both inside of USAID as well with 
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their partners, are concerned with this trend, however, which has closely linked and 
integrated development with security (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, & Potter, 2015; Hills, 
2006; Modirzadeh, Lewis, & Bruderlein, 2011).  
National Counterterrorism Center. The NCTC was created in 2004 in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 commission (Fessenden, 2005; George, 2017; Kean & Hamilton, 
2004; Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012). 
Part of the new ODNI, the NCTC is one of four analytic centers within that organization 
that was created by Congress (ODNI, n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012; Reinwald, 2007). The 
NCTC mission is to “lead and integrate the national counterterrorism (CT) effort by 
fusing foreign and domestic CT information, providing terrorism analysis, sharing 
information with partners across the CT enterprise, and driving whole-of-government 
action to secure our national CT objectives” (ODNI, n.d.).  
NCTC is staffed by more than 1,000 personnel, with almost half of NCTC’s 
workforce being liaisons officers or employees detailed from approximately 20 different 
Federal departments and agencies—from intelligence, defense and military, homeland 
security, and law enforcement communities (Fessenden, 2005; George, 2017; Reinwald, 
2007; ODNI, n.d.). The NCTC budget is classified, as is the annual budget for all of the 
U.S. intelligence community, but open source information indicates the overall 
intelligence community budget is funded at approximately $42 million (Fessenden, 2005; 
NCTC, 2017). NCTC has the responsibilities for integrating analysis and coordinating 
information sharing from across the intelligence community (George, 2017; NCTC, 
2017; ODNI, n.d.; Priest & Arkin, 2012; Reinwald, 2007). As such, the NCTC provides 
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an interagency forum and supporting process to link national-level counterterrorism 
policy to strategic operational objectives and tasks for counterterrorism (NCTC, 2017; 
ODNI, n.d.).  
Being an intelligence entity, the organizational culture at NCTC shares many of 
the traits that are routinely used to describe intelligence professionals (Bean, 2009; Best, 
2011; (Fessenden, 2005; Kean & Hamilton, 2004). This organizational culture includes 
dedication to mission, being analytic and technical, and having a process-oriented view 
(Bruijn, 2006; Johnston, 2005; Priest & Arkin, 2012). The process perspective is viewed 
by some in the interagency as somewhat overdone, as they are known for broad 
coordination of their products and efforts to reach consensus in their assessments 
(Johnston, 2005; Jones, 2006; Kean & Hamilton, 2004). They have a general reputation 
for ambiguity, nuance, and avoiding taking sides in policy debates (Feith, 2008; Johnston, 
2005; Jones, 2006; Rodman, 2009). They focus on what is known, based on a regimented 
assessment of confidence levels, and avoid predictions or extrapolation (Jones, 2006; 
NCTC, 2017).  
The broader intelligence community, of which NCTC is one part, is viewed by 
some in the interagency as ‘stove-piped,’ with each of the 16 separate organizations that 
make up the intelligence community jealously guarding their own independent views and 
assessments (Bruijn, 2006; Fessenden, 2005; Garicano, & Posner, 2005; Kean & 
Hamilton, 2004). They report both majority and dissenting assessments in the same 
product (NCTC, 2017). The perceived culture regarding intelligence professionals by 
many in the interagency is due in large part to the role they play in U.S. government 
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policymaking (Cronin, 2010; Garicano, & Posner, 2005; Marrin, 2007). They are policy 
advisors, not policymakers, and pride themselves in being objective and unbiased 
(Fessenden, 2005; Marrin, 2007; NCTC, 2017; Rodman, 2009). This can, however, cause 
some policymakers to gravitate to those select intelligence products that reinforce their 
own views and perspectives (Feith, 2008; Fessenden, 2005; Kean & Hamilton, 2004; 
Marrin, 2007).  
Individual Policymaker Roles and Responsibilities 
Individual government employees in U.S. departments and agencies can and do 
have real impact in both the development and implementation of policy decisions 
(George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; McCormick, 2012). This 
is due to a couple of factors, first of which is their access and placement within the policy 
bureaucracy (Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; 
Rodman, 2009). They serve at the touch point between senior decision makers in 
government and the programs and activities necessary for carrying out policy decisions 
(Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Ross, 2007; Rodman, 2009). Senior decision makers are those 
at the highest levels of government, including the political appointees who are nominated 
by the president and confirmed by the Senate, but also include the additional political 
appointees who are placed in lower level positions by the president but don’t require 
Congressional confirmation (George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Jackson, 2015a).  
The political appointees number approximately 4,000 individuals across the 
various departments and agencies of the U.S. executive branch, and of these more than 
1,200 require Senate confirmation (Piaker, 2016; Political Appointee Tracker, 2018). For 
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reference, the number of presidential nominated, Senate confirmed political positions at 
the four departments or agencies referenced above, which represent their respective 
senior leadership, include 161 at State, 57 at Defense, 11 at USAID, and 1 at NCTC 
(Piaker, 2016; Political Appointee Tracker, 2018). Given the span of their 
responsibilities, and the complexities of the issues they must deal with on a daily basis, 
they are critically dependent upon the senior career members of the civil service (as well 
as the members of the foreign service and military) who support them as members of 
their immediate staff (Abrams, 2017; Cohen, 2018; Feith, 2008; Gates, 2014; Ross, 2007; 
Rodman, 2009). It is these individual government employees who frame the issues in 
papers, draft the policy positions for review, coordinate their review within the inter- and 
intra-departmental bureaucracy, present them for decisions, promulgate decisions into the 
interagency, and oversee implementation of decisions made (Cohen, 2018; Cotter, 2017; 
George, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Kraft & Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012).  
A second factor, which is of no less significance, is the extensive knowledge and 
experience gained over many years, sometimes decades, resident in the members of the 
government civil service who have the information and skills critical to successful 
policymaking and implementation (Avey & Desch, 2014; Bacchus, 2015; Cohen, 2018; 
Destler, 2015).  
Policy development and implementation is a complex and challenging 
environment, dealing with the details related to the programs and personnel available, the 
approved legislative authorities, the appropriated resources, the processes and 
mechanisms for achieving consensus, and the relationships (and trust) necessary across 
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the policymaking enterprise to work through difficult bureaucratic challenges (Abrams, 
2017; Avey & Desch, 2014; Bacchus, 2015; Cotter, 2017; McCormick, 2012). The 
bureaucratic process is by its nature designed to be deliberative, which is why those 
individuals who have worked for extended times within the system and bureaucracy can 
and do have a tremendous amount of influence (Abrams, 2017; Avey & Desch, 2014; 
Bacchus, 2015; Cohen, 2018; Cotter, 2017; Destler, 2015).  
Key Outside Influencers  
Beyond just dealings with their own departments and agencies senior leaders, 
individual U.S. government employees who work in the policy environment are also 
attuned to other key entities that can and do influence the making of U.S. policy (George, 
2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; McCormick, 2012). These entities include Congress (both 
elected members and their staff), think tanks, lobbyists, and the media (Eisenfeld, 2017; 
George, 2017; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Part of the function of policy 
development and implementation by U.S. government employees includes routinely 
engaging with these entities (Eisenfeld, 2017; George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011). This 
engagement falls into two general categories, which is soliciting inputs and information 
in the development of policy, and then describing and explaining policy decisions and 
resulting programs and activities (George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011). The former 
category of engagement with outside entities serves to inform the development of 
potential policy options or courses of action that can be refined and recommended to 
senior policymakers (George, 2017; Kraft & Marsk, 2011; Milner & Tingley, 2015). The 
latter category of engagement contributes to an administration’s role and responsibility to 
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articulate policy decisions and actions of government to key stakeholders, principal 
among these being Congress and the general public (George, 2017; Milner & Tingley, 
2015; Skidmore, 2012).  
Congress. First and foremost, the principal outside influencer of policy is the 
Congress (Carter & Scott, 2010; Halperin & Clapp, 2007; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). As 
the directly elected representatives of the people, Congress is the organization that both 
authorizes programs and activities and appropriates the resources necessary for their 
implementation (Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). Since policy 
statements and documents provide the framework for setting the goals and objectives of 
government efforts, the Congress plays an integral role in the policy process (Skidmore, 
2012; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Spanier & Nogee, 2013). Congressional authority 
within foreign policy is exercised in numerous ways. The Senate must confirm 
Presidential nominees for high executive branch positions, and once confirmed, routinely 
summon these senior leaders to testify before them on their efforts and activities 
(Auerswald & Maltzman, 2003; Gvosdev, 2017; Halperin & Clapp, 2007).  
The power of the purse manifests itself through Congressional members, 
particularly in the appropriations committees, and their committee staff, who require 
significant reporting on program allocation and implementation (Hersman, 2010; 
McCormick, 2012; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Since the budget is authorized and 
appropriated on an annual basis, members of Congress and their committee staff are 
continuously engaged with department and agency personnel in monitoring 
appropriations allocated in the past, discussing implementation in the present, and 
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planning for increases or reductions in the future (Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; Smith, 
Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). For personnel in the State Department and USAID, it is the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, and House Appropriations Committee, that exert the most influence 
on foreign policy and foreign developmental aid (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Kraft & 
Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012). For those in the Defense Department policy 
organizations, it is the Senate armed services committee, House armed services 
committee, and the respective Defense appropriation committees, that demand significant 
detail into military planning, activities, and operations (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; 
Kraft & Marks, 2011; McCormick, 2012). 
A significant number of the members of Congress have served multiple terms, 
many over decades, which provides them a great deal of knowledge, expertise, and 
legacy regarding the details of foreign policy (George, 2017; Mann, 2010; McCormick, 
2012). This relative longevity is also reflected in the Congressional staff and the role they 
play, particularly with the Congressional committee staff, who have both the deep 
knowledge as well as the personal and professional relationships with the U.S. 
government employees who work in the policy environment (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; 
George, 2017; Mann, 2010; McCormick, 2012). U.S. government employees who work 
developing and implementing foreign policy maintain a careful balance between the 
policy requirements of the president through the executive branch and the legislative 
oversight functions of the Congress (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; 
McCormick, 2012).  
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Think tanks. Think tanks are not-for-profit organizations staffed by subject 
matter experts and policy practitioners that focus their analysis in areas related to foreign 
affairs and security policy (George, 2017; McGann, 2007; Nicander, 2015; Weidenbaum, 
2011). This focus has direct implications to policy development regarding terrorism and 
counterterrorism (Kraft & Marks, 2011; McGann, 2007; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 
2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). Differing from lobbying or issue advocacy groups, think 
tanks are generally research based organizations that in many cases serve as a bridge 
between the academic community and policymakers (Abelson, 2006; Milner & Tingley, 
2015; Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016). By some counts there are more than 1,500 think 
tanks in the U.S., most located in and around Washington, D.C., providing independent 
analysis, advice, and exerting a significant amount of influence (McGann, 2007; 
Medvetz, 2012).  
The best known, and considered both independent and bipartisan, are the Center 
for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), the Brookings Institution, the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR), RAND Corporation, and the Center for a New American 
Security (CNAS), with others like the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI), and Cato Institute, generally described as having a more partisan 
perspective (Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; 
Weidenbaum, 2011). Many who are familiar with think tanks and their work refer to 
them as ‘non-academic researchers’ or ‘universities without students’ (Nicander, 2015; 
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). These organizations, and their 
key personnel, are well-known in the policy environment of Washington, advising 
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policymakers, providing expert testimony to Congress before committees, and leveraged 
by journalists and the media (Medvetz, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Mulgan, 2006) 
Think tanks play an important role in foreign and security policy generally, and 
counterterrorism policy specifically, for two reasons (Abelson, 2006; McGann, 2007; 
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). First is their strong reputation, which is based on the 
quality of their personnel and their products (Kraft & Marks, 2011; George, 2017; 
Nicander, 2016). Second is their networking, based on what some have identified as a 
‘revolving door’ between their organizations and the government (George, 2017; 
Nicander, 2016; Weidenbaum, 2011). In essence, think tanks in Washington serve as a 
shadow bureaucracy for foreign and security policymaking, since many of their senior 
and mid-level employees consist of former government policymakers or senior decision 
makers (Abelson, 2006; Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 
2016). This environment also provides their personnels’ unique access to existing 
government employees in the Federal departments and agencies (Abelson, 2006; 
Nicander, 2015; Nicander, 2016; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). The more partisan 
Heritage Foundation, AEI, and Cato Institute, are even recognized as temporary 
placeholders for senior leaders in the party that is ‘out of power,’ that is, whichever party 
that doesn’t hold the White House at a particular time (Abelson, 2006; George, 2017; 
Nicander, 2016). It is this revolving door, and staffing with past and potential future 
senior leaders, that requires current U.S. government policymakers to take think tanks, 
and the positions they espouse and the products they produce, very seriously (George, 
2017; Nicander, 2016).  
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Lobbyists. Policymakers within the U.S. government are also directly engaged 
and influenced by individuals and groups who seek to push personal or collective policy 
agendas (Eisenfeld, 2017; George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick, 2012). These 
types of outside influencers of policy are most commonly referred to as lobbyists, interest 
groups, or issue advocacy organizations (George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick, 
2012). There are hundreds, if not thousands, of specific interest groups within the U.S. 
that aggressively advocate for specific policy enactments (Grossmann, 2012; Milner & 
Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016).  
The principal focus of lobbying is on the Congress; however, executive branch 
departments and agencies are also regularly engaged by lobbying organizations regarding 
policy issues (George, 2017; Grossmann, 2012; McCormick, 2012). Lobbying is 
regulated, with groups declared and officially registered (Grossmann, 2012; Milner & 
Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). In the foreign affairs and security 
domain, lobbying groups advocate for items across a wide spectrum of topics and issues, 
for example developmental assistance, humanitarian aid, foreign relations and positions 
for (and against) specific nations, security assistance, military education, human rights, 
rule of law, war crimes, etc. (Gabaccia, 2017; George, 2017; Gilens & Page, 2014; 
Newhouse, 2009; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016; Tidwell, 2017). In the area of foreign 
and defense policy, lobbyists can also represent foreign interests, both of governments as 
well as non-governmental organizations, and some foreign governments use lobbyists to 
great effect (Newhouse, 2009; Tidwell, 2017).  
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The power of lobbyists or issue advocacy groups to influence policy is in their 
collective membership as well as their ability to generate visibility and awareness, 
mobilize support or opposition, and build consensus across political coalitions (Gilens & 
Page, 2014; Grossmann, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 
2016). Influence on executive branch policymakers can also be brought to bear indirectly, 
as when lobbyists energize an elected member of Congress on an issue (or problem) 
within a specific program in a particular Federal department or agency (Eisenfeld, 2017; 
George, 2017; Milner & Tingley, 2015). The nature of the political systems and processes 
in the U.S. make influence efforts by lobbyists, interest groups, and issue advocacy 
organizations very effective, including in foreign and security policy (Eisenfeld, 2017; 
Gilens & Page, 2014; Shakoori, Kiani, & Heidarpour, 2016).  
Media. The final key influence entity discussed is the media. This is a broad 
category, given the proliferation of information sources available via the Internet, and the 
term ‘the Media’ can mean a host of organizations existing across a wide array of 
products and platforms (Cohen, 2015; George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick, 2012). 
Examples specifically dedicated to professional journalism include traditional entities 
such as newspapers, magazines, and broadcast organizations, both television and radio 
(McCormick, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). Many of 
these also have an online presence on the Internet (Milner & Tingley, 2015; Smith, 
Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). The traditional function of ‘the press’ has been to observe, 
investigate, and report to the public on the functions and activities of government (Felle, 
2016; Graber & Dunaway, 2017). In this capacity, serving a non-governmental check and 
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balance function, the press is referred to by some as the ‘fourth estate’ (Felle, 2016; 
George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017).  
In the emerging age of ‘fake news,’ and charges of bias in journalism, it can be 
increasingly difficult to know which are reputable, objectives sources and which are not 
(Entman, 2007; Felle, 2016; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2016; Meijer & Bijleveld, 2016; Meijer & 
Bijleveld, 2016; Weaver & Willnat, 2016). The 24-hour news cycle, with its need to fill 
time and generate revenue, has to many blurred the lines between the profession of 
journalism from those who provide subject matter knowledge or commentary on one 
hand, and those who state opinions or provide witty (or witless) entertainment on the 
other (Cohen, 2015; Meijer & Bijleveld, 2016; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Robinson, 2001; 
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). For issues related to government and politics, 
specifically regarding foreign affairs and security policy, the media entities generally 
recognized as objective, credible, and reliable, known for following the principals of 
professional journalism, exist across the platforms of print, television, and radio, all of 
which also maintain a presence online on the Internet (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Eisenfeld, 
2017; Hersman, 2010; Milner & Tingley, 2015).  
Media entities not only report on the making of policy, but also have a significant 
impact in influencing policy (Cohen, 2015; George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick, 
2012; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004). While the functions of policy development, 
particularly related to foreign affairs and security, are conducted outside of direct public 
view, journalists have significant access to policy stakeholders, from which they are able 
to obtain ‘inside information’ regarding issues, debates, and conflicts (Gadarian, 2010; 
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George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; McCormick, 2012; Robinson, 2001). As such, the media 
serves as a parallel process to the official policy mechanism for which policymakers can 
indirectly influence decisions, ‘leaking’ information to enhance certain positions or bring 
pressure to bear to achieve particular decisions (Cohen, 2015; McCormick, 2012; Milner 
& Tingley, 2015; Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016).  
U.S. government employees who work in foreign affairs and security policy are 
very attuned to media journalist’s awareness of and reporting on topics of interest to their 
political leadership (George, 2017; Hersman, 2010; Mann, 2010; McCormick, 2012). 
Statements by senior political decision makers on policy issues that are reported in the 
media are watched closely by U.S. government employees, as are the reactions to these 
pronouncements by other political actors (George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017; 
Smith, Dunne, & Hadfield, 2016). In addition, ‘breaking news’ items are also monitored 
closely, as these emergent issues can result in immediate shifts of focus or priority by 
senior political policymakers (George, 2017; Graber & Dunaway, 2017; Smith, Dunne, & 
Hadfield, 2016).  
Counterterrorism Policy Implementation 
Counterterrorism policy within the ‘3-D’ construct, spanning diplomacy, 
development, and defense initiatives, is implemented through specific programs and 
activities (George, 2017; Keane & Diesen, 2015; Kraft & Marks, 2011). Diplomacy 
programs and activities related to counterterrorism are those implemented by the State 
Department (George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. 
Department of State, n.d.c.). Examples of these span a broad range of efforts, including 
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antiterrorism assistance programs, initiatives to counter violent extremism, countering 
terrorism finance, sponsoring international security awareness events and regional 
strategic initiatives, terrorist screening and interdiction programs, and specific regionally-
based counterterrorism partnerships (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department 
of State, n.d.c.). State Department counterterrorism programs are designed to strengthen 
bilateral and regional partnerships, support civilian capacities for governance, improve 
law enforcement and judicial capabilities, and enhance information sharing to counter 
terrorist threats (Bernard, 2016; Byman, 2015; Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; U.S. 
Department of State, n.d.b.).  
Numerous development programs and activities implemented by USAID also 
support counterterrorism policy (George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; USAID, n.d.; 
USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). These USAID initiatives fall 
under the category of working in crises and conflict (USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011). 
Programs related to this category include political transition initiatives, peacebuilding and 
reconciliation, providing safe and secure environments, and community resilience, 
provide foundational support through prevention in areas that are at risk for terrorism 
(Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011). For areas of instability and 
conflict, there are programs related to conflict mitigation and prevention, recovering from 
crisis, and atrocity prevention, that seek to address the challenges in areas where conflicts 
are ongoing (Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, n.d.; USAID, 2011).  
There is a special category of USAID development efforts that are specifically 
related to countering violent extremism, which are divided into two areas (USAID, 2011; 
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U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). The first seeks to counter what are called 
‘push’ factors, such as social marginalization, ungoverned areas, government repression, 
human rights violations, corruption, and threat perceptions based on ethnic or cultural 
issues (Kraft & Marks, 2011; USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). 
The second area addresses ‘pull’ factors that influence individual radicalization and 
recruitment, such as social status, respect from peers, sense of belonging or commitment, 
personal empowerment, and achieving success and fulfilment (Kraft & Marks, 2011; 
USAID, 2011; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). Some of these initiatives have 
been controversial within the development community, both inside and outside of 
government, where some resist what they view is an attempt to ‘securitize development’ 
(Bernard, 2016; Jordan, Kosal, & Rubin, 2016; USAID, 2011).  
The Defense Department also conducts a robust range of programs and activities 
that support achievement of U.S. counterterrorism policy objectives (Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency [DSCA], n.d.; George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; McNerney, 
2016). Foreign military sales, including with financing arrangements for resource-
challenged nations, and the transfer of excess military equipment from U.S. stockpiles are 
provided for partner countries that face urgent or other capability gaps in their operations 
against terrorist or insurgent groups (DSCA, n.d.; George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; 
McNerney, 2016). A wide range of military-to-military training activities, including 
advising and assisting in partner nation counterterrorism operations, are also conducted 
by U.S. military personnel that support partner nation militaries in tactical proficiency 
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and operational capacity building (Carr, 2016; DSCA, n.d.; Frazier & Hutto, 2017; 
George, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2011; Reveron, 2016).  
Defense Department security cooperation projects focus on U.S. partner nations, 
primarily those that need to implement responsible civilian control of military and 
security forces, building up the institutions necessary to provide essential services to their 
own civilian populations (DSCA, n.d.; Kraft & Marks, 2011; Omelicheva, Carter, & 
Campbell, 2017; Reveron, 2016). Finally, the Defense Department also hosts mid-to-
senior level military officers from allied and partner nations in numerous military 
education programs within the United States, such as that provided through the National 
Defense University, regional centers, and service war colleges (DSCA, n.d.; Kraft & 
Marks, 2011; Omelicheva, Carter, & Campbell, 2017; Reveron, 2016). These courses, 
many ending with academic degrees or professional certifications, provide for leadership 
development, strategic thinking, and operational planning, which all contribute to 
collective security and enhance U.S. military partnerships worldwide (Kraft & Marks, 
2011; McNerney, 2016; Reveron, 2016).  
Theoretical Foundations Regarding the Causes of Terrorism 
Since the goal of this study was to understand individual policymakers 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism, it was necessary to have a baseline for which to 
describe what they may view as the prime motivators of terrorism. To this end, six 
primary theories related to what causes terrorism provided a sound research framework 
(Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & Heath-Kelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016). 
These theories address terrorism as being caused by religious ideology (Berman, 2004; 
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Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014), root causes (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006), 
State sponsorship (Arendt, 1953; Byman, 2007; Sterling, 1981), failed states (Crocker; 
2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004); rational choice (Crenshaw, 2003; 
Hoffman, 2011; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011), and group dynamics (Berrebi, 2009; 
Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007). The underlying academic elements and key research 
findings of each of these theories are summarized in this section.  
It is of note that while many of these theories share common characteristics, they 
are also unique in the assumptions made, approaches used, and conclusions drawn 
(Akhtar, 2017; Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Breen-Smyth, 2011; Martin, 2017). Research 
into the causes of terrorism is relatively recent, beginning in the 1970s following the end 
of colonialism and creation of new independent states in the post-World War II period, 
some of which involved violent political insurgencies (Hain & Pisoiu, 2017; Martin, 
2017; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). Prior to this, the research into the use of violence 
against civilians, whether political or military, was studied within the context of 
traditional warfare (Hain & Pisoiu, 2017; Martin, 2017; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). 
There remain some in the academic community who believe that modern research into 
the causes of terrorism is skewed to an overly Western perspective (Jackson, Toros, 
Jarvis, & Heath-Kelly, 2017; Jarvis & Lister, 2014; Silke & Schnidt-Petersen, 2017). 
Others are concerned that modern research into the causes of terrorism is overly 
‘positivist,’ attempting to only establish causal relationships between phenomena, such as 
violence and grievance, but missing broader and deeper critical academic opportunities 
for knowledge (Akhtar, 2017; Hain & Pisoiu, 2017).  
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This study made no academic assessment or research judgement regarding the 
soundness of specific theories on causes of terrorism (Jackson, Toros, Jarvis, & Heath-
Kelly, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016). I sought to leverage existing research 
from which to qualitatively view individual perceptions to understanding the views of 
current U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Breen-
Smyth, 2011; Martin, 2017; Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Silke & Schnidt-
Petersen, 2017). Regardless of how these numerous theories on the causes of terrorism 
are viewed in the academic community, they are relevant, since they are routinely 
identified or alluded to in official government policy documents that address terrorism 
(NCTC, 2017; ODNI, n.d.; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department of State, 
n.d.c.; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).  
Religious Ideology 
Huntington (1996) is considered by many the chief among modern political 
theorists who consider that ideology, specifically driven by culture, race, language, and 
religion, is the prime motivator for the use of violence against civilians as a means to 
achieve political ends. Others who have promoted this theory as a cause of terrorism 
include Berman (2004), Frum and Perle (2003), and Owen (2014). Ideology is defined as 
“a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or 
political theory,” and “the set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual” 
(Ideology, 2018, para. 1). Those who view religious ideology as a primary cause of 
terrorism also see religion as a central defining characteristic of culture and therefore of 
civilizations, and view clashes due to conflicting ideologies as the greatest threat to world 
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peace (Berman, 2004; Frum & Perle, 2003; Huntington, 1996; Owen, 2014). They stress 
that religious ideological factors create both global security challenges and an existential 
threat to the Westphalian state system (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; Carson & Suppenbach, 
2018).  
This theory usually presents ‘political Islam,’ termed Islamism by proponents of 
this theoretical approach, as a religious ideology that underline political approaches, 
systems, and structures, comparable by some to the totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and 
communism (Berman, 2004; Owen, 2014). Advocates of this theory often point to 
statements by notable terrorist such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu 
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leaders within al Qaeda and the Islamic 
State, respectively, to support their theoretical position (Ibrahim, 2007; Rubin, 2014; U.S. 
Department of State, 2004). Each of these terrorists routinely and consistently use the 
language of religion (in this case, Islam) as the principal justification of their violence, 
especially as it relates to the use of violence against civilian targets (Ibrahim, 2007; 
Rubin, 2014; U.S. Department of State, 2004). The perspective regarding religious 
ideology as a cause of terrorism is also reflected in statements by President’s Bush, 
Obama, and Trump, and therefore has influenced U.S. counterterrorism policy (Goldberg, 
2016; Johnson, 2002; Johnson & Hauslohner, 2017).  
Qualitative studies demonstrate links between religious ideology and terror attack 
lethality (Carson & Suppenbach, 2018). Qualitative research findings also indicate both 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors with religious ideology overtones, where radical Islamists are 
‘pushed’ towards violence due to a backlash against the impacts of globalization and 
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‘pulled’ towards religious radicalization through global media availability, the purpose of 
a pure cause and lure of martyrdom, and influences of Madrassas (i.e., Islamic religious 
schools) (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; Buzdar, Tariq, & Ali, 2018; Carson & Suppenbach, 
2018). The role of religion in radicalization can also be strengthened within cultures as 
well as across cultures, given that Islam is not a unitary belief structure but consists of 
numerous sects and splinter elements, notably that between the Salafi, Shi’a, and Sufi 
traditions, evidenced in recent times by the split between al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
(Cohen et al., 2018). Research further indicates radicalization can be a key component of 
conflict where radical leaders compete to obtain adherents and followers, whether locally 
via direct engagement or globally via the Internet; however, most studies show that 
individuals are still mostly influenced by personal, face-to-face interactions on the path to 
radicalization (Isaacs, 2017; Jiries, 2016)  
Research results from quantitative methods also support the theory regarding 
religious ideology being a primary cause of terrorism (Barron & Maye, 2017; Cherney & 
Murphy, 2017; Neo et al., 2017). A multitude of research that analyzes population 
surveys spanning numerous regions (e.g., the U.S., Europe, North Africa, the Middle 
East, even Australia and Southeast Asia) demonstrate causal linkages between aspects of 
religious belief among Muslims and their support for, or even participation in, violence to 
achieve specific objectives (Barron & Maye, 2017; Burstein, 2018; Cherney & Murphy, 
2017). Additionally, some research findings conclude that the presence of religious 
ideology espoused by attackers correlates with more deadly attack tactics and patterns 
(Burstein, 2018). This is particularly the case for those who indicate a strong belief in the 
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concept of jihad (as ‘holy war’) (Barron & Maye, 2017; Cherney & Murphy, 2017). 
Quantitative studies also demonstrate results that indicate measurable impacts from the 
portrayal in the media of discrimination against Muslims and the propensity of 
radicalized Muslims to use violence and terrorism in support of a perceived cause or to 
even exact revenge (Saiya, 2017; Schbley, 2004; Neo et al., 2017).  
There are studies, however, that demonstrate using the language of ‘religious 
ideology’ in describing terrorism is unhelpful (Francis, 2016; Gunning & Jackson, 2011). 
This research indicates perceived differences between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ acts of 
violence against civilians is over-simplistic or even misleading (Gunning & Jackson, 
2011; Sing, 2016). The underlying factors used in research design is critical, and 
opponents of the ‘religious ideology’ theory as a cause of terrorism stress that some key 
assumptions about the motives, causes, and behavior of groups are in many cases 
unsupported (Francis, 2016; Gunning & Jackson, 2011). This opposing research indicates 
making connections between Islam and violence only contributes to ‘Islamophobia,’ 
undermining a fuller understanding on root causes of political violence, and even 
building the growth of intolerant attitudes against Muslims (Pop, 2016; Sing, 2016). 
Some research even indicates possible links between government efforts to 
delegitimizing certain actors while attempting to justify contentious counterterrorist 
practices (Gunning & Jackson, 2011).  
Application of this theory in U.S. counterterrorism policy is evidenced 
predominately in military responses through combat operations as well as programs 
related to countering violent extremism (Kraft & Marks, 2011; McIntosh, 2015; 
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Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Tan, 2009). These responses have three primary 
objectives, which is to degrade and destroy Islamist armed groups, deter potential future 
attacks by demonstrating strength and resolve, and undermine the ideological justification 
that underpins Islamist religious justification for violence (Kraft & Marks, 2011; 
Schroden, Rosenau, & Warner, 2016; Tan, 2009). Significant U.S. military operations 
against al Qaeda and Islamic State forces and operatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, 
have been underway for over 17 years (Cronin, 2015; McIntosh, 2015). These operations 
are also augmented by periodic drone strikes in other locations, such as in North Africa, 
Somalia, and Yemen (Jordan, 2009; McCrisken, 2013). Counter narrative campaigns, 
embedded in broader U.S. countering violent extremism programs, are also focused on 
undermining Islamist religious messaging that justifies violence (Aly, 2013; Holtmann, 
2013; U.S. State Department & USAID, 2016). These efforts remain controversial, as 
many who don’t subscribe to the role of religious ideology in terrorist motivation still 
question the coherence and effectiveness of counter narrative efforts (Betz, 2008; 
Prentice, 2012; Quiggin, 2009).  
Root Causes 
The root causes theory as it relates to the motivations of terrorism stresses key 
underlying factors, mostly related to economic, educational, demographic, and political 
issues, as the fundamental reasons individuals move to the use of violence to achieve 
political objectives (Betts, 2002; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). Much of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this approach is based on research into the economics of violence and 
conflict that preceded the attacks of 9/11 (Abadie, 2006; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & 
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Swagel, 1996; Becker, 1983; Hirshleifer, 1991). As such, this approach makes linkages 
between poverty, political instability, and the use of violence (Abadie, 2006; Alesina et 
al., 1996). Some research indicated poor economic conditions in a country increase the 
probability of political coups or serve as reliable predictions for the outbreak of civil wars 
(Alesina et al., 1996; Collier & Hoeffer, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004). 
This theory also highlights the role of poverty in explaining how violence and terrorism 
would be exasperated when combined with the presence of rampant disease, corruption, 
and competition for reducing resources necessary for a minimal level of personal 
sustainment (Feldman, 2009; Miguel et al., 2004).  
A broad lack of education among a population has also been researched as 
another key economic factor to explain a root cause of terrorism (Feldman, 2009; 
Newman, 2006). Studies suggest that there are potential linkages, at least at the individual 
level, of a lower standard of living and low education both being present in those who 
participate in terrorist attacks (Khan & Azam, 2008; Newman, 2006). Other research 
focuses on other potential causal factors, such as discrimination and political grievance, 
arbitrary actions and physical abuse by security services, and lack of opportunities for 
betterment or advancement (Betts, 2002; Feldman, 2009; Krueger & Malecˇkova´, 2003). 
The root cause of terrorism perspective can be seen in U.S. counterterrorism policy, even 
that articulated relatively recently, particularly related to programs designed to counter 
violent extremism (U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). “In many environments 
where the risk of violent extremism is high, development has failed to take root, gover-
50 
 
nance is weak, access to education and training is limited, economic opportunities are 
few, and unemployment is high” (U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016, p. 4).  
A review of recent academic literature demonstrates qualitative research that build 
on the root causes perspective that terrorist violence is an economic phenomenon 
(Ayegba, 2015; Chauhan & Foster, 2014; Intriligator, 2010). Studies regarding 
populations for regions in both Africa and the Middle East highlight connections between 
poverty, unemployment, age, and violence of a terrorist nature (Ayegba, 2015; Caruso & 
Gavrilova, 2012; Chauhan & Foster, 2014). Research results suggest that there are also 
positive indications within the root causes framework that these types of economic 
factors can be exasperated by a young population demographic, particularly young men, 
as well as the presence of repression and brutality by state security forces (Caruso & 
Gavrilova, 2012; Intriligator, 2010; Jarvis & Lister, 2016). The impact of education upon 
populations is another contributing root cause that has also been studied, in the context of 
how it contributes to social differences, social fractures, and political violence (Jarvis & 
Lister, 2016). When economic differences manifest itself as a real or perceived 
discrimination of an ethnic minority, this also has been shown through qualitative 
analysis to be a valid predictor of domestic violence, including terrorism (Ayegba, 2015; 
Piazza, 2011). More research through qualitative methods into broader socio-economic 
and contributing factors as root causes for terrorism is clearly warranted in the academic 
community (Caruso & Gavrilova, 2012; Chauhan & Foster, 2014).  
Root cause theory regarding terrorism has also been studied through quantitative 
methods (Campos & Gassebner, 2013; Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Qvortrup & Lijphart; 
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2013; Shahbaz, 2013). Research indicates that explanations on the use of terrorism where 
economics is a contributing root cause has consistency (Bird, Blomberg, & Hess, 2008; 
Qvortrup & Lijphart; 2013). In Europe, there are quantitative results demonstrating that 
terrorists come from relatively poor background (or are first- or second-generation 
immigrants from poor countries), who become disenchanted and angry in their new home 
(Bird, Blomberg, & Hess, 2008; Qvortrup & Lijphart; 2013). Economic factors have also 
been highlighted as a quantitatively determined contributor to terrorism in Pakistan, 
which like its neighbor Afghanistan, suffers from a steady stream of terrorism attacks 
against civilian targets (Shahbaz, 2013). The potential role of poverty as a causal factor 
for terrorism has also been studied in the Israeli-Palestinian context, even as it relates to 
motivational differences between male and female terrorist attackers (Jacques & Taylor, 
2013). Within the U.S. domestic context, studies have indicated less linkages between 
poverty or economic factors and terrorist attacks (Piazza, 2017). However, the root 
causes theory for terrorism is not without its critics in the academic community (Djankov 
& Reynal-Querol, 2010; Mintz & Brule, 2009). Some find the linkage between poverty 
and terrorism spurious, based on faulty assumptions and biased perspectives (Djankov & 
Reynal-Querol, 2010). Others question the research findings, stressing that the evidence 
is weak since it may be more inferentially based and not grounded on a solid data 
foundation (Mintz & Brule, 2009).  
Regardless of its academic critics, however, the root cause of terrorism theory, 
particularly in the context of poverty and despair as a driver of terrorism, was prevalent in 
statements made by senior leadership within both the Bush and Obama administrations 
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(Acosta, 2015; Aldrich, 2014; Bush, 2002a; Powell, 2009; Sterman, 2015). In a 
Washington summit on countering extremism, President Obama called on governments 
to “address the grievances that terrorists exploit, both political and economic” (Acosta, 
2015, para. 2). Obama’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, routinely used similar language 
about fighting violent extremism by countering poverty.  “The fight against violent 
extremism will continue for decades unless the root causes of despair and hopelessness 
are addressed” (Morello, 2015, para. 1). “We have a huge common interest in dealing 
with this issue of poverty, which in many cases is the root cause of terrorism” (Sterman, 
2015, para. 2). In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush 
told a gathering of economic leaders at a United Nations summit, “we fight against 
poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush, 2002a, para. 3). The use of 
developmental assistance programs to counter terrorism was also articulated by Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, who often spoke of development as a core national security issue, 
drawing direct links between terrorism and poverty (Powell, 2009). While the language 
of root cause theory is absent from how President Trump speaks about terrorism, its 
legacy remains in numerous aspects of developmental assistance programs and activities 
in the State Department and USAID under the auspices of the countering violent 
extremism framework (Aldrich, 2014; U.S. Department of State, n.d.b.; U.S. Department 
of State, n.d.c.; U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).  
State Sponsorship 
Traditional or orthodox political perspectives on the cause of terrorism, directly 
linking political violence by rebels, insurgents, or terrorists, to state sponsorship are 
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provided by Arendt (1953), Richardson (1998, 1999), Sterling (1981), and more recently, 
Byman (2007). In this theory, nation-states provide the backing, funding, guidance, and 
motivation to terrorist groups and individuals, which are then encouraged or utilized to 
target opposing states or groups in order to indirectly influence political decisions and 
achieve political ends (Arendt, 1953; Byman, 2007; Richardson, 1998 & 1999; Sterling, 
1981). Coming out of World War II, many academics and political theorists in the West 
viewed the totalitarian communist regime in the Soviet Union as the principal sponsor of 
guerrilla and insurgent movements across the world, working to undermine and 
destabilize democratic countries friendly with the West (Arendt, 1953; Sterling, 1981). It 
was no secret that the foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union and its communist client 
states, such as Cuba, were openly directed towards world domination (Arendt, 1953; 
Sterling, 1981). The view of the Soviet Union as a destabilizing actor against democracy 
was a prevailing image up to and through the 1980s, clearly evident in both academic 
studies as well as in political rhetoric, such as President Reagan’s repeated references to 
the Soviet Union as an  ‘evil empire’ (Busch, 1997; Byman, 2007; Goodnight, 1986; 
Richardson, 1999).  
Over time, other nations were identified as state sponsors of terrorism, principal 
among these including Iran, Libya, the Palestinians, and Syria (Byman, 2007; 
Richardson, 1999; Sterling, 1981). In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1989, and the coincident end of the Cold War, a further evolution occurred (Hoyt, 2000; 
Richardson, 1998). Evolving through the 1990s, Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea were 
recognized as also becoming main sponsors of terrorists and their attacks, in what some 
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referred to as a transition from the communist ‘Reds’ to the up and coming ‘Rogue’ states 
(Hoyt, 2000; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007. By the late 1990s there were seven states identified 
by the U.S. government as official state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Richardson, 1998).  
State sponsorship as a key cause of terrorism is evident in the political rhetoric of 
the last several administrations (Haass, 2013; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007; Shear & Sanger, 
2017). One of the key political justifications for the U.S. attack against Afghanistan 
following 9/11 was over its refusal to apprehend and turn over al-Qaeda fighters, 
allowing official safe haven to al-Qaeda to operate from its territory in the execution of 
their terrorist planning, training, and launching of global attacks (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007). 
In addition, being a state sponsor of terrorism was also one of the political justifications 
used by the Bush administration for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Haass, 2013; Krebs & 
Lobasz, 2007). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East and 
North Africa in 2011, President Obama designated Syria under the Bashir Assad regime 
as a ‘state sponsor of terror’ of groups conducting attacks in the region and used this in 
2012, as well as Assad’s brutal crackdown against his own population, to initiate 
economic sanctions (Haass, 2013). Most recently, the Trump administration designated 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terror in late 2017, using this and other coercive efforts 
to punish North Korea for its continued development of nuclear weapons and aggressive 
testing of ballistic missile upon which to deliver them (Shear & Sanger, 2017). There 
remain four countries that are officially identified by the U.S. government as ‘state 
sponsors of terrorism,’ which are Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (Shear & Sanger, 
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2017; U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.). Being so designated means that each are 
sanctioned from receiving any U.S. foreign assistance, no defense exports or sales, and 
severe financial and economic restrictions (U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.).  
There are a multitude of qualitative research studies that address why states seek 
to sponsor terrorist groups (Bapat, 2011; Berkowitz, 2017; Cunningham, 2010; Regan, 
2002; Salehyan, 2010). Research indicates that states use terrorist groups, usually on a 
covert basis (but not always), to apply coercion on other states in areas where cooperation 
or diplomacy fails to achieve political objectives (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 
2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat, 2011). States are more likely to employ terrorist proxies 
against their enemies when they assess the strategic benefits outweigh the potential risks 
of exposure or retaliation (Berkowitz, 2017; Cunningham, 2010; Regan, 2002; Salehyan, 
2010). Some qualitative studies indicate that the states that are most likely to sponsor 
terrorists groups against their enemies are those that are moderately weak or those that 
are major powers (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat, 2011; 
Berkowitz, 2017). Terrorist groups also actively seek state sponsors as well, for 
numerous reasons, not least being to obtain financial resources (Bapat & Bond, 2012; 
Freeman, 2011; Regan, 2002; Salehyan, 2010). Terrorist groups can also obtain 
intelligence and weaponry from state sponsors, in many cases much more easily than they 
can obtain it through other means (Bapat & Bond, 2012; Carter, 2012). By aligning with 
a state sponsor, terrorists are able to increase their lethality and thereby their impact and 
influence (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008; Bapat, 2007; Bapat & Bond, 2012; 
Freeman, 2011). Some research findings demonstrate that the more vulnerable the 
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terrorist group, the higher the probability it will seek to align itself with a state sponsor 
(Bapat & Bond, 2012; Carter, 2012). State sponsorship can also have its drawbacks, 
however, in loss of some autonomy (Carter, 2012). It can even seriously backfire, and 
data from some research demonstrates cases where a state sponsor may be pressured by a 
stronger state to betray individual terrorists, their plots, or even enable broader retaliatory 
action (Carter, 2012).  
Research into specific states that sponsor terrorism is also plentiful. Data shows 
that terrorist groups from certain countries have a higher likelihood to attack American 
targets or citizens (Carter, 2012; Neumayer & Plümper, 2011). This appears to be due to 
numerous factors, including in countries that receive significant U.S. military aid, or 
places where there are U.S. military personnel stationed or operating (Neumayer & 
Plümper, 2011). There is also plentiful research into specific states that sponsor terrorist 
groups (Byman, 2007). Libya’s role as a state sponsor of terror in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the factors that were leveraged to advance its political and economic interests, 
provides a good example (Ani & Uzodike, 2015). Another example of a long-term state 
sponsor of terrorism is Iran, which remains a designated state sponsor of terrorist by the 
U.S. government (Byman, 2008; U.S. Department of State, n.d.d.; Wigginton et al., 
2015). Iran has used its al-Qods Force to support, fund, and train terrorist groups across 
the Middle East (Wigginton et al., 2015). However, research indicates that over time Iran 
has become more cautious and circumspect in its overt support to terrorist organizations, 
with data showing this may be due to an evolving attempt to avoid United Nations 
condemnation and appear more normalized in the international environment (Byman, 
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2008; Wigginton et al., 2015). While not officially sanctioned by the U.S., both Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia appear as nations that research has demonstrated are examples of 
apparent U.S. allies that also support terrorist groups to achieve political interests, 
sometimes even against the U.S. (Byman, 2008; Riedel, 2008).  
Quantitative studies into state sponsorship of terrorism also highlights several key 
research results. Research findings conclude that rivalries between medium or weak 
states in close proximity is a reliable predictor for states that sponsor terrorism (Findley, 
Piazza, & Young, 2012; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011). Findings also 
indicate that the willingness of terrorist groups to accept support from a state sponsor is 
more likely in countries that suffer from existing internal discord, have ongoing and open 
conflicts underway, or where the local government receives significant security or 
military support from a foreign power (Morgan, Bapat, & Krustev, 2009; Salehyan et al., 
2011). Quantitative research also indicates economic ramifications for states that are 
sanctioned as state sponsors of terrorism (Breuer, Felde, & Steininger, 2017; Byman, 
2007; Morgan et al., 2009). Findings indicate that the stock prices for companies that 
withdraw business from countries declared ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ rise, however, 
there is also evidence that some businesses that remain in these countries over a longer-
term period may also benefit from positive stock results (Breuer et al., 2017). Some 
researchers disagree that overt state sponsorship remains a viable tool, due mostly to the 
negative international reaction for it being a means to achieve political objectives, 
combined with the apparent growing lack of state control over the groups they do sponsor 
(Hamilt & Gray, 2012; O’Sullivan, 2010).  
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Evidence of the impact of the theory of state sponsorship of terrorist on U.S. 
policy exists beyond statements and rhetoric of senior U.S. political leaders (Haass, 2013; 
Krebs & Lobasz, 2007; Shear & Sanger, 2017). With the end of the Cold War and U.S. 
dominance in the international environment, sanctions became a clear tool used by U.S. 
policymakers to coerce ‘problem’ states, particularly those identified as state sponsors of 
terrorism (Eckert, 2008; O’Sullivan, 2010; Tucker, 1998). In many cases, the use of 
economic sanctions is the way for political leaders to appear tough without having to 
cross into more coercive methods, such as military action (Maller, 2010). Economic 
sanctions against states identified by the U.S. State Department as ‘state sponsors of 
terrorism’ is evident in current policy towards the four countries currently on this list: 
Syria (since 1979), Iran (since 1984), Sudan (since 1993), and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea, since 2017) (U.S. Department of State, 
n.d.d.).  
Failed States 
Research regarding failed states as a theory for explaining the cause of terrorism 
is provided by Crocker (2003), Hamre and Sullivan (2002), Rotberg (2002), and Takeyh 
and Gvosdev (2002). Foundations for this perspective can be found in the concept of the 
‘quasi-state’ as outlined by Jackson (1990). He studied the creation of Third World 
nations post World War II, where in many cases in post-colonial regions (e.g., Africa, the 
Middle East) weak states were established and fostered by the broader international 
community in spite of whether they were or were not ready for independence or self-
governance (Jackson, 1990). These ‘quasi-states’ as he called them were areas of 
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‘negative sovereignty,’ or places that had the trappings of a nation but lacked the basic 
elements necessary for true governance or control (Jackson, 1990). Dorff (1996) 
continued this theme regarding ‘weak states,’ arguing that the inability of a state to 
control violence, specifically terrorism, would lead to the use of more violence, in 
addition to other problems such as gross violations of human rights. Fukuyama (2004) is 
a well-known and more recent proponent within the field of international relations that 
expanded on this theory (i.e., quasi- or weak-states as ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’) for 
explaining terrorist violence.  
In general, this theory posits that a lack of effective governance, in many cases 
combined with multi-ethnic tensions or conflict and a repressive security regime, fosters 
the development, use, and export of terrorist violence by groups out of these weak states 
(Crocker; 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Rotberg, 2002). It is the weakness of state 
institutions across functions related to security, finance, health, education, and commerce, 
among others, that serves to draw terrorists (and criminal elements) to these locations 
(Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). It becomes a predictable cycle of 
violence fueled by the breakdown of civil institutions and authority (Mallaby, 2002; 
Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). Terrorists and their groups are drawn to these ‘safe havens,’ 
precisely because the lack of central authority provides them the freedom and autonomy 
to recruit, organize, fund, train, and stage operations, without the risk of any real 
interference (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Mallaby, 2002; Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). At the 
same time, being a terrorist group located within a ‘sovereign state’ also provides a 
semblance of protection under international norms, since it is difficult for a stronger state 
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to directly interfere in another weaker state absent a justification and authorization under 
international principles and law (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). This is the real-world 
ramification of ‘negative sovereignty’ (Jackson, 1990). Proponents of the failed state 
theory as the primary cause of terrorism point to the need, therefore, of strengthening the 
institutions of weak or failing (or even failed) states in order to begin to address the ‘root 
cause’ of terrorism (Crocker, 2003; Mallaby, 2002; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Rotberg, 
2002).  
The view regarding weak or failing states and linkages to terrorism can be seen in 
statements by U.S. administration officials over the last several decades. President 
Clinton used as justification the lack of governance for his involvement in Somalia 
(Rieff, 1999). While this intervention was primarily justified as a humanitarian initiative, 
it also had a security aspect, which over time led to increased U.S. military 
counterterrorism efforts that ultimately led to the failed ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident 
while attempting to capture Faraka Aideed, a Somali warlord (Ibrahim, 2010). In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Strategy published by the George W. 
Bush administration in 2002 clearly stated that “America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Bush, 2002b, p. 1). Condoleezza Rice, 
Secretary of State in the Bush administration, also made it clear that nations that could 
not exercise appropriate sovereignty and control over their territory had ‘spillover effects’ 
on neighboring and regional states in the form of terrorism (Garfinkle, 2005). In his last 
State of the Union speech in 2016, President Obama also highlighted the threat of 
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terrorism posed by failing states, a more serious threat to American security that that 
posed by ‘evil empires’ (Patrick, 2016).  
There are distinct qualitative findings that demonstrate links between failed or 
failing states and the prevalence of terrorism (Chenoweth, 2013; George, 2016; Howard, 
2016). Failed states are viewed as a magnet for terrorism and other forms of political 
violence, with research indicating local citizens are driven to violence when chronic 
deprivation and corruption close normal pathways to success and security (George, 2016; 
Howard, 2016). Studies show that failed states experience a higher level of violence and 
terrorism that stable states (Chenoweth, 2013; George, 2016). There are country-specific 
examples and other case studies that provide qualitative evidence of the link between 
failed states and terrorism (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Patrick, 2007; Piazza, 2008). Boko 
Haram in northern Nigeria is in great part enabled by the corruption and failure of the 
Nigerian government (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). Research demonstrates that other 
weak or failing states, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, or other African nations across 
the Trans-Sahara, or failed states like Somalia, are much more likely to both host terrorist 
groups as well as suffer inordinately from these groups’ attacks (Piazza, 2008). Some 
research has even mapped the intersections between failed governance and terrorism 
(Patrick, 2007).  
Research into the factors indicating a failed state are numerous, but usually 
highlight state authority, capacity for basic services, and legitimacy (Grävingholt, Ziaja, 
& Kreibaum, 2015; Howard, 2010). Other key contributing factors include ethnic 
divisions, corruption, porous borders and migration flow, and changes due to climate or 
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environment (Howard, 2010). These factors for failure are complex, however, with 
conflicting research results apparent across the literature (Jones, 2008; Krieger & 
Meierrieks, 2011; Newman, 2007). Some findings call for increased research into broader 
foundational flaws, such as socioeconomics and political underdevelopment, and even the 
legacy impacts of post-colonial transformation (Jones, 2008; Krieger & Meierrieks, 
2011). A failed state may be a contributing reason but may not be the singular causal 
factor for terrorism some researchers imply, since terrorist attacks also occur in strong, 
stable states, including Western democracies, indicating that state failure may not be a 
sufficient explanation for the presence of, and attacks by, terrorists (Newman, 2007).  
Some findings indicate perspectives within wealthy, strong, and stable states may 
be biased and unduly influence how the link between failed states and terrorism is viewed 
(Bueger & Bethke, 2014; Chenoweth, 2013; Newman, 2007). Some research outright 
questions the validity of the claim that failed or failing states are linked to terrorism at all 
(Call, 2008; Coggins, 2015; Hehir, 2007). A study of data over ten years from 153 
countries found quantitative evidence that prevailing research studies often disregard 
broader political context (Coggins, 2015). When other violence is included, some 
research indicates limited statistical differences between strong and weak states regarding 
acts of terrorism (Hehir, 2007). Many studies demonstrate that terrorist groups can and do 
emerge from states viewed as strong, stable, advanced, and democratic, indicating the 
‘strength’ of the state doesn’t necessarily correlate with the presence of terrorist groups 
and terrorist attacks (Call, 2008; Mazarr, 2014; Newman, 2007). These researchers rather 
see undue influence of a broader, post 9/11 ‘state-building narrative’ that has biased how 
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failed states are viewed, being more supportive of strategic objectives rather than analytic 
rigor (Hehir, 2007; Mazarr, 2014).  
The challenges posed by ‘failed’ or ‘failing states,’ in the context of a theory for 
the cause of terrorism, is evident in statements by senior U.S. policymakers from both 
parties across the last several administrations. The National Security Strategy authored by 
the George W. Bush administration in 2002 highlighted the dangers of ‘weak states’ 
being ‘vulnerable to terrorist networks’ and posing “as great a danger to our national 
interests as strong states” (Bush, 2002b; Cover Letter, para. 7; see also Rice, 2003). A 
specific example of the impact of this guidance is seen in the creation (in 2004) of the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State 
Department to lead U.S. government efforts to respond effectively to address failing 
states, with a special focus on Afghanistan and Iraq (Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 
2005; Krasner & Pascual, 2005). This office has evolved over time, but still exists as the 
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations within the State Department, working to 
address the causes of violent conflict and terrorism through targeted, in-country 
development assistance programs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e.). Another specific 
example was the creation (also in 2004) of the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), established to help weak states build the elements of basic services to help avoid 
internal conflicts that have the potential of destabilizing neighbors and provide 
ungoverned territory as safe havens for terrorists (François & Sud, 2006; Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, n.d.). The MCC collaborates with poor countries, creating 
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compacts for long term development projects, often in the hundreds-of-millions of dollars 
over many years (Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d.).  
The theme regarding the potential dangers of terrorism being caused by ‘failing 
states’ was continued by the Obama administration in the 2010 National Security 
Strategy of the United States (Obama, 2010). The theory of failed states as a cause of 
terrorism is most recently reflected in the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United 
States approved by the Trump administration, which states “the United States will also 
assist fragile states to prevent threats to the U.S. homeland. Transnational threat 
organizations, such as jihadist terrorists and organized crime, often operate freely from 
fragile states and undermine sovereign governments. Failing states can destabilize entire 
regions” (Trump, 2017, p. 39).  
Rational Choice 
Crenshaw (2003), Hoffman (2011), and Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), are key 
proponents of rational choice terrorism theory, where the use of violence to achieve 
political objectives is assessed to be primarily based on a rational cost-benefit calculation, 
with violence used against civilians when other avenues for achieving political ends are 
deemed unavailable or ineffective. There are many aspects or academic perspectives 
within rational choice theory regarding terrorism that relate the terrorists criteria to items 
such as economic, political, institutional, and even demographic factors (Hoffman, 2011; 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). When assumed to be ‘rational actors,’ terrorists make 
conscious and deliberate decisions regarding objectives, targets, and timing for the use of 
violence in order to maximize the utility towards the outcomes they desire (Sandler & 
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Enders, 2004). Unfortunately, as a tactic for achieving political objectives, violence 
targeted against civilians by terrorists has been shown to be very effective (Hoffman, 
2011).  
The aspects of rational choice for the use of violence within the field of 
international relations and political science is traditionally derived from state-on-state 
theory (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2011, Jackson, 2008). The ‘rational’ factors used to 
influence the actions of states fall into numerous categories (Drezner, 2011; Pouliot, 
2016). Diplomats use demarches and other forms of official statements of protest to 
highlight problems and build diplomatic pressure (Pouliot, 2016). Sanctions are also 
leveraged to bring economic hardship and therefore coercive influence to bear to alter the 
cost-benefit calculation and influence behavior (Drezner, 2011; Roehrig, 2009; Seliktar, 
2011). Military actions are also a form of ‘coercive diplomacy’ to compel changes in 
state behavior (Jakobsen, 2011; Wilner, 2011). Examples of the use of these types of 
coercive tools in the terrorist context are numerous, at least where the U.S. has tried to 
alter other states rational cost-benefit calculus regarding the sponsorship or use of 
terrorism (Crenshaw, 2003). Examples include: U.S. military attacks in 1993 against Iraq 
following its attempt to assassinate President George H. W. Bush during his visit to 
Kuwait; severe economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Iran when its 
involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack was revealed; and the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 attack, when the Taliban refused the U.S. 
ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda fighters (Crenshaw, 2003; 
Seliktar, 2011 Seliktar, 2011; Tarzi, 2005).  
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As with nation-states, when rational decision theory is applied to terrorist groups, 
similar cost-benefit calculations can be observed (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Sandler & 
Enders, 2004). As rational actors, terrorist use violence directed at both state institutions 
as well as against civilian targets in order to maximize the political and societal impacts 
to achieve particular goals and objectives (Crenshaw, 2003; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; 
Sandler & Enders, 2004). The factors used by individual terrorists and terrorist groups 
span numerous elements, including economic, political, institutional, and even 
demographic or ethnic criteria, however, while all of these play a role, it remains difficult 
to apply single motivational models broadly to explain or predict violent acts by terrorists 
(Sandler & Enders, 2004). Rationality regarding terrorists use of violence appears 
focused, and although terrorists do move beyond narrow self-interest in some cases, the 
use of terrorist violence remains a calculated tactical act with the goal of achieving 
strategic goals (Caplan, 2006; Frey & Luechinger, 2004). This view of rationality leads 
some to conclude that counterterrorism policies that aim to reduce the potential benefits 
of the use of violence against civilians rather than attempting to increase the cost of its 
use may be more effective within the rational act theoretical frame (Frey & Luechinger, 
2004; Sprinzak, 2000; Victoroff, 2005).  
There is a range of both qualitative and quantitative research that provide insights 
into rationality as it relates to terrorism. A large body of evidence indicates that terrorists 
are rational individuals who consciously use violence against civilians to achieve 
objectives (Abrahms, 2008; Shughart & William, 2011). While terrorism can be 
considered a tactic, it has a well-recognized strategic affect (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
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Shughart & William, 2011). It has been shown that the use of terrorism by individuals is 
undeniably rational from both a ‘means-ends’ sense as well as for how it is employed 
(Abrahms, 2008; Littler, 2017; Shughart & William, 2011). Individual or collective 
terrorist groups manage tradeoffs between obtaining the resources and the amount of 
damage or death inflicted, whether from a bombing, a shooting, or running people down 
with trucks (Abrahms, 2008; Chenoweth et al., 2009; Littler, 2017). Terrorists have also 
been shown to be adept at dealing with defenses or countermeasures, finding ‘safe 
havens’ from which to arm and train, and maneuvering through or around police or 
security forces in order to reach civilian targets (Phillips, 2009; Shughart & William, 
2011).  
Rationality as a component of motivation is central if terrorists themselves and the 
death and destruction they inflict are to be deterred in any meaningful way by states 
(Crenshaw, 2003; Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2014; Miller, 2013). Deterring terrorism is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, if a baseline of the potential motivation is not well 
understood (Crenshaw, 2003; Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2014; Miller, 2013). One area 
of particular interest for understanding rationality and motivation is that of suicide 
terrorists – those individuals or groups that knowingly plan to kill themselves in the 
conduct of their terrorist attack (Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Pape, 2003; Van Um, 
2011). It is this area where researchers struggle to find analytic explanations, especially 
since research indicates that terrorist groups that employ suicide operations gain more by 
way of political concessions that those groups that don’t use it as part of attack operations 
(Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Pape, 2003).  
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Opposing views in research regarding ‘rational choice’ theory as a cause of 
terrorism typically are based on the extreme complexity of the environment, or even 
biased subjectivity by the observer, in defining what is actually ‘rational’ (Hewitt, 2003; 
Nalbandov, 2013). Some studies content that true rationality may or may not be 
determinable in the conduct of terrorist attacks, and that studies that indicate otherwise 
are inherently biased (Jackson, 2008; Nalbandov, 2013). Rationality may also be 
situational dependent or change dynamically from time to time depending on the 
influence of multiple, competing priority variables (Nalbandov, 2013). Some research 
indicates it may be psychological factors, even mental illness, that causes what is deemed 
‘irrational’ terrorist attacks (Corner & Gill, 2015; Merari, 2010). Research findings 
indicate, for example, that a high prevalence of mental health disorders exists for some 
‘lone-actor’ terrorists, which contradicts the notion that terrorist are ‘normal’ (Corner, 
Gill, & Mason, 2016; Weenik, 2015). These and other research findings contend that 
select behavioral aspects or cues regarding individual terrorists can be profiled, and 
possibly serve as predictors of impending violence (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 
2013; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Others claim these types of profiles cannot be 
usefully leveraged at the individual level, only generally across groups or organizations 
(Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014).  
In some respects, the ‘rational choice theory’ for describing the cause of terrorism 
underpins many of the theories discussed previously (Hewitt, 2003). Each of these 
theories represent different frames or potential decision criteria that influence or drive 
terrorists’ decisions, whether it be religion, poverty, lack of education or opportunity, 
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political ideology, or repression or persecution (Berman, 2004; Betts, 2002; Byman, 
2007; Crocker; 2003; Frum & Perle, 2003; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Huntington, 1996; 
Newman, 2006; Richardson, 1998 & 1999; Sterling, 1981; Tandon, 2000). Evidence of 
senior leaders and policymakers assuming various forms of ‘rational choice’ theory as a 
driver of terrorism exist across many of the policies, programs, and pronouncements 
highlighted in previous sections. Counter narrative campaigns against Islamist religious 
messaging that justifies violence assume religion is the motivating rationality (Aly, 2013; 
Holtmann, 2013). Many development, reconstruction, and stabilization programs by the 
U.S. government are allocated in the context of alleviating poverty and despair, assuming 
to influence the rational decision criteria of terrorists (Acosta, 2015; Aldrich, 2014; 
Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein, 2005; Krasner & Pascual, 2005; Sterman, 2015).  
Group Dynamics 
Kuzner (2007), Piazza (2006, 2007), and Berrebi (2009), have outlined key 
aspects of group dynamics terrorist theory, where individual perspectives, influencers, 
and motivations due to inter-group relationships and interactions underpin decisions for 
the use of violence against civilians for political ends. This approach has legacy analytic 
roots in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social 
identity theory is based on the concept that people define themselves in terms of their 
relationships to others and to social groups (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). It is membership within a social group that is a primary influence of how an 
individual views context, the value criteria that is used for assessing situations, and 
selection of available choices for final decisions (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Huddy, 
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2001). Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) stated that people need to belong, judge their 
group in contrast with other groups, which serves as a reinforcing commitment to both 
the group as well as to self-identity. This group commitment and solidarity is of 
particular importance during conflict (Melucci, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The greater 
the perceived differences between the groups in the eyes of the individual, as well as how 
potential threats to the group are perceived, determines the intensity of the conflict 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Huddy, 2001; Melucci, 1995).  
Applied to terrorism, group dynamics as a motivator for violence is usually in the 
context of a reaction to a perceived threat to a group (Berrebi, 2009; Wright, 2015). In 
this sense, the use of violence is ‘justified’ to right a perceived wrong, whether for pure 
revenge, or as a means of defense, or in a broader attempt to achieve a better or stronger 
position for the group (Fischer, Haslam, & Smith, 2010; Ginges & Atran, 2009; Wright, 
2015). Group dynamics theory plays a central role to many in defining the 
‘radicalization’ process’ (Doosje et al., 2016; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Doosje et 
al. (2016) and others generally break this down into three primary steps, all of which are 
closely linked to perceived impacts to a ‘group.’ First is the sensitivity or grievance 
phase, where injustices are observed, and resentments are built up (Borum, 2011; Doosje 
et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014). Second is the membership phase, where resentment 
transitions into collective solidarity with an identified movement or organization (Doosje 
et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Silke, 2008). Finally comes the 
action phase, where resentment, combined with membership, leads to action, which can 
span efforts from simple resistance to more serious confrontations or attacks (Borum, 
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2011; Doosje et al., 2016; Klandermans, 2014). As such, group radicalization for 
whatever the cause is based on growing extremes of identity, belief, commitment, and 
behavior in support of what in the end is conflict or violence between identifiable groups 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Kuzner, 2007; Strelan & Lawani, 2010). Whatever way 
the group is quantified and defined, it serves within the group dynamic frame as the 
underlying basis for understanding and explaining terrorism, what Piazza (2006) defines 
in his ‘social cleavage theory.’  
There is a body of research that provides both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence for group dynamics being a cause of terrorism. Analysis of terrorists’ 
statements, narratives, and post-attack interviews provides keen insights into terrorists 
perceptions, motivations, and the impact of group dynamics (Altier, Horgan, & 
Thoroughgood, 2012; Bartlett & Miller, 2012). As such, the use of terrorism has been 
demonstrated to be a ‘social’ phenomenon, with individuals motivated by their status 
within a particular group, as well as how they perceive their fellow group members view 
them individually (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Simi, Bubolz, & Hardman, 2013). The sense 
of self and identity within the ‘in group’ influences behavior and decision making, with 
terrorist groups showing significantly higher motivational factors when compared to non-
terrorist groups (Gunning, 2009; Smith, 2008a; van de Linde & van der Duin, 2011). The 
group dynamic is also shown to be influenced by how individuals view themselves in the 
context of being in an ‘out group’ as well, and this view also contributes to the intensity 
of the ‘in group’ motivation (Bohorquez et al., 2009; Desmarais & Cranmer, 2013; 
Smith, 2008a). Group dynamics even play a role with what are termed ‘lone wolf’ 
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terrorists, where even self-identified communities of interest or belief absent actual group 
membership or interaction has been repeatedly shown to be a factor in the justification for 
terrorist violence (Spaaij, 2010).  
There is broad research related to understanding group dynamics theory as a 
primary cause of terrorism, and opposing research views are few (Murdoch, 2016). 
Within the psychological community there are those, however, who urge caution 
(Murdoch, 2016; O’Hara, 2007). While they will agree that there is solid research 
evidence that group dynamics play a role in radicalization and even the use of terrorist 
violence, they also point to other dynamics that influence individual behaviors (Hulme, 
2014). As demonstrated in earlier sections, there is a large body of research that provides 
evidence that other possible contributing factors, such as poverty, globalization, racism 
and discrimination, even climate change impacts, can influence how individuals view 
their situation, referred to by some as psychological literacy, being determinate for cost-
benefit criteria that drive how they make decisions (Hulme, 2014; Banyard & Hulme, 
2015). Those researchers who appear to oppose viewing group dynamics as a primary 
driver of terrorism seem less concerned with the concept of group dynamics itself than 
they are with the potential misunderstanding or bias in research that may attempt to 
oversimplify the situation or context within the terrorist’s environment (Murdoch, 2016; 
O’Hara, 2007). To these researchers, inaccurate or misguided psychological knowledge 
about an individual terrorist or larger terrorist group may be worse than a lack of 
psychological literacy, as it would bias the research results just the same (Hulme, 2014; 
Murdoch, 2016; O’Hara, 2007).  
73 
 
Evidence of senior leaders and policymakers articulating aspects of ‘group 
dynamics’ theory as a driver of terrorism exist across many of the strategies, policies, and 
programs, highlighted in previous sections. The most recent U.S. National Security 
Strategy, published by the Trump Administration in 2017, still highlights “transnational 
threat organizations” posing a serious threat to the United States, along with Russia, 
China, Iran, and North Korea (Trump, 2017, p. 39). This document acknowledges that 
America continues to wage war against jihadist terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al 
Qaeda, and that the threat from these groups will continue for the foreseeable future 
(Trump, 2017). This language continues the strategic theme articulated by the Obama 
Administration, which also highlighted the threats to the U.S. and its interests due to 
terrorists, their organizations, networks, and affiliates (Obama, 2010). The ‘Global War 
on Terror’ initiated under President George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks was focused on Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and its affiliates (Bush, 2002b). 
President Bush also put in place a policy structure to identify and counter ‘Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations’ in Executive Order (EO) 13224 (U.S. Department of State, 
n.d.f.). EO 13224 provides a means to disrupt financial support networks for terrorists by 
formally designating terrorist organizations and then blocking the assets of foreign 
individuals who are members of the designated entity (U.S. Department of State, n.d.f.). 
Under EO 13224 there are currently 65 separate groups designated as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) by the U.S. State Department, clearly indicating that groups are 
viewed by the U.S. government as playing a central role in terrorist violence (U.S. 
Department of State, n.d.g.).  
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Conceptual Constructs That Influence Perspectives on Terrorism 
This section adds a third lens, specifically a conceptual framework, to the 
literature review from which to help understand why individual policymakers may have 
particular perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism. First, individual factors related 
to policymakers’ background, education, training, or experiences may be found to 
influence their perspectives on the causes of terrorism towards a particular theory. Social 
cognitive theory (Bandura 1989, 2001, & 2011) and cultural theory (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas, 1985; Wildavsky, 1987) have both been used to describe, 
assess, and understand factors that influence how individuals view their surroundings, 
ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and make decisions. Insights from both 
these theories may help provide a conceptual construct to understand individual influence 
relative to the phenomenon of interest.  
Second, assessing individual perspectives within the context of unique 
organizational bureaucracies might also explain particular influences or biases that may 
help in understanding particular alignment of an individual policymaker’s views with a 
specific theory regarding the cause of terrorism. Specific organizational theories may 
therefore provide additional perspectives from which to view and understand the 
phenomenon. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), groupthink theory 
(Janis, 1971; Janis, 1972), and the organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison 
& Zelikow, 1999), may also be applicable as conceptual constructs for understanding 
organizational influence on policymakers views regarding the causes of terrorism. The 
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underlying academic elements of each of these theories are briefly outlined in this 
section.  
Social Cognitive Theory  
Developed by Bandura (1989, 2001), the foundational element of social cognitive 
theory is that individuals learn by observing others. Behaviors that are learned, whether 
due to self-efficacy, positive reinforcement, or placement within specific environmental 
settings, become central to an individual’s personality over time (Bandura, 1989; 
Bandura, 2001; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Self-efficacy is driven by the individual’s 
beliefs in their ability to complete the replicated task or effort successfully (Bandura, 
1989; Bandura, 2001). The attempted task is reinforced overtime when the task is 
recognized in a positive manner (Bandura, 1989; Bandura, 2001). The specific 
environmental setting of the individual provides repeated examples for correct behavior, 
a social context for positive recognition and reinforcement, and even appropriate social 
support and materials (Bandura, 1989; Bandura, 2001; Wood & Bandura, 1989). 
Learning within the social cognitive theory construct is motivated through processes such 
as the setting of goals, evaluations of progress, value judgements, social comparisons, 
and achievement of objectives (Bandura, 2011; Schunk & Usher, 2012). All of these 
structures and processes operate interactively as determinates that serve to influence, 
shape, and mold individual perspectives over time (Wood & Bandura, 1989). 
There are research results where social cognitive theory has been applied to public 
sector employees. Self-efficacy has been demonstrated to be enhanced where public 
employees are given clear goals, offered training, coached and mentored during the 
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performance of tasks, and given evaluation feedback on their progress towards achieving 
an assigned objective (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008; Rehg, Gundlach, & Grigorian, 
2012). The impacts of positive reinforcement of individual actions overtime, through 
such mechanisms as coaching, mentoring, and recognition of performance, is another 
element of social cognitive theory that has been shown to positively motivate public 
sector employees (Fernandez & Moldogaziev, 2015; Latham et al., 2008; Wright, 2004). 
The environmental settings, or organizational context and culture, can also provide strong 
motivations to the unity of effort and execution of public service (Taylor, 2014). Over 
time, these environmental or organizational structures fundamentally shape how public 
employees react to situations, building a disciplined context for influencing individuals 
within organizational practices and performance effectiveness (Salas, Rosen, & 
DiazGranados, 2010; Taylor, 2014). While this research is not directed specifically at the 
counterterrorism policy environment, the general lessons from applying social cognitive 
theory research may help provide useful insights for understanding why U.S. government 
employees working in counterterrorism policy may view terrorism and its causes in 
particular ways.  
If as according to Bandura (1989, 2001, 2011) perspectives and behaviors of 
individuals are shaped through their learning by observing others, then the analysis of 
what individual U.S. policymakers believe is the primary cause of terrorism can be 
informed by including participant questions that help put their views in context of their 
social environment. Their longevity within an organization, or their self-identification 
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within specific groups (e.g., professional, academic, political, religious, social), may 
provide useful insights for understanding the phenomenon under study.  
Cultural Theory  
First articulated by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the primary perspective that 
underlies cultural theory is that individuals use a cultural lens, or filter, from which to 
view situations. This cultural lens provides a particular ‘worldview’ that influences not 
only how situations are perceived, but also impacts decisions made in response to 
situations (Douglas, 1985; Wildavsky, 1987). Cultural perspectives are shaped over time 
through people’s socialization and daily interactions in two primary dimensions, which 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) called the ‘group’ and ‘grid’ dimensions. The ‘group’ 
dimension sets up the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ or in the in-group and out-
group, and defines the criteria for interactions, whether positive or negative, between 
various groups (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987). The 
‘grid’ dimension sets up the conditions by which individuals interact within the groups to 
which they belong, including the in-group constraints as well as freedoms for social 
behavior and interactions groups (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Wildavsky, 1987). Since culture is the primary, foundational element that defines these 
group and grid interactions, according to cultural theory there can be no individual 
perceptions absent a cultural framework (Douglas, 1985).  
Looking at individual and societal challenges through a cultural perspective is not 
new and is recognized within the research community as falling under the constructivist’s 
paradigm (Bigo, 2008). The application of the tenets of cultural theory in national 
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security policy has a classical legacy, with the writings of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and 
Clausewitz, leveraged by those teaching military strategy to demonstrate the moral and 
physical attributes necessary to success in conflict (Lantis, 2009). It is also evident in the 
‘clash of civilizations’ approach outlined by Huntington (1996). Beyond just conflict 
studies, cultural implications for broader public administration is also recognized as both 
a challenge as well as an opportunity (Bigo, 2008; Durodié, 2017; Tansey & O’riordan, 
1999; Wright, 2015). It is used in the positive sense to help build a sense of community 
(group) that can influence motivation towards achievement of collective goals (Durodié, 
2017; Tansey & O’riordan, 1999). In contrast, it can also be a negative factor, driving 
wedges between communities, particularly related to ethnicity, that can cause fear and 
distrust, which are also clearly demonstrated as powerful influencers and motivators to 
action (Tansey & O’riordan, 1999; Wright, 2015). There are academic examples of this 
cultural perspective applied in the counterterrorism policy area (Coaffee, 2006; Mythen 
& Walklate, 2006). Research shows that how terrorism is framed can have significant 
implications for how counterterrorism strategies are developed and applied, and a narrow 
cultural lens can be an overly simplistic construction when used to understand terrorism 
(Coaffee, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006). 
As with social cognitive theory, aspects of cultural theory as outlined by Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982) can be applicable to understanding why particular U.S. 
policymakers view the causes of terrorism the way that they do. Research questions that 
solicit how policymakers view culture, their own as well as others, may assist in viewing 
responses regarding terrorism in context. Cultural awareness, whether through an 
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individual’s background, exposure to other cultures besides their own, even foreign 
travel, may help provide valuable context regarding individual policymaker’s views on 
terrorism and how they might perceive the best approaches to addressing the terrorism 
challenge.  
Resource Dependency Theory  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) developed resource dependency theory, which has 
been used to define and understand the cultures and constraints of organizations 
developing and implementing policy options. With theoretical roots in power dependence 
relations by Emerson (1962), resource dependency theory is premised on the foundation 
that external resources of organizations both bound and influence their activities (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Since organizations depend on resources, they are the ultimate source 
of their structure, functions, operations, and power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Since 
rarely do organizations control every aspect of their required resources, they are 
dependent on, and interconnected with, other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Successful business executives and managers are those who understand the linkages 
between criticality and scarcity, with the critical resources being those that the 
organization must have to function (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Resource dependence theory is not just relevant to the private sector, and its 
effects on the nonprofit sector have also been studied (Carroll & Stater, 2008; Kerlin & 
Pollak, 2011; Ruggiano & Taliaferro, 2012; Sowa, 2009). Scholars argue that it is one of 
the main reasons nonprofit organizations have become more commercialized in recent 
times, with increasing competition between private and nonprofit sector, nonprofits are 
80 
 
using marketization techniques to compete for resources (Carroll & Stater, 2008; Kerlin 
& Pollak, 2011; Ruggiano & Taliaferro, 2012; Sowa, 2009). The principles of resource 
dependency theory also apply to the public sector and government organizations as well, 
where for example at the U.S. federal level, resources are authorized and appropriated by 
Congress and managed by and through various Federal departments and agencies (Kraft 
& Marks, 2011; George, 2017; Marvel & Marvel, 2008; Seidman, 1998).  
Resource dependency theory has been leveraged across a wide spectrum of 
organizational research. It has been used in assessing the effects of reorganizations on 
companies and non-profits (Kerlin & Pollak, 2011; Seidman, 1998). In addition to 
research on private and public-sector organizations, resource dependency theory has also 
been applied in the international environment as well (Brechin & Ness; Ren, Gray, & 
Kim, 2009). The impact of resource dependency on executive or employee training, 
learning, and development, in order to address particular company challenges, is also 
well researched (Akrofi, 2016; Macagno, 2013; Menon, 2012). Aspects of leadership, 
including for senior executives, board members, managers, and team leaders, has also 
been analyzed by researchers through the lens of resource dependencies (Chen, Treviño, 
& Hambrick, 2009; Terry, 2015; Vandewaerde et al., 2011; Yar Hamidi & Gabrielsson, 
2014). Beyond addressing those in leadership or management of organizations, 
understanding the decision-making factors and processes of general employees has also 
been reviewed through aspects of resource dependency theory, including on how these 
individual decisions impact broader organizational initiatives (Drees & Heugens, 2013; 
Huse, 2008; Nemati et al., 2010; Nienhüser, 2008). Finally, understanding potential 
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organizational influences on policy development has also leveraged resource dependency 
theory, addressing how government can offset or augment organizations ability to 
diversify across their resource base (Rivas, 2012; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012)  
U.S. government departments and agencies depend on resources obtained in order 
to function. The U.S. Congress serves as the resource provider to federal public 
institutions, with financial resources distributed and overseen through the annual 
authorization and appropriation process. As such, key elements of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
(1978) resource dependency theory can directly apply to U.S. government policymakers, 
and Congressional resource constraints may influence executive branch decision making, 
including in counterterrorism. Research questions that solicit individual knowledge 
regarding their own organizations counterterrorism authorities can help provide insights 
into whether individual perceptions on the cause of terrorism might be influenced by the 
authorities and tools available in the policymaker’s organizational environment.  
Groupthink Theory  
Many non-academics may recognize the term ‘groupthink’ from George Orwell’s 
(1950) classic fictional tale of the dystopian future, and it was further highlighted by 
Whyte (1952) as ‘rationalized conformity’ where the values of the group become 
inherently right and true precisely because it is the group’s position. Within the academic 
community, however, it is Janis (1971, 1972, 1982, 1989) who refined the concept and 
further developed it as groupthink theory as a lens used to define and understand 
individuals functioning within bureaucracies that limit policy development and 
evaluation of options. Janis defines groupthink as a psychological phenomenon where 
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individuals in a group setting faced with a collective challenge drive to build harmony 
and consensus, while at the same time minimizing in-group conflict and suppressing 
dissent (Janis, 1972, 1982). Individuals in the group unconsciously (or are pressured 
consciously) to avoid identifying alternative options to the group for fear of being outside 
the norm (Janis, 1972, 1982). This can result in decisions that do not consider critical 
alternatives or viewpoints, blinding the group to potential disastrous consequences (Janis, 
1972, 1982). In his original work on groupthink theory, Janis used a case study research 
approach to review several key foreign policy failures of the U.S. government, initially 
addressing the Roosevelt administration’s failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Kennedy administration’s Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 
(Janis, 1971, 1972). He subsequently analyzed the Johnson administrations policy for the 
Vietnam war from 1964-1967 and other foreign policy failures (Janis, 1982).  
Groupthink theory is well known across the organizational research community. It 
appears routinely as both a theoretical and a conceptual framework in research seeking to 
describe and understand organizational dynamics, particularly the dynamics related to 
decision making processes. Growing out of how Janis first used the groupthink 
theoretical approach, much of this research is focused on decision making in international 
relations (Kertzer & Tingley, 2018; Morin & Paquin, 2018; Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). 
However, it has also been expanded to other non-public bureaucratic organizations (Klein 
& Stern, 2009; Lunenburg, 2010). Groupthink principles have been used extensively by 
researchers to analyze and assess numerous types of organizations beyond just the public 
sector, including across a wide variety of private business entities, as well as 
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organizations as varied as education, academia, health care, construction, etc. (Hassan, 
2013; Klein & Stern, 2009; Lunenburg, 2010; Rose, 2011; Straus, Parker, & Bruce, 2011; 
Tuuli, Rowlinson, & Koh, 2010). Groupthink has helped organizational researchers 
understand dynamics due to an organization’s size, age, culture, and diversity (Atiyah, 
2016; Chung-An, 2014; Sahin, 2014). It is also of note that the particulars of groupthink 
theory are not always negative in the foreign policy environment, at least to some 
researchers (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017). Sometimes the group cohesiveness and 
concurrence-seeking tendencies that are key to groupthink tenants may also be useful for 
explaining successful foreign policy decision outcomes (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017).  
Janis (1972, 1982) described three basic factors that lead to groupthink: 
overestimation of the group and its capabilities, closed-minded rationalizing of opposing 
options or warnings, and pressures toward uniformity and the illusion of unanimity. All 
of these basic factors have unique symptoms (Janis, 1972, 1982). These symptoms, 
should they appear during the interview phase of this research, can help explain why 
particular views by U.S. counterterrorism policymakers on the causes of terrorism may 
exist, especially where common themes or trends are observed within the differing U.S. 
government agencies that work in the counterterrorism environment.  
Organizational Process Model  
The organizational process model is one of three political decision-making 
models developed by Graham Allison (1969, 1971) in his assessment of the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis (the others being the rational actors model and the governmental politics 
model). The organization process model posits that existing governmental organization, 
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structure, and bureaucratic processes limits a nation’s actions, often biasing the final 
policy decision outcome (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). In many cases, 
decisions by individuals in government are typically constrained to the first proposed 
course of action that adequately addresses the issue, successfully achieves consensus, and 
best limits short-term uncertainty (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). There are 
several key factors indicative in this model. First, leaders break challenges down into 
composite parts, usually along organizational lines within the bureaucracy, rather than 
deal with the whole challenge (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Second, the first 
course of action identified that satisfies the immediate challenge is usually selected, 
putting off longer term (and sometimes harder) solutions (Allison, 1971; Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). Third, due to time constraints during a crisis, preexisting structures and 
processes govern how the challenge is addressed, which can limit innovation and 
creativity in developing possible solutions (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
Finally, and in a similar manner, decisions are also effectively limited to pre-existing 
plans and pre-developed responses (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  
Allison’s (1969, 1971) approach for understanding decision making is well 
known in the organizational research community (Guilhot, 2016; McConnell, 2016). The 
fundamentals of the organizational process model are used in a variety of studies as a key 
framework for understanding how foreign policy is made, particularly during crisis 
situations (Guilhot, 2016; McConnell, 2016; Redd & Mintz, 2013). Of particular note are 
the limitations imposed on decision makers by established bureaucratic structures and 
processes (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). In some cases, processes are 
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demonstrated to be both rigid and entrapping, which are self-reinforcing in how they are 
used and implemented over time (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). The 
data available to decision makers can also drive decision making into a particular process, 
or to a set of planned response options (Masha, 2014; Amason & Mooney, 2008). The 
processes used can also be very specific to, and limited by, the type of organization 
designated as the lead for option development by the interagency (Barbuto, 2016).  
There are many modern examples of Allison’s organizational process model 
being used to explain and understand perceived policy failures (Allison, 1969; Allison, 
1971). These examples include the George W. Bush administration’s decision-making 
process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Mitchell & Massoud, 2009; Smith, 
2008b). The Obama administration’s decisions regarding the troop surge into 
Afghanistan in 2009 and the Libyan intervention in 2011 have also been assessed using 
the organizational process model (Blomdahl, 2016; Marsh, 2014). Other foreign policy 
environments, such as in southeast Asia between India and Pakistan, Japan’s security 
policymaking, and even policy decision making in the European Union, have all been 
assessed using Allison’s model (Allison, 1969; Allison, 1971; Chowdhury & Islam, 2017; 
Howe, 2010; Zahariadis, 2013). Allison himself applied his organizational process model 
in 2012 by assessing the U.S. policy towards Iran in the area of Obama administration 
efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Allison, 2012).  
U.S. government departments and agencies depend on organizational structures 
and policy processes to address policy challenges, whether long-term and enduring or 
emergent or in a crisis. Therefore, Allison’s (1969, 1971) organizational process model 
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can be useful in understanding perspectives of U.S. policymakers within the various 
departments and agencies that work counterterrorism policy. The individual perspectives 
on the causes of terrorism of these policymakers may be impacted by the organizational 
factors outlined by Allison (1969, 1971). These factors, such as sub-dividing the 
challenge among different organizations, or a focus on immediate versus longer-term 
solutions, or use of pre-existing options, lend themselves to tailored research questions to 
help provide contextual insights into individual study participant perceptions on the cause 
of terrorism.  
Gap in Research 
Insights into senior decision making relative to counterterrorism policy exist 
(Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Wolff, 2018; Woodward, 2007; 
Woodward, 2011). The policy decision making by the George W. Bush administration in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, including the decisions to conduct military operations in 
Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, were addressed by well know 
authors (Woodward, 2007; Woodward, 2011). Several books provided interviews and 
insights into the workings of the Obama administration, covering critical foreign policy 
decisions related to Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the counterterrorism decision making 
surrounding drone strikes in Africa and the Middle East (Klaidman, 2012; Mann, 2012; 
Sanger, 2012). The latest example of such insight is that into the Trump administration 
following its first year in office (Wolff, 2018). While these sources may be based on first-
hand accounts and contain rich detail, journalistic standards are not the same as those 
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necessary for a scholarly approach and do not use acceptable research methodologies 
(Kassop, 2013).  
There is academic research into U.S. counterterrorism policies. Of particular 
interest is the policy for the use of drone strikes in Africa and the Middle East (Cronin, 
2010; Desch, 2010). The policies for aggressively engaging threats posed by terrorists 
against Americans and U.S. interests were very similar between the George W. Bush and 
Obama administrations (Desch, 2010; Goldsmith, 2009; Jackson, 2015a; Pilecki, Muro, 
Hammack, & Clemons, 2014). These and other counterterrorism policies demonstrates 
empirical evidence of some consistency among the U.S. political elite regarding 
perspectives on terrorism over the last decade (Cronin, 2010; Cronin, 2013; Goldsmith, 
2009; Stern, 2015). Most studies related to U.S. counterterrorism policy use historical 
archival research, or textual analysis from speeches, policy pronouncements, or policy 
documents, including little or no analysis of actual qualitative interviews of U.S. 
government counterterrorism policy experts (Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2015a; Jackson, 
2015b Pilecki, Muro, Hammack, & Clemons, 2014; Sageman, 2014).  
There are research studies in specific areas of counterterrorism policy where 
interviews of government or military officials have been conducted. As an example, 
Jordan, Kosal, and Rubin (2016) conducted extensive interviews with U.S. government 
officials regarding views on counterterrorism policy, finding that ‘kinetic activity’ (i.e., 
military strikes against terrorist targets) is the predominant, sometimes default option. 
Interview data from government officials suggest that the Internet’s value to terrorists as 
a source of practical knowledge is overblown (Kenney, 2010). Current and former 
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military drone pilots who have participated in executing strikes against terrorists in Africa 
and the Middle East have been queried regarding their personal experiences (Bentley, 
2018). Federal, state, and metropolitan police officials who work in counterterrorism 
programs have also been interviewed to understand their perspectives on the 
effectiveness of various counterterrorism initiatives (Nussbaum, 2012; Ortiz, Hendricks, 
& Sugie, 2007).  
However, real questions still exist for scholars as to what factors influence the 
development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies (Jackson, 2011; 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). A gap in research existed at the intersection where 
academic theories meet the reality of individual U.S. government employees who 
develop, influence, and implement counterterrorism policy. Most studies related to this 
area use historical archival research and little analysis of actual field interviews 
(Sageman, 2014). Kassop (2013) suggested that scholars need to conduct detailed 
research, including collecting data from current and past government counterterrorism 
officials, to confirm and explain actual factors that may influence the decision process 
regarding counterterrorism policy more fully.  
Summary 
The purpose of this literature review was to examine in depth the academic 
research available to help frame the understanding of individual perspectives on the 
causes of terrorism of U.S. government policymakers who work in key U.S. government 
organizations that develop and shape counterterrorism policy, programs, and initiatives. 
This literature review first provided a baseline description of the policymaking process 
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within the U.S. government, focusing on particular implications to counterterrorism 
efforts. It then systematically addressed the key elements of who, what, and why that is 
necessary to fully understand the selected phenomenon of interest. The scope of who 
describes the four key organizations that are the focus of this study—State Department, 
Defense Department, USAID, and the NCTC—including details about their unique 
histories, organizational structures, cultures, roles, and responsibilities within the U.S. 
counterterrorism policymaking process. Several additional key outside influencers of 
U.S. policymaking were also described to provide additional context for this research—
Congress, think tanks, lobbyists, and the media.  
The what leverage six generally recognized theories used within academia to 
understand the causes of terrorist—religious ideology, root causes, state sponsorship, 
failed states, rational choice, and group dynamics—each of which contain a wide body of 
academic writing and research regarding their unique assumptions, underlying factors, 
and suggested approaches and tools for mitigation. These six theories provide the 
theoretical framework upon which is study is based. The broader issue as to why 
individual policymakers have particular perceptions regarding specific causes of 
terrorism provides the conceptual framework of this study. This conceptual framework 
leverages five theories recognized in academia for their applicability to understanding 
either individual or organizational influence on decision making—social cognitive 
theory, cultural theory, resource dependency theory, groupthink theory, and the 
organizational process model.  
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This literature review clearly demonstrates the research gap that exists at the 
intersection where academic theories on the causes of terrorism meets the reality of the 
actual perceptions of individual U.S. policymakers. Qualitative data collected from 
current U.S. government counterterrorism officials, particularly at the mid-to-senior 
levels of the career civil service, sheds important light on the actual perspectives that 
inform and influence the current decision-making process regarding U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. The nature of this study is therefore based on a qualitative 
research methodology, since it is a solid approach for exploring and understanding the 
meaning derived by individuals or groups associated with a social or human 
phenomenon. The next chapter describes in detail how a phenomenological research 
strategy of inquiry allowed the investigation, analysis, and understanding of these 
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism and helped frame them within the 
broader context of individual or organizational influences. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to understand the linkages between theory and 
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories 
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism 
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach through 
individual interviews and a participant questionnaire to analyze U.S. policymakers’ 
perspectives within organizational cultures and assess the impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the 
research design, including a rationale for why this type of research approach was selected 
for this study. The second section outlines the role of the researcher as the observer, 
which includes how potential researcher perspectives and biases were minimized and 
mitigated. The third section outlines the study methodology, including participant 
selection, the basis for instrument development and deployment, details regarding 
recruiting participants, the collection of qualitative data through individual interviews and 
a survey questionnaire, a detailed data analysis plan, and issues of trustworthiness, 
including ethical procedures. This chapter concludes with a brief summary and transition.  
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions 
To bridge the gap in knowledge by exploring, understanding, and 
explaining the perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism of professionals working in 
key U.S. counterterrorism policymaking organizations, this phenomenological research 
study addressed one central research question: To what extent do individual perspectives 
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on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible influences on these 
views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies, 
impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? The following five subquestions 
were also considered, further amplifying the central research question: 
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align 
with existing academic theories?  
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be 
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?  
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced 
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking 
organizations?  
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected 
between and among the key policymaking organizations? 
SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy? 
Central Concept of the Study 
Recommendations regarding U.S. counterterrorism policy are developed within 
the principal foreign policymaking organizations of the U.S. government’s executive 
branch. Specific worldviews and diverse terrorism theories emphasize different 
fundamental approaches, activities, and tools necessary to achieve success in mitigating 
the threats posed by terrorism. Which theory regarding the causes of terrorism a 
particular policymaker or policy professional holds is influenced by personal experience, 
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including factors such as professional expertise, academic education, career progression, 
cultural awareness, and personal relationships. The effects of individual perspectives 
regarding the causes of terrorism may also be impacted when these views are not merely 
personal but are influenced by broader organizational cultures and bureaucratic structures 
that are reflected across institutions.  
How personal factors and organizational cultures impact career policymakers’ 
decision-making is unclear, with potentially significant implications for the development 
and implementation of U.S. national counterterrorism policies and programs. Incorrectly 
applying counterterrorism tools to address terrorism based on one theoretical frame could 
be ineffective and may exacerbate the terrorist problem if different organizations attempt 
to apply tools from conflicting theoretical frames simultaneously.  
Research Tradition and Rationale 
The nature of this study was a qualitative, which provided a solid approach for 
exploring and understanding the meaning derived by individuals or groups associated 
with a social or human problem (see Creswell, 2014). I explored individual 
counterterrorism policy professionals’ worldviews regarding how they define the 
underlying causes of terrorism. A naturalistic approach associated with a social 
construction perspective provided an appropriate research design to focus on how 
individuals perceive the world and how they interpret meaning based on their experiences 
(see Rubin & Rubin, 2012).  
A qualitative phenomenological research design allowed me to investigate, 
analyze, and understand policymakers’ worldviews and potential organizational biases. 
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Viewing study participants both individually and organizationally, factoring in shared 
participant experiences, authorities, and resources, allowed me to observe unique 
bureaucracies and provided insights into the impact of the phenomenon on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  
Role of the Researcher 
My role in this study was to serve as an observer-participant conducting one-on-
one interviews and administering queries and probes as necessary (see Ravitch & Carl, 
2016; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I also deployed a one-page survey questionnaire to each 
interview participant prior to the start of each data collection session. I had the sole 
responsibility for performing the study, including selecting participants, gaining and 
documenting their informed consent, conducting interviews, collecting and processing 
the data, analyzing the results, and preparing the findings. All participants were presented 
with the same interview questions and questionnaire, and I served as the sole instrument 
for obtaining their verbal and written responses (Knox & Burkard, 2009; Lavis, 2010). I 
leveraged my familiarity and experience with the topic to create a climate of familiarity 
that enabled participants to provide insightful and nuanced responses (see Moustakas, 
1994). 
I am a career member of the federal civil service and have worked for the U.S. 
government in various capacities for over 32 years, including the last 17 years in 
Washington, D.C. working in policy development and implementation in the area of 
counterterrorism. I actively participated in interagency policymaking during the last 15 
years. This experience assisted me during individual interview sessions because I am 
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knowledgeable about policy processes, procedures, vocabulary, organizations, and 
bureaucratic interactions, which enabled me to develop trust and confidence with 
participants. There are benefits in selecting a topic or setting in which the researcher 
identifies and participates (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).  
I recognize that as a former member of the U.S. counterterrorism policy 
community I have a particular worldview and personal perspective regarding causes of 
terrorism, and that I may have had inherent bias in my role as a researcher. Care was 
taken to ensure balance and objectivity in the interviewing and data collection process. 
The bias risk was mitigated through several careful procedures, including recording and 
transcribing verbatim all interviews, and by using the same interview questions with 
limited and constrained probes with every participant. Given my background in the field, 
it was possible that some study participants knew about me, and some had worked with 
me in various official capacities related to policy topics. However, I did not have any 
relationship with participants outside of the standard work-related engagement or beyond 
the normal interactions conducted within the professional policy environment. I did, 
however, leverage my access, placement, and previous professional relationships across 
the interagency, which helped me recruit suitable participants.  
Methodology 
Participants and Selection Logic 
The purpose of the study was understanding perspectives of current U.S. 
government policymakers working in key offices within the principal foreign policy 
organizations responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism policy. 
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These include the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, and the National Counter-Terrorism Center. Although the 
names of participants were included as part of the data collection process, individual 
names were not included when transcripts were made from the recorded interview 
sessions. In addition, individual participant names were not recorded in the process of 
deploying and collecting the individual survey questionnaires. No participants are 
identified by name in this study. Themes and findings arising from the data analysis are 
only characterized based on organization, not individual names.  
The participant selection criteria were individuals employed in one of the four 
U.S. federal organizations responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism 
policy. The sampling for participants for interviews was not random but was targeted to 
include interested and cooperative employees with more than 8-10 years of government 
experience whose work included development and implementation of counterterrorism 
policies within these organizations. The criteria for exclusion were political appointees, 
because of their short-term experience within government.  
The sample included participants from the four organizations that lead U.S. 
counterterrorism policymaking. Between six and eight individual interviews were 
conducted per organization, translating into 31 total participants across all four 
organizations. Although the broader policymaking entities of these organizations consist 
of 300-400 individuals each, those working specifically on counterterrorism policy is a 
subset within these policy organizations. I assumed that the sample of 31 participants 
would enable data saturation (see Mason, 2010).  
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Given my current position, I had unique access and placement to enable me to 
contact the subject counterterrorism organizations, identify and recruit participants, and 
collect the data. Participants were identified through a three-step process. In Step 1, I 
contacted former professional colleagues in each of the four organizations. This 
engagement was conducted in person so the scope and purpose of the research could be 
fully explained. Colleagues’ advice was solicited in identifying the appropriate office 
managers or supervisors. Step 2 was contacting the identified office managers or 
supervisors to obtain permission to address them and their staff via e-mail to explain the 
scope and purpose of the research, build interest and cooperation, and recruit participants. 
Those interested then responded with their contact information, enabling follow-up 
engagement for scheduling individual interviews.  
Step 3 was contacting the list of potential study candidates via e-mail using a 
study invitation template (see Appendix C) that was tailored to match details for each 
organization. Once suitable and willing participants for the study were identified, 
individual consent was then obtained to ensure transparency in how the information 
collected in the research project was to be managed. This consent required approval by 
the Walden University institutional review board (IRB). The Walden University’s 
approval number for this study is 11-21-18-0545148. Informed consent was required 
from each study participant and was obtained in writing using a consent form template.  
As a qualitative research project, it was difficult to predict exactly how many 
interviews and participants were required for this study to be statistically significant, 
since a standard used for quantitative research doesn’t directly apply for qualitative 
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methods (see Baker, Edwards, & Doidge, 2012). For a qualitative research methodology, 
Baker, Edwards, and Doidge (2012) stress that researchers should solicit data from 
interviews until different answers to research questions are no longer received (Baker, 
Edwards, & Doidge, 2012). Some research suggests that saturation can occur in a typical 
qualitative research study within six to twelve interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 
2006). The research goal of this study followed the concept that saturation occurred when 
the collection of new data did not add any additional input to the qualitative themes 
identified as part of this project (see Mason, 2010).  
Instrumentation 
Two researcher-developed instruments were used for data collection in this study. 
The first instrument was a series of structured but open-ended questions that relate to 
each of the five subquestions that amplify the central research question. The interview 
questions consisted of several questions to address each of the five research subquestions. 
The interview questions were deployed in a semi-structured manner, with probes used 
only as necessary to provide clarification to participant responses (Creswell, 2014; Knox 
& Burkard, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). Use of 
a semi-structured format for interviews allowed participants to respond to the questions in 
a full narrative based on their unique perspective and experience, and therefore did not 
limit responses to pre-determined answers (Knox & Burkard, 2009; Morse & Field, 
1995). I conducted all interview sessions as the researcher in face-to-face settings, and all 
were fully audio recorded for later transcription and analysis (Creswell, 2014; Rubin & 
Rubin, 2012; Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).  
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The second data collection instrument was a survey questionnaire that was also 
deployed to each interview participant. This secondary instrument collected information 
related to the participant’s individual background (see Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 
1999). The questionnaire included information related to organization of employment, 
years of service, work experience (e.g., career field, amount of service overseas), scope 
of international travel, cultural awareness, level of education (e.g., level of degree(s), 
academic field), and level of religiosity. This secondary instrument provided broader 
context to assist in understanding the factors that lead to the development of individual 
worldviews and perspectives regarding the causes of terrorism due to individual or 
organizational influence (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999).  
A small pilot study involving two participants was conducted prior to the formal 
data collection to assist in refining the interview questions and questionnaire (see 
Creswell, 2012). This pilot involved two professional peers from my organization’s 
leadership and professional development office. The pilot study was used to determine 
whether the planned questions for the interviews were ambiguous, leading, or 
insufficiently open to address the fundamental aspects of the five research subquestions 
and the central research question.  
Data Collection Plan 
Rooms were arranged and scheduled at three of the four departments or agencies 
selected for this study within which the individual interview sessions were conducted. 
The rooms were all small conference rooms or training rooms, each with chairs as well as 
small, classroom type tables upon which the recording equipment was placed. Special 
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permission was obtained to use recording equipment. This wasn’t problematic, as each of 
the departments or agencies identified had facilities already dedicated for the execution of 
professional development and training, or for public affairs interviews with the media. 
The recording equipment consisted of a laptop computer with an external microphone in 
order to enhance the quality of audio recordings. I operated this recording equipment in 
my role as the researcher, having successfully tested and deployed it during the pilot 
study discussed above.  
The entire interview data collection occurred over a period of 13 weeks, from 
February through May 2019, with each of the four departments or agencies occurring on 
separate weeks. A week or two separated the interviews between organizations, allowing 
for the collation and management of the data recordings and survey questionnaires. 
Arrangements were made with each department or agency to conduct the individual 
interviews during normal work hours (i.e., 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) over two to three 
consecutive days. This minimized the impact on the organizations as well as simplified 
the data collection by the researcher. The average duration of each of the individual 
interview sessions was 30-45 minutes.  
As expected, the existing pool of U.S. counterterrorism policy professionals 
within each of the four selected departments or agencies provided a robust pool of 
participants that were interested and willing to volunteer for the study. Office managers 
proved extremely helpful in recruiting a suitable number of participants from the 
organizations identified. Other than re-iterating the parameters and confidentiality of the 
consent agreement during each interview, no debriefings or exit procedures from the 
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study were conducted. There was no requirement for follow-up procedures or follow-on 
interviews with the participants.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The data analysis plan for this research consisted of two parts. First was the 
analysis of the transcript data collected from the individual interviews. The interview 
questions were divided into three general parts, each part consisting of a series of 
questions: individual perspectives, collective influences and biases, and inter-
departmental similarities and differences. Each of the three parts were initially analyzed 
separately through qualitative methods, with results compared as appropriate. Transcript 
data from each interview session was organized by question and response, with each 
individual answer sentence coded for descriptive identifiers (i.e., first cycle), further 
coded for concept identifiers (i.e., second cycle), and then grouped by categories (i.e., 
third cycle) that emerged from the qualitative analysis. General themes were then 
identified (i.e., fourth cycle) and assessed, first within the parameters of each subresearch 
question (e.g., individual views on terrorism, potential individual or organizational 
influences) to identify analytic trends, with assessed similarities, differences, or gaps, 
identified for further analysis.  
As discussed above, the sample size consists of six to eight individual participants 
within each organization, for a total sample size of 31 individuals. As planned, each 
individual interviews lasted on average 30-45 minutes, which translated into 
approximately 25 hours of recorded transcript data. The volume of data did not preclude 
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the use of a manual coding process, but the commercially available software tool NVIVO 
12 was also used to assist the qualitative analysis process.  
Additional data was also collected from each participant prior to each interview 
through a short, written survey questionnaire. These questions, numbering 20, solicited 
background information, such as information related to education level and type, years of 
employment, work experience, amount of international travel or service overseas, cultural 
awareness, and level of religiosity. This quantitative data was collected and organized in 
a combined data set and analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 25. The quantitative data 
from the survey questionnaire was organized by organization (i.e., individuals were 
anonymized in the data set), and it provided context for the collected qualitative interview 
data. Use of the survey questionnaire assisted in a fuller understanding of the factors that 
lead to the development of individual worldviews and perspectives regarding the causes 
of terrorism, as well as organizational factors or biases, and other educational or 
experiential influence.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness was addressed through the four standard factors described by 
Anney (2014), Bitsch (2005), and Shenton (2004). Regarding credibility, which is 
focused on the internal validity of this research, there is clear and credible alignment 
between this study’s problem statement, research purpose, research questions, and 
methodology (see Anney, 2014; Shenton, 2004). This ensured that the qualitative data 
collected and analyzed actually addressed what was intended (Anney, 2014, p. 276). The 
use of multiple participants within a single organization, and then including participants 
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from multiple organizations, provided a level of triangulation that strengthened the 
analytic results and conclusions of this study (Toma, 2014; Tracy, 2010). For 
transferability, although individual study participants were not identified by name in this 
study, participants are appropriately described to sufficiently highlight their collective 
involvement in the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy. This 
demonstrated the specific context of the data collection and allows other researchers or 
readers of this study to be able to compare and contrast the analytic results with other 
relevant research studies (Anney, 2014, p. 276; Bitsch, 2005, p. 75; Shenton, 2004, p. 
70).  
To ensure dependability, strong data collection and management techniques were 
used throughout this process, including audio recordings of all interview sessions, 
documented transcripts from each audio file, digitally scanned copies of every survey 
questionnaire, demonstrating for subsequent research a level of confidence that a similar 
research project would yield similar analytic results (see Anney, 2014; Bitsch, 2005; 
Shenton, 2004). Finally, confirmability was addressed through the research plan, 
demonstrating the manner in which interviews were conducted, the process and 
procedures used to collect and process the qualitative data, and logic used in the analysis 
of the data and development of findings and recommendations, mitigated risk of 
researcher bias tainting the analytic results (Anney, 2014, p. 279; Shenton, 2004, p. 72; 
Tobin & Begley, 2004, p. 392).  
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Ethical Procedures 
Once participants for the study were identified, consent was formally obtained in 
writing to ensure transparency in how the information collected in this research was 
managed. Research did not proceed until formal approval by the Walden University IRB 
was obtained. In accordance with the highest standards of qualitative research methods, 
the identities, rights, and needs of each study participant were respected and protected 
(see Creswell, 2013). After IRB approval, each participant was fully informed of the 
objectives of the research in writing on the consent form and reminded verbally prior to 
the start of every individual interview session. The fact that study participation was 
voluntary was stressed, as was the fact that participation and interview responses would 
remain anonymous, with individuals only identified by a numeric participant code. A 
single digital master file linking individual participant names with their assigned numeric 
participant code was kept by the researcher on a single password-protected laptop, and 
this file was deleted once the requirements of the dissertation was completed.  
Audio files from every interview was stored on the single password-protected 
laptop computer belonging to the researcher. The individual audio files were only 
identified by the participant code and were transmitted to the commercial online service 
REV for transcription into Word documents. At no time did transcript files identify a 
particular individual, neither in the file name nor in the document text. Each participant 
was also provided a digital copy of their respective transcript if requested, enabling them 
to review, verify, and approve its use in the research. Digital copies of all audio files were 
deleted once the requirements of the dissertation were fully completed.  
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The handwritten survey questionnaire data also did not identify a particular 
individual by name, but were only identified using the participant code discussed above. 
Each handwritten survey was scanned into an individual PDF digital file for storage, with 
hardcopies of the surveys destroyed once this scanning was completed. Data from these 
surveys was subsequently input manually by the researcher into a quantitative data set 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 25, where it was collectively stored, organized, and analyzed. 
All individual interview transcripts, as well as the digitally stored survey questionnaires, 
remain on the researcher’s password-protected laptop for a period of five years as 
required by Walden University.  
Summary 
The methodology described in this chapter summarizes the research steps that 
were taken for data collection, organization, analysis, and protection, to enable research 
to understand the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories regarding the 
causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism policymaking 
organizations. The qualitative approach described, informed by the collected quantitative 
survey questionnaire data, enabled well-grounded academic research into individual 
policymakers perspectives, within the context of organizational bureaucracies and 
cultures, to quantify impacts on U.S. counterterrorism policy.  
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and 
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories 
regarding the causes of terrorism among professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism 
policymaking organizations. To address this gap, I used a qualitative approach through 
individual interviews and participant questionnaires to analyze individual perspectives 
within and across organizational cultures and to assess the impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. The research question addressed in this study was as follows: To 
what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S. 
policymakers, and the possible influences on these views due to personal factors, 
organizational cultures, and interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy? There were five subquestions that were used to amplify the 
central research question: 
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align 
with existing academic theories?  
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be 
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?  
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced 
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking 
organizations?  
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected 
between and among the key policymaking organizations? 
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy? 
The first section of this chapter provides the analytic context, including the setting 
for the participants and organizations, key demographics of those interviewed, an 
overview of the data collected, and highlights from the data analysis process. The second 
section addresses trustworthiness through evidence of credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. The third section presents the study’s results and 
provides a summary of the emerging themes from the data analysis. These results are 
then discussed in more detail, highlighting the observed themes for how terrorism is 
viewed, the potential impact of personal and organizational influences, commonality and 
differences across the interagency, and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. This chapter 
concludes with a brief summary and transition.  
Analytic Context 
The analytic context includes the setting for the participants and organizations, 
key demographics of those interviewed, an overview of the data collected, and highlights 
from the data analysis process.  
Setting 
I conducted one-on-one interviews with study participants from four separate U.S. 
government organizations involved in counterterrorism policy in the Washington, D.C. 
area over a period of 13 weeks from February through May 2019. I used a semistructured 
interview format, including 11 standardized questions (see Appendix A) to enable study 
participants to describe their perspectives on a range of terrorism-related issues. To 
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provide a sense of familiarity, comfort, and privacy, I conducted the interviews at 
participants’ respective home agency in small conference rooms. Interviews lasted 
between 30 and 45 minutes, although a few went over 1 hour. Probes and follow-up 
questions were used sparingly to gather deeper insights and clarity on initial responses. 
Four interviews were conducted over the phone due to the unavailability of a suitable 
facility or the participant’s inability to participate in a sit-down, face-to-face interview.  
Each participant also provided data from a survey questionnaire that consisted of 
20 questions (see Appendix B). These data provided broader individual-specific 
background information related to education level and type, years of employment, work 
experience, amount of international travel or service overseas, cultural awareness, and 
level of religiosity, which provided a broader context from which to analyze the interview 
data.  
Demographics 
A purposeful sampling strategy was employed to identify and recruit current U.S. 
government employees and military officers working in counterterrorism policy offices 
with at least 8-10 years of overall experience. Of the approximately 100 individuals 
contacted, 31 volunteered to participate in the study. Almost 70% were 40 years old or 
older, and more than 75% had worked for the federal government more than 10 years. 
Half had more than 5 years working counterterrorism policy. Three quarters of the study 
participants were male. The sample had a strong academic background, with over 80% 
having master’s degrees, multiple master’s degrees, or doctorates. A summary of study 
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participant demographics is shown in Table 1. The full demographic data set from the 
entire 20-question survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix D. 
An overview of the organizational demographics is provided in Table 2. These 
data showed that 87% of State Department participants were older than 41 years, and 
almost 40% had served in the federal government more than 20 years. Half of the State 
Department participants (50% or 4 individuals) had doctoral degrees, almost 90% had 
been in more than 16 countries, and almost 40% had served in a foreign post for more 
than 10 years. For participants from USAID, 75% were older than 41 years, and 75% had 
a master’s degree. The gender split in the USAID participants was 50/50; 75% had served 
in the federal government more than 10 years, and 25% had served in a foreign post more 
than 10 years. Within OSD, 56% were older than 41 years, and 85% had a master’s 
degree. The gender split in OSD was 71% male, 28% female. For the Joint Staff, half of 
those participating were under 40 years, and more than 80% had one or more master’s 
degrees. There were no women participants from the Joint Staff. Two thirds of the Joint 
Staff participants had been in more than 16 countries, and two thirds had been deployed 
overseas for more than 5 years. The full demographic data set from the entire 20-question 
survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix D.  
Data Collection 
 Interviews were conducted with 31 participants. These included eight from the 
State Department, eight from USAID, two from NCTC and from within DoD, seven from 
OSD, and six from the Joint Staff. Each study participant signed a consent form and 
completed the one-page survey questionnaire. Interviews with the State Department   
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Table 1 
Study Participant General Demographics 
    DoD TOTAL 
Category State USAID NCTC OSD JS # % 
Age Range       
  20 to 30 1 0 0 1 0 2 6.45 
  31 to 40 0 2 1 2 3 8 25.81 
  41 to 50 5 2 1 1 2 11 35.48 
  51 to 60 2 4 0 2 1 9 29.03 
  >60 0 0 0 1 0 1 3.23 
Gender       
  Male 7 4 1 5 6 23 74.19 
  Female 1 4 1 2 0 8 25.81 
Education Level 
  No College 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  BA/BS 2 0 1 1 1 5 16.13 
  MA/MS 2 6 0 6 3 17 54.84 
  Multiple MA/MS 0 1 1 0 2 4 12.90 
  PhD/JD 4 1 0 0 0 5 16.13 
Years of Federal Service 
  1 to 10 1 2 1 3 0 7 22.58 
  11 to 20 4 4 1 1 3 13 41.94 
  21 to 30 3 2 0 0 2 7 22.58 
 >30 0 0 0 3 1 4 12.90 
Number of Countries Visited 
  0 (None) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  1 to 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  6 to 10 0 0 1 1 1 3 9.68 
  11 to 15 1 0 1 2 1 5 16.13 
  >16 7 8 0 4 4 23 74.19 
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad 
  0 (None) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  1 to 5 4 4 2 5 2 17 54.84 
  6 to 10 1 2 0 2 3 8 25.81 
  11 to 15 2 1 0 0 1 4 12.90 
  >16 1 1 0 0 0 2 6.45 
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Table 2  
 
Organizational Demographics Results Overview 
State Department Participants 
Age Range Gender Education Level 
Years of 
Federal Service 
Years Living 
or Serving 
Abroad 
Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % 
20-30 1 12.5 Male 7 87.5 No College 0 0 1-10 1 12.5 None 0 0 
31-40 0 0 Female 1 12.5 BA/BS 2 25 11-21 4 50 1-5 4 50 
41-50 5 62.5      MA/MS 2 25 21-30 3 37.5 6-10 1 12.5 
51-60 2 25      +MA/MS 0 0 >30 0 0 11-15 2 25 
>60 0 0      PhD/JD 4 50      >16 1 12.5 
                              
USAID Participants 
Age Range Gender Education Level 
Years of 
Federal Service 
Years Living 
or Serving 
Abroad 
Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % 
20-30 0 0 Male 4 50 No College 0 0 1-10 2 25 None 0 0 
31-40 2 25 Female 4 50 BA/BS 0 0 11-21 4 50 1-5 4 50 
41-50 2 25      MA/MS 6 75 21-30 2 25 6-10 2 25 
51-60 4 50      +MA/MS 1 12.5 >30 0 0 11-15 1 12.5 
>60 0 0      PhD/JD 1 12.5      >16 1 12.5 
                              
NCTC Participants 
Age Range Gender Education Level 
Years of 
Federal Service 
Years Living 
or Serving 
Abroad 
Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % 
20-30 0 0 Male 1 50 No College 0 0 1-10 1 50 None 0 0 
31-40 1 50 Female 1 50 BA/BS 1 50 11-21 1 50 1-5 2 100 
41-50 1 50      MA/MS 0 0 21-30 0 0 6-10 0 0 
51-60 0 0      +MA/MS 1 50 >30 0 0 11-15 0 0 
>60 0 0      PhD/JD 0 0      >16 0 0 
                              
(continued) 
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OSD Participants 
Age Range Gender Education Level 
Years of 
Federal Service 
Years Living 
or Serving 
Abroad 
Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % 
20-30 1 14.3 Male 5 71.4 No College 0 0 1-10 3 42.9 None 0 0 
31-40 2 28.6 Female 2 28.6 BA/BS 1 14.3 11-21 1 14.3 1-5 5 71.4 
41-50 1 14.3      MA/MS 6 85.7 21-30 0 0 6-10 2 28.6 
51-60 2 28.6      +MA/MS 0 0 >30 3 42.9 11-15 0 0 
>60 1 14.3      PhD/JD 0 0      >16 0 0 
                              
Joint Staff Participants 
Age Range Gender Education Level 
Years of 
Federal Service 
Years Living 
or Serving 
Abroad 
Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % Data # % 
20-30 0 0 Male 6 100 No College 0 0 1-10 0 0 None 0 0 
31-40 3 50 Female 0 0 BA/BS 1 16.7 11-21 3 50 1-5 2 33.3 
41-50 2 33.3      MA/MS 3 50 21-30 2 33.3 6-10 3 50 
51-60 1 16.7      +MA/MS 2 33.3 >30 1 16.7 11-15 1 16.7 
>60 0 0      PhD/JD 0 0      >16 0 0 
                              
 
 
participants occurred over three days (February 6, 7, and 12, 2019), and were conducted 
in small conference or training rooms in the Harry S. Truman building in Washington, 
D.C., the headquarters of the U.S. Department of State. Interviews with the USAID 
participants occurred over four days (March 14, 20, 21, and 22, 2019); seven were 
conducted in their library in the Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center, 
the headquarters of USAID in Washington, D.C., and one was conducted over the phone. 
Interviews with the two NCTC participants were conducted over the phone on April 22 
and 26, 2019. Interviews with the DoD participants from OSD and Joint Staff occurred 
over four weeks (April 12 to May 10, 2019), and all but one were conducted in a small 
conference room in the Pentagon Library & Conference Center, located adjacent to the 
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Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense in Washington, D.C. One 
OSD interview was conducted over the phone on May 6, 2019.  
Given my current position, I had unique access and placement that enabled me to 
contact the subject counterterrorism organizations, identify and recruit study participants, 
and collect the necessary data. Participants were identified and invited through a three-
step process. In Step 1, former professional colleagues in each of the four organizations 
were contacted by phone, and the scope and purpose of the research were explained. 
Colleagues’ advice was then used to identify the appropriate office managers or 
supervisors.  
The next step was contacting the identified office managers or supervisors to 
obtain their permission to conduct the study within their organizational offices. First 
contact was made by phone to set up subsequent face-to-face meetings from which to 
explain the scope and purpose of the research. Permission from each office manager or 
supervisor was obtained via signed letters of cooperation. These were then submitted to 
the Walden University’s IRB to obtain formal academic authorization to recruit and 
interview study participants.  
Once formal IRB authorization was obtained, follow up phone calls or face-to-
face meetings were conducted with each office manager or supervisor to alert them that 
staff recruiting was ready to commence, allowing them to shape how best to recruit 
participants from within their respective offices. For the State Department, USAID, and 
the Joint Staff, office managers or supervisors had me prepare a group recruiting email 
which they then forwarded to their own staff on my behalf. For OSD, office managers or 
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supervisors provided me a list of names and contact information for me to e-mail directly 
from among their staff to recruit participants. My recruiting e-mails leveraged the 
template shown in Appendix C, with minor deviations to personalize it for individuals 
and organizations. Participants then responded directly to me via e-mail or phone 
indicating their willingness to participate.  
Recruiting at NCTC posed a challenge. Office managers were contacted directly, 
and while supportive, none were willing to sign a letter of cooperation. Their referrals to 
the NCTC public affairs office ended with no follow through, and numerous attempts to 
gain support and approval failed. A follow up recruitment plan for NCTC was 
subsequently developed and approved by the Walden University IRB, authorizing me to 
contact NCTC employees directly outside of business hours. Eight NCTC employees 
were contacted by phone, but only two were willing to volunteer to be participants.  
Once volunteers for the study were identified, interviews were scheduled using 
both phone and e-mail. Scheduling emails included the consent form, survey 
questionnaire, and instructions regarding the conduct of the interview. Prior to the start of 
all interviews, the consent form was reviewed, and a signature obtained, the completed 
survey questionnaire (at Appendix B) was collected, and the basics of the interview 
recording was reviewed. The audio recording then started, and the interviews were 
conducted using the questions shown in Appendix A. Upon completion of the interview, 
the audio recording was terminated, and the participant thanked. Audio files were 
uploaded to the commercial transcription service REV at the end of the day, resulting in 
interview transcriptions in MS Word file format being received within 12 to 24 hours. A 
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“thank you” e-mail (shown at Appendix C) was sent to each participant within one to two 
days of the interview, with a digital copy of the audio transcription MS Word file 
attached for those participants who had requested a copy be provided.  
 Although the venue for interviews changed by organization, basic parameters 
remained the same, either using a small conference or training room that enabled private, 
one-on-one discussions, or having a private, one-on-one phone conversation. No unusual 
or unexpected circumstances were encountered in the data collection process.  
Data Analysis 
In completing the goals of this phenomenological study, the analysis of data 
collected was critical in understanding the perspectives of current U.S. government 
policymakers regarding the causes of terrorism and the impacts on the development and 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Data analysis was conducted in four 
specific phases. First was the preparation phase to prepare the raw data, in the form of 
recorded audio files, to a format enabling qualitative analysis (see Patton, 2014; Richards 
& Morse, 2013; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Audio files were transcribed using REV, a web-
based commercial transcription service, which converted the audio MP4 digital files into 
Microsoft Word documents (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012). These Word documents were 
then organized in two formats for later analytic processing: individual interview files, 
maintained in file folders corresponding to the organization of the participant; and 
individual question files, where all the interview responses for every participant within 
each organization for each interview question were combined into a single narrative file.  
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This phase also included the conversion of data results from the individual survey 
questionnaires into a dataset created using the IBM SPSS Statistics 25 software tool. 
Creation of this dataset was done manually. This dataset enabled broader context from 
which to analyze the collected qualitative interview data, which assisted in deeper 
understanding of factors related to participants’ perspectives on the causes of terrorism, 
including organizational factors or biases, and other educational or experience-related 
influence.  
Second was the coding phase, which was done manually using Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets organized by participant, their organization, and interview question. The 
first coding pass on the data reviewed the text from every interview in detail (see Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016; Yin, 2011). Key 
words and phrases from each of the 11 interview questions were identified and recorded 
in the Excel spreadsheet. In the second coding pass, identified key words and phrases 
across participants within specific organizations for each question were reviewed and 
refined, resulting in the identification of specific categories to summarize or generalize 
first coding pass results (see Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; 
Saldaña, 2016; Yin, 2011). The third coding pass addressed identified categories, pulling 
out noted themes for each of the interview questions, structured within organizations (see 
Richards & Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Saldaña, 2016). The fourth coding 
pass focused on the interview question files, where, as discussed above, all the participant 
responses within a single organization were blended and combined into a single narrative 
file.  
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Third was the review phase, where analysis moved above the individual data and 
codes and focused exclusively on categories and themes identified within organization 
for each interview question (see Richards & Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016). Using the NVIVO 12 software tool, identified 
categories and themes from the manual coding process outlined above were further 
reviewed to highlight particular word counts, as well as assess word linkages and 
associations. This additional analysis was performed leveraging the capabilities provided 
by NVIVO 12, using the combined narrative files created for each question, which were 
organization based. This further analysis reassessed and refined identified categories and 
themes highlighted in the manual coding process described above (see Richards & 
Morse, 2013; Rossman & Rallis, 2003; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016). Categories 
and themes were modified as necessary to accommodate the additional analytic insights 
identified through the use of NVIVO 12.  
Fourth and finally was the results phase, where themes identified for each of the 
three research subquestions were presented as the analytic interpretation of the research 
findings to increase understanding into the perspectives of current U.S. government 
policymakers on the causes of terrorism and impacts on development and implementation 
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. These results are presented in the analytic results section 
that follows.  
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Evidence of Trustworthiness 
As outlined in chapter 3, trustworthiness was addressed through the four standard 
factors described by Anney (2014), Bitsch (2005), and Shenton (2004). How each factor 
was addressed and successfully achieved is discussed below.  
Credibility  
Regarding credibility, the internal validity of this research, there is clear and 
credible alignment between this study’s problem statement, research purpose, research 
questions, and methodology, which was maintained throughout the course of the data 
collection and analysis process (see Anney, 2014, p. 276; Shenton, 2004). This ensured 
that qualitative data collected throughout the one-on-one interviews with participants, as 
well as the quantitative data collected via the survey questionnaires, fully addressed what 
was intended for this study (see Anney, 2014). The use of multiple participants within 
each organization, and including participants from across the multiple organizations, 
provided a strong level of triangulation that strengthened the analytic results and 
conclusions of this study (Toma, 2014; Tracy, 2010).  
Transferability 
For transferability, although individual study participants were not identified by 
name in this study, participants were appropriately described with a suitable level of 
detail to sufficiently highlight their collective involvement in the development and 
implementation of counterterrorism policy. This demonstrated the specific context of the 
data collection and allows other researchers or readers of this study to be able to compare 
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and contrast the analytic results with other relevant studies (Anney, 2014, p. 276; Bitsch, 
2005, p. 75; Shenton, 2004, p. 70).  
Dependability  
To ensure dependability of the study, strong data collection and management 
techniques were used throughout this process, including audio recordings of all interview 
sessions, documented transcripts from each audio file, and digitally scanned copies of 
every survey questionnaire (see Anney, 2014, p. 278; Bitsch, 2005, p. 86; Shenton, 2004, 
p. 71). These actions demonstrate to future researchers a level of confidence that a similar 
research project would yield similar analytic results (see Anney, 2014; Bitsch, 2005; 
Shenton, 2004).  
Confirmability 
Finally, confirmability was addressed through the research plan, demonstrating 
the manner in which interviews were conducted, the process and procedures used to 
collect and process the qualitative data, and the logic used in the analysis of the data and 
development of findings and recommendations, mitigated risk of researcher bias tainting 
the analytic results presented in this study (Anney, 2014, p. 279; Shenton, 2004, p. 72; 
Tobin & Begley, 2004, p. 392).  
Analytic Results 
This study was designed to address a single research question:  To what extent do 
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the 
possible influences on these views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and 
interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? Five 
120 
 
subquestions were developed to amplify the central research question, and 11 specific 
interview questions were deployed to each participant to gain their individual insights and 
perspectives. The interview questions are shown in Appendix A, which also shows how 
these interview questions align within the five research subquestions. An overview of the 
qualitative themes observed by organization are shown below in Table 3, with a full list 
of detailed data categories and themes resulting from the results phase of the data 
collection process shown in Appendix E.  
An overview of the key analytic themes that emerged is presented below, with 
views and quotes from specific study participants (e.g., 104, 302, 505) identified using 
the following numeric series structure in order to protect individual identities: 100’s for 
the State Department, 200’s for USAID, 300’s for NCTC, 400’s for OSD, and 500’s for 
the Joint Staff. A comprehensive presentation of the detailed participant responses to 
every interview question from which the analytic themes emerged is also shown in 
Appendix F.  
Themes Regarding How Terrorism Is Viewed 
 An individual’s sense of grievances was the theme most expressed across the 
majority of participants as the primary cause of terrorism, especially from those within 
USAID, OSD, and the Joint Staff (204, 206, 208, 403, 404, 503, 505). Participants 
expressed numerous variations on this theme, and stressed that the sense of grievance 
could be due to many differing factors, such as perceptions over inequities in status (204, 
406, 503, 505), housing (205, 207), or economic opportunity (105, 204, 406, 407).   
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Table 3  
 
Summary of Qualitative Themes Observed 
Interview Question State USAID NCTC 
DoD 
OSD JS 
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align with existing 
academic theories?  
2. What do you feel are 
the primary causes of 
terrorism today?  
Complex 
Depends 
Marginalization 
Grievances 
Frustration 
Personal-
Motivation 
Individual-
Factors 
Grievances 
Ideology  
Need 
Purpose 
Inequities 
Governance 
Grievances 
Ideology 
1. How does the threat of 
terrorism equate to other 
threats to U.S. national 
security?  
Important 
Medium 
Overblown 
Medium  
Not 
Existential 
Not 
Existential 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be understood through 
individual factors related to personal experience?  
3. What has had the 
greatest influence on 
your own understanding 
regarding the causes of 
terrorism? 
Reading 
Experience 
Living 
Abroad 
Experience 
Reading 
Studying 
Experience 
Experience 
Living 
Abroad 
Experience 
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced by existing 
bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policy making organizations?  
7. Have your own 
perspectives on the 
causes of terrorism been 
influenced by your 
organization? 
 
Somewhat Very Much 
Not Much 
Somewhat 
Definitely * 
6. How widely shared is 
your view regarding the 
causes of terrorism 
among others across 
your organization? 
Generally 
Very Well 
Fairly Well 
Somewhat 
Very Well 
Fairly 
Well Not 
Sure 
Generally 
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and 
among the key policy making organizations? 
5. How well do you 
think your organization’s 
counterterrorism policy 
professionals understand 
the causes of terrorism? 
Generally 
Very Well 
Very Well 
Somewhat 
Incredibly 
Well 
Very Well 
Not Much 
Very Well 
Medium 
 (Continued) 
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Interview Question State USAID NCTC 
DoD 
OSD JS 
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and 
among the key policy making organizations? 
9. How well do you 
think counterterrorism 
policy professionals that 
you work with outside 
your organization 
understand the causes of 
terrorism? 
Generally 
Very Well 
* 
Good 
Generally 
Good 
Generally 
Varied 
10. How much common 
understanding regarding 
the underlying causes of 
terrorism do you see 
across the organizations 
who work 
counterterrorism policy? 
Generally 
Generally 
Somewhat 
Somewhat Generally 
Generally 
Common 
View 
SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? 
4. How could the U.S. 
best address the threat of 
terrorism? 
Consistency Prevention 
Less Strikes 
Via Partners 
* 
Via 
Partners 
Coalitions 
8. How is your 
organization enabled or 
hindered by its existing 
authorities and resources 
in addressing terrorism? 
Constrained 
Limited 
Hindered 
Hindered 
Both 
Adequate 
Limited Limited 
11. How much do you 
think other organizations 
working 
counterterrorism policy 
are enabled or hindered 
by their own existing 
authorities and resources 
in addressing terrorism? 
Imbalances 
Overlapping 
Hindered 
Imbalances 
Both 
Adequate 
Hindered 
Hindered 
Limited 
* Note. No Emerging Theme Noted. 
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Participant 406 succinctly expressed this as overall “…disenfranchisement and feeling 
socially excluded, economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised in your 
community with no options,” which open populations up to recruitment to terrorist 
groups and organizations. Participant 205 referred to broader forces that precluded 
normal options, a sense “…that there are forces that they can’t change through the current 
system. The only way to really affect the change is to do something drastic.”  
Marginalization, whether due to race, ethnicity, language, location, etc., was also 
expressed by those interviewed (203, 206, 207, 405, 506) as causing perceptions of 
grievance. Several views were like participant 206, who expressed it as “…a sense of 
marginalization, lack of inclusion in the political system, grievances, whether they be 
individual or whether it’s a group affinity type grievance, seems to be one of the major 
drivers.” Lack of governance and personal security was also expressed (206, 406, 503) as 
being a major cause of grievance, particularly when combined with physical repression 
and arbitrary abuse or punishment threatening individuals’ sense of safety (207, 402, 
404). Participants discussed how these grievance factors lead to growing frustrations, a 
sense of helplessness, with limited options for improvement, leading in the views of a 
majority of participants to the consideration for, and use of, terrorist violence.  
 However, the view regarding perceived causes of terrorism was not unanimous. 
Of note were the views expressed by participants from the State Department, where the 
common theme noted (101, 103, 105, 107, 108) was the complexity of the problem set 
and its dependence on the unique situations due to local or regional dynamics. Responses 
were like that expressed by participant 101: “I think it’s a really complicated process that 
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involves everything from economics, sociology, political circumstances, history. In some 
cases, it’s not genetic, but family related.” State Department participants also pushed 
back on the basic assumption of the question of terrorist causes itself (402 expressed this 
view as well), stressing instead that the complexities of the phenomenon of terrorist 
violence was set within an elaborate and dynamic structure of individual and family (106, 
402), local (104), even regional dependencies (108). Participant 105 said “It’s not just 
one or two factors that go into it. It’s more complex than that…” One State Department 
participant (101) highlighted examples of extreme differences in terrorist behavior by 
siblings growing up in the same situation – one choosing a violent path with the other 
not.  
The theme of ideology as a cause of terrorism was mentioned by five OSD and 
Joint Staff participants (401, 404, 501, 502, 504). A few others (105, 201, 207, 301) also 
mentioned the role of ideology in radicalization to terrorist violence. However, ideology 
was specifically challenged by several State Department participants as being overly 
simplistic an explanation regarding terrorism (101, 103, 107, 108).  
 Regarding perceived seriousness of the terrorism threat, views by participants 
varied. An observed theme that the overall threat of terrorism is medium, but definitely 
not existential, was noted in the commonality of responses by participants from USAID, 
OSD, and the Joint Staff (203, 205, 206, 207, 401, 403, 405, 406, 501 through 506). The 
view expressed by participant 203 was representative of others, who said terrorism is 
“Something to keep an eye on, but not something to be so consumed with that all of your 
resources flow in that direction.” Both NCTC participants also agreed with this view 
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(301, 302). The outliers were again participants from the State Department, where a 
variety of perspectives were expressed, with no noted commonality of theme. Some (102, 
107) viewed the terrorist threat as high, even existential, but others differed, with one 
(108) even having the perspective that the seriousness is “vastly exaggerated.” This last 
perspective was shared by two participants from USAID (202, 208), who expressed the 
view that the issue is “well overblown.”  
Themes Regarding Personal Influences 
The most common theme observed from participants regarding what influenced 
their own views regarding terrorism was that of experience. Responses were similar to 
that of participant 108, who said “Key to my views is the field experience I have had, I 
think…” Participant 208 expressed it in a similar manner: “I guess it’s my lived 
experience. Interacting with people, both those on, what I would say are extremist 
spectrums, or people who have held extreme views on either side of it.” However, the 
exact nature of experience was further qualified or refined by participants, who expressed 
additional details in numerous ways. The first refinement noted was that highlighting 
their professional experience serving in their official capacities, working foreign policy 
related portfolios across their careers (105, 107, 302, 401, 404, 406, 501). Participant 401 
expressed it as: “Professional experience of studying terrorists and just being involved in 
the problem for so long, just that longevity of it…” A nuance on this theme was observed 
in responses from USAID participants, who identified their travel experience, specifically 
serving in overseas posts, which provided them rich cultural exposure through close 
interactions with local populations (202, 203, 204, 205, 206).  
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Another variation on the theme of experience was that of living abroad as having 
an identified influence on participants in how they viewed terrorism (102, 105, 108, 403, 
405). Participant 405 talked about the lived experience: “I think it has to be living abroad 
and seeing it, being in these cultures. And living around the people who are fighting it 
kind of on the front lines is the biggest one.” In each of these cases, the participants had 
served overseas in conflict-prone areas and discussed how this experience living in areas 
experiencing terrorist violence influenced their perspectives. The responses from most 
the Joint Staff participants (502 through 506 but expressed as well by 201) also discussed 
how living abroad influenced their views regarding terrorism, although for each of them 
it was specific to their own combat experiences in the context of their deployments 
throughout their personal military careers. Participant 502 said: “I would say just my 
experience overseas deployed to environments obviously that are ripe for terrorist 
organizations because they lack security, because they lacked any sort of government, 
and a group.” This view was shared by Participant 504: “I think experience. Seeing it 
firsthand, …both in Iraq and Afghanistan.”  
While not a common theme, several participants highlighted experience from 
violence as having a significant influence on how they view terrorism. Two (106, 207) 
related personal experiences related to the 9/11 attack that they said greatly influenced 
how they view terrorism. Two others (301, 401) highlighted other firsthand experience 
observing terrorist violence with greatly influencing their views on the topic. Two others 
(206, 402) related unique childhood experiences as having influenced their views on 
terrorism. One (206) discussed the experience of growing up poor in an economically 
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challenged region of the U.S., and how this provided unique insight and understanding 
into how stressed populations deal with their government. The other (402) talked about 
how growing up hearing his father and other Vietnam veterans talk about that conflict 
influenced how he looks at foreign policy, especially regarding conflict and terrorism.  
Another lesser observed theme was the influence of reading on views regarding 
terrorism. This theme was observed in the responses from State Department and USAID 
participants (103, 107, 201, 205, but also 407). A couple of participants (104, 206) 
refined the theme of reading to that gained through their own academic study. References 
to the influence of reading was articulated in ways such as doing “…a lot of reading. I 
think just trying to be open to all of the opinions that are out there and being able to 
assess it together” (205). One (208) stressed their extensive personal interest and reading 
in the subject of history as having a large influence on their views regarding terrorism: “I 
guess, I’m a student of history, so that first and foremost as an amateur historian, I am 
able to take a long view where terrorism has always been part of the human condition…”  
Themes Regarding Bureaucratic or Organizational Influences 
Two distinct themes were observed regarding the influence of organizations on 
personal views of terrorism. On one hand were the views of 16 participants, who 
expressed the perspective that their views had definitely or very much been influenced by 
their organizations (102, 107, 201 through 208, 404, 405, 406, 501, 503, 505). The view 
expressed by participant 204 was common to many in this group, saying: “Yeah, I think 
how it got framed in my head with drivers, etc. It was definitely influenced by the agency 
because that was sort of the framework through which to process. So, I think that did 
128 
 
influence it a lot.” This positive theme was also reflected in the number of participants 
(again, a total of 16) who felt their own views regarding terrorism were shared across 
their organization very well (102, 106, 202 through 206, 401, 402, 406, 501, 503, 505, 
506). While these two groups did not overlay exactly one-to-one, the overlap between 
these two views was significant (i.e., 11 of the 16 participants).  
Two interesting discrepancies within this theme were noted, with participant 203 
stating their views were shared with fellow career civilian coworkers, but not with their 
political leadership. Participant 204 expressed a generational difference, with a common 
view among younger employees, but not as much common view with their older 
colleagues. Three from OSD (403, 405, 407) were not sure whether their own views 
regarding the causes of terrorism were shared among their colleagues.  
In contrast was the theme by many of the other participants (a total of nine) that 
there was not much perceived influence on their individual views on terrorism resulting 
from their organization, or at most only somewhat of an influence (101, 103, 104, 105, 
301, 403, 502, 504, 506). Participant 105 thought external factors were more important: 
“My initial reaction would be to say, it’s probably more shaped by external factors than 
internal factors.” In a similar manner, participant 301 answered this question with: “Not 
much, no. I feel I actually brought more from the outside based on my personal 
experience than what I gained from the bureaucratic experience.” From the broader 
perspective, 11 participants also had the more negative view that their own views 
regarding terrorism were only somewhat or generally shared among their colleagues 
(101, 103, 104, 107, 108, 201, 206, 207, 302, 502, 504). Only one participant (301) said 
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that their views regarding terrorism were definitely not shared across their organization: 
“I do not believe they share my view very much.” 
These views regarding the influence of their organization on their own 
perspectives were set within the general context that their coworkers understand the 
causes of terrorism very well, a view expressed by a majority (19 total) of participants 
(102, 105, 107, 201 through 208, 302, 401, 402, 403, 406, 502, 504, 506). Seven felt their 
colleagues generally understood the causes of terrorism (101, 103, 104, 106, 407, 501, 
503). There were only three participants (403, 404, 505) who had a divergent view, that 
being their counterterrorism policy colleagues did not well understand the causes of 
terrorism.  
Themes Regarding the Interagency 
An overall positive theme emerged from study participants regarding their 
perceptions on the level of understanding on the causes of terrorism by their interagency 
colleagues. A total of 15 participants had the perception that their counterterrorism policy 
colleagues across the interagency understand the causes of terrorism good or very well 
(102, 106, 107, 201, 207, 301, 302, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407, 501, 503, 505). Many of 
these perspectives were like that expressed by participant 407: “I think there’s a lot of 
folks that do have a good understanding.” Several, like participant 207, expressed 
perspectives that their interagency colleagues had extensive understanding on the causes 
of terrorism – “The level of knowledge, expertise, and also tolerance in the community is 
really striking, and I think is underappreciated outside of the community.” Nine 
additional participants had the view that their interagency colleagues had a general 
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understanding (101, 103, 104, 105, 201, 204, 205, 208, 502). These views were very 
similar to how participants assessed the level of understanding regarding terrorism among 
colleagues within their own organization. The outlying, divergent views regarding their 
interagency colleagues were expressed by several USAID colleagues, but not as a 
specific theme. Participant 203 said they didn’t know, and participant 204 had the 
perspective that the level of understanding varied across organizations. Participant 206 
felt things were improving over time.  
 Another theme emerged that indicated study participants had the overall 
impression that there is a common level of understanding regarding the causes of 
terrorism amongst their interagency colleagues. A total of 11 study participants expressed 
perceptions that there is generally a common understanding across the interagency 
regarding the causes of terrorism. (104, 106, 201, 202, 203, 404, 405, 406, 502, 503, 
504), with two additional (301, 506) expressing that there was somewhat of a common 
understanding across the interagency. Participant 401 stated this as “I think there’s 
symmetry, it’s not bad,” which was a view expressed by many. Several others in this 
group expressed it like participant 404: “I mean I think on a macro level, yeah, I mean 
people realize that these are incredibly complex problem sets…” The noted divergent 
views were from Joint Staff participants, two of whom also expressed perspectives that a 
common understanding is not there (501, 505), or the view expressed by participant 504, 
who felt that counterterrorism policy professionals are just fatigued after dealing with the 
challenge for 18 years: “I think people are at fatigue. I’m not sure there’s much else we 
can do that we aren’t already doing.” 
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Themes Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 
 Unlike the areas discussed above, no common theme emerged on the topic of how 
the U.S. could best address the threat of terrorism. Responses from study participants 
were extremely varied on this topic, both within and between organizations. Only within 
USAID was there some internal commonality, with five of the eight respondents (202, 
204, 205, 206, 208) expressing prevention activities being among the best ways to 
address the threats posed by terrorism. A few, such as participant 101, spoke in 
generalities: “I think the best way to deal with it, is to be aware that it’s not a one size fits 
all kind of thing.” Participant 401 highlighted terrorism as a condition to be managed, not 
a problem that could ever be solved. “We can get to a point where it is a condition we’ve 
mitigated, it’s a condition that we can live with, but…it’s probably not something [we 
can eliminate completely].” Participant 406 said the U.S. approach should be much less 
that what it’s been doing: “Maybe we should take a more backseat, hands off approach by 
empowering and supporting the local governments… I feel like the U.S. should take a 
less prominent role in the counter terrorism programming that it’s doing, and that’s on all 
fronts.” 
Regarding organizational empowerment, whether their own or their view of other 
entities, the overwhelming theme was U.S. organizations are constrained, limited, and 
hindered, by existing authorities and available resources in their ability to address 
terrorism. This negative theme of constraint or hinderance was observed in a total of 26 
study participants, making it the predominate perspective across the board (101 through 
108, 201 through 208, 401 through 407, 501, 502, 505). Comments such as the following 
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were typical responses. “So, [resources are] totally inadequate to take anything to 
scale…” (from participant 202). “But you know, you can always do more with more…” 
(from participant 203). Participant 208 felt their full potential is hindered: “So it means 
that we’re never able to truly meet our potential in this space because it’s under 
resourced.” Participant 404 said: “I think we’re largely hindered from engaging 
effectively.”  
However, there were a few outliers from this last theme. Both NCTC participants 
(301, 302) felt their organizations and others in the interagency had adequate authorities 
and resources. A few Joint Staff participants also shared this divergent view, with three 
respondents (503, 504, 506) reflecting that their and other organizations are not hindered 
in their efforts to address terrorism.  
Summary 
The first section of this chapter provided the analytic context of this research 
project, including a review of the setting for the participants and organizations addressed, 
highlighting key demographics of those interviewed. It also provided an overview of the 
data collected and summarized the data analysis process. The second section addressed 
trustworthiness, highlighting the demonstrated evidence of credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. The third section presented the study’s analytic results, 
first by restating the research question, and then providing a summary of the emerging 
themes from the data collection interviews of study participants. These results were then 
discussed in greater detail, highlighting the observed themes for how terrorism is viewed, 
the potential impacts of personal and organizational influences, commonality and 
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differences across the interagency, and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. The final 
chapter presents the study’s analytic findings, draws conclusions, and makes 
recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and 
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories 
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism 
policymaking organizations. I used qualitative methodology, including individual 
interviews and data from participant questionnaires, to analyze individual perspectives 
within and across organizational cultures and to assess the impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Unlike other studies related to this area, which included 
historical archival data and little analysis of field interviews (Kassop, 2013; Sageman, 
2014), this study included insights provided by current government counterterrorism 
officials to address their views on the causes of terrorism and their reflections on the 
factors that influence their decision-making process regarding counterterrorism policy 
development.  
In addressing the primary research question and its five subquestions, the 
following key findings were observed. First was the predominance among study 
participants of root causes theory as the primary cause of terrorism. Second was personal 
experiences are a dominant influence in views on terrorism. Third was perspectives 
regarding organizational influence on participants’ views of terrorism varied by 
organization. Fourth, participants viewed their colleagues as well versed in the causes of 
terrorism. Finally, individual views had a minimal impact on U.S. counterterrorism 
policy.  
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The first section of this chapter provides the interpretation of the key findings. 
The second section addresses the limitations of the study, which is followed by a series of 
recommendations, including areas that would benefit from further research. Potential 
implications of the research are then reviewed, including areas in which this research can 
influence positive social change in the development and implementation of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Final reflections on the study are then presented. The chapter 
closes with an overall conclusion to the research project.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Qualitative thematic analysis of the interviews, supported by analysis of data 
gathered from the survey questionnaire, resulted in five key findings. These findings are 
set within the broader context of who, what, and why for understanding the selected 
phenomenon of interest defined by the research question: To what extent do individual 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism among U.S. policymakers, and the possible 
influences on these views due to personal factors, organizational cultures, and 
interagency bureaucracies, impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy?  
The who was a static baseline purposely selected as the target of this research, 
including four primary organizations in the executive branch of the U.S. government 
responsible for developing and implementing counterterrorism policy: the State and 
Defense Departments, USAID, and NCTC. The first key finding addressed what U.S. 
policy professionals think causes terrorism. The next three key findings addressed why 
based on policy professionals’ personal experiences, bureaucratic cultures, or interagency 
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similarities and differences in views. The last key finding addressed how these factors 
impact U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
Predominance of ‘Root Cause’ Theory Perspectives 
 The first subquestion of this study was the following: To what extent do 
individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align with existing academic theories? 
This issue was the foundational baseline of this entire study, which is why it appeared at 
the beginning of the main research question and all five of the research subquestions. The 
theoretical framework of this research (primary theories on the causes of terrorism) was 
the lens through which the emerging themes from the study participants were interpreted.  
 One finding from this study was that most study participants viewed grievances as 
the primary cause of terrorism. Participants reported that these grievances could be due to 
many factors, such as inequities in status, housing, or economic opportunity. 
Marginalization was also mentioned, as was lack of governance, personal security, 
repression, and arbitrary abuse or punishment by the authorities. Participants discussed 
how these grievance factors lead to growing frustrations, a sense of helplessness, and 
limited options for improvement, causing affected individuals to consider and then 
resorting to terrorist violence.  
The emerging theme that grievances, due to chronic inequities, marginalization, 
repression by authorities, lack of recourse, and overall helplessness, are the primary cause 
of terrorism aligns with the fundamental elements of root causes theory (see Betts, 2002; 
Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). Root causes theory as it relates to the 
motivations of terrorism stresses key underlying factors related to economic, educational, 
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demographic, and political issues as the fundamental reasons individuals use violence to 
achieve political objectives (see Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). 
In addition, participants’ identification of arbitrary actions and physical abuse by 
government military or security services and a lack of opportunities for betterment or 
advancement as key factors among the grievances further aligns with root causes research 
by Betts (2002), Feldman (2009), and Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003).  
 The view of grievance being the primary cause of terrorism was not unanimous, 
however. Some participants expressed the complexity of the problem set and its 
dependence on the unique situations due to local or regional dynamics. These participants 
discussed how complex dependencies are usually set within an elaborate and dynamic 
structure of individual, family, local, and regional dependencies. This view regarding the 
causes of terrorism aligns with group dynamics theory described by Berrebi (2009), 
Kuzner (2007), and Piazza (2007), in which individual perspectives and influences due to 
intergroup relationships underpin decisions for the use of violence against civilians for 
political ends. Within group dynamics theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) discussed 
how individuals need a sense of group belonging and judge their group in contrast with 
other groups. These types of group commitment and solidarity are of particular 
importance during conflict and have been shown to be a powerful motivator to violence 
(Melucci, 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
 This finding provides unique research-based insights into the views on the causes 
of terrorism among current U.S. counterterrorism policymakers. The finding extends 
knowledge within the academic community, as called for by Kassop (2013) and Sageman 
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(2014), who highlighted the need for researchers to collect data from current and previous 
U.S. government officials regarding their views on terrorism, moving beyond textual or 
narrative-based analysis of official U.S. policy speeches and documents. Insights that 
policymakers view grievances as a primary cause of terrorism, which aligns with root 
causes theory, and that differences in views also exist, namely aligning with group 
dynamics theory, provided for a better understanding of how U.S. policymakers shape 
and implement counterterrorism policy.  
Personal Experiences Are a Dominant Influence in Views on Terrorism 
 The second research subquestion of this study was the following: To what extent 
can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be understood through individual factors 
related to personal experience? Participant perspectives regarding personal experience 
were viewed through the conceptual framework of this study to understand how 
individuals view their surroundings, ascribe context to events, weigh select criteria, and 
make decisions. Notable among these theories that address the role of individual factors 
as influences on decision-making are social cognitive theory (Bandura 1989, 2001, 2011) 
and cultural theory (Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Wildavsky, 1987). Key 
aspects of these theories were reflected in participants’ perspectives regarding the 
influence of their experiences on their views.  
Data analysis indicated that participants’ views regarding terrorism are 
significantly influenced by their personal experience. One important factor mentioned by 
many participants was professional experience serving in their official capacities and 
working on foreign-policy-related portfolios throughout their careers. Another factor 
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reported was travel experience, specifically serving in overseas posts or on deployment, 
which provided participants with cultural exposure through close interactions with local 
populations. Finally, the experience of living abroad was also highlighted by study 
participants as having a significant influence on how they view terrorism, especially 
those who had served overseas in conflict-prone areas.  
 Study participants’ identification of professional experiences as the primary 
influence on their perspectives regarding terrorism aligns within the social cognitive 
theoretical framework. Developed by Bandura (1989, 2001), the foundational element of 
social cognitive theory is that individuals learn by observing others. Behaviors that are 
learned, including those from placement within specific environmental settings, are 
central to an individual’s personality and perspectives over time (Bandura, 1989, 2001; 
Wood & Bandura, 1989). The data collected from the survey questionnaire (see Table 1 
and Appendix D) showed the length of service among the study sample. Almost 70% 
were 40 years old or older, and more than 75% had worked for the federal government 
more than 10 years. More than 50% had worked in counterterrorism policy for more than 
5 years. Taylor’s (2014) research regarding social cognitive theory demonstrated that 
organizational context and culture provide strong motivations to the unity of effort and 
execution of public service. Over a period of time, the work environment and 
organizational structures shape how public employees view and react to situations (Salas 
et al., 2010; Taylor, 2014). These factors were demonstrated in my participants’ 
description of the importance of their personal experiences in how they view the causes 
of terrorism.  
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 Participants in the current study also highlighted the role of travel (i.e., personal 
and business) and living abroad as key elements of their experience influencing their 
views on terrorism, a finding that directly aligns within cultural theory. As articulated by 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the primary perspective that underlies cultural theory is 
that individuals use a cultural lens, or filter, from which to view situations. This cultural 
lens provides a particular worldview that not only influences how situations are viewed, 
but also impacts how decisions are made in response to situations (Douglas, 1985; 
Wildavsky, 1987). The additional data collected from participants via the survey 
questionnaire (see Table 1 and Appendix D) demonstrated the significant cultural 
awareness among the study sample. More than 80% of study participants assessed their 
cultural awareness at High or Expert, with 75% having been to more than 15 countries, 
50% having lived abroad more than 5 cumulative years, and almost 20% having lived 
abroad more than 10 years. Almost 75% speak one or more languages. Research by 
Coaffee (2006) and Mythen and Walklate (2006) showed how terrorism is framed by 
individuals, which has significant implications for how counterterrorism strategies are 
developed and applied. An overly narrow cultural lens can result in an overly simplistic 
construction when used to understand terrorism (Coaffee, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 
2006). A lack of cultural awareness was not observed in the current study’s sample.  
 This finding provides unique research-based insight into the importance of 
personal experience as a key influence on U.S. policymakers’ views of terrorism. 
Elements from social construction theory and cultural theory are present in their views, 
given their rich descriptions of their working experience within the federal 
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counterterrorism policy community, or more broadly from their extensive travel or 
experiences living abroad in areas plagued by terrorist violence. This research filled a gap 
in academic knowledge by demonstrating the importance of personal experience as an 
influence on how the causes of terrorism are viewed and addressed.  
Regarding Organizational Influence, It Depends 
 The third research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent are these 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced by existing bureaucratic cultures in 
specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking organizations? Participant perspectives 
regarding organizational influence was viewed through the conceptual framework of this 
study to understand how individuals view their surroundings, ascribe context to events, 
weigh select criteria, and make decisions. Three organizational theories were used to shed 
insights into participants views: resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
the organizational processes model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), and 
groupthink theory (Janis, 1971, 1972).  
The finding from this research is that views by participants regarding 
organizational influences on how they perceive the causes of terrorism depends on the 
organization. Two distinct, conflicting themes were observed regarding the potential 
influence of organizations on personal views regarding terrorism. On one hand, 50% of 
participants had the perspective that their views had been influenced by their 
organization. This group entailed all the participants from USAID and half each from the 
OSD and Joint Staff. Most of these participants also had the perspective that their own 
views regarding terrorism were shared across their organization. On the other hand, 30% 
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of the participants, half from the State Department and half from the Joint Staff, 
expressed perceptions that their individual views regarding terrorism had not been 
influenced by their organization. With a few additions, this same cohort also expressed 
the perspective that their own views regarding terrorism were only somewhat shared 
among their colleagues.  
 In addition to the expressed benefits of experienced colleagues and ability for 
recurring foreign travel, USAID participants also had the view that their organization 
provided the framework from which they view the terrorism problem. Many specifically 
referred to the ‘prevention framework,’ discussing their organization’s efforts to get 
ahead of possible causes of terrorism with vulnerable populations. In this sense, this 
perspective is reflective of the organization process model, since the stated prevention 
framework by so many participants indicates it is inherent in USAID’s structure and 
programming processes (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Kuwashima, 2014; 
Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). A well-established organizational structure can overly focus 
on particular responses and can be self-reinforcing in how they are used and implemented 
over time (Kuwashima, 2014; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011).  
These participants didn’t articulate this prevention framework was specifically 
limiting. However, other responses to interview questions indicated they (as well as the 
majority of all participants) did feel strongly that their organization’s efforts were 
hindered by both authorities and resources. Perceptions regarding bureaucratic limitations 
are indicative of not only Allison’s (1971) organization process model, but also that of 
resource dependency theory premised by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). The overwhelming 
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commonality in the views by participants that their organizations are fundamentally 
hindered in their activities, both due to authorities and appropriations from Congress, 
aligns within the foundational element described by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), where 
external resources of organizations both bound and influence their activities, functions, 
and operations.  
 Only within USAID participants was an organizational alignment apparent, with 
perspectives their organization did influence their employees’ views regarding terrorism. 
While 30% of the participants expressed the perception that their individual views 
regarding terrorism had not been influenced by their organization, this view was not 
expressed by a majority from any other organization, being shared by half of the 
participants from the State Department and the Joint Staff, respectively. These views run 
counter to the elements of both Allison’s (1971) organization process model and Pfeffer 
and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency theory. There is no apparent analytic reason 
for these differences in views regarding organizational influences from the participant 
interviews or the collected survey data. The entire participant sample indicated 
similarities in length of service, with 75% having worked for the federal government 
more than 10 years, and more than 50% working specifically in counterterrorism policy 
for more than 5 years (see Table 1 and Appendix D).  
The level of data collected from the interviews and the survey data does not 
appear to be sufficient to reasonably determine whether elements of Janis’ (1972, 1982) 
groupthink theory can be applied to the observed results regarding organizational 
influences. As discussed above, there seemed to be correlation within the participant 
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cohort who expressed the perspective their organization had influenced their views 
regarding terrorism, feeling that their views were shared with colleagues within their 
organization as well. In contrast, the cohort who didn’t have perspectives of 
organizational influence also didn’t assess their views were shared with colleagues. In 
neither of these cohorts was any data observed indicating whether participants were 
unconsciously or consciously pressured to modify their views, which is the underlying 
element of the groupthink theory described by Janis (1972, 1982).  
 These findings regarding presence of organizational influence provides research-
based insight into the views of U.S. counterterrorism policymakers. The only observed 
organizational alignment occurred within the participants from USAID, who were part of 
the 50% of the study participants expressing the perspective that their views had been 
influenced by their organizations. These views appear in alignment with key elements in 
both the organization process model and resource dependency theory (Allison, 1971; 
Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The other 30% of participants, 
however, had differing views, with perceptions their organization didn’t have influence 
on their views of terrorism. This research demonstrates a continued gap in knowledge 
regarding the presence of, and details regarding, organizational influence on U.S. 
counterterrorism policymakers, requiring further academic research.  
Participants Think Their Colleagues Understand Terrorism Well 
 The fourth research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent are these 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected between and among the key 
policymaking organizations? Participant views on the causes of terrorism are the 
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foundational baseline of this study and are discussed in detail in the first research finding 
above. However, the purpose of this research subquestion was to gain insight into 
participants’ views regarding the level of perceived understanding of terrorism, both 
within their own organization as well as more broadly across the interagency. The finding 
from the data is clear that most participants view their colleagues working 
counterterrorism policy, both within (83%) and without (75%) their own organization, as 
having a very good understanding of the causes of terrorism. This result was consistent 
across all the organizations included in this research, with no organizational-unique 
dynamics or discrepancies noted.  
 As discussed previously, the view most prevalent across participants was that of 
grievances being the primary cause of terrorism, a view that aligns with the fundamental 
elements of root causes theory (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000). 
This perspective was not unanimous, however.  Some participants expressed the overall 
complexity of terrorism, being dependent on unique local or regional dynamics, a 
perspective that aligns with group dynamics theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; & 
Piazza, 2007). Regardless of these results, 83% of study participants expressed the 
perspective that their colleagues within their own organization had a general or more 
understanding of the causes of terrorism. Looking across their colleagues in their 
interagency partner organizations, there was just a slightly lower response, with 75% 
expressing the view that their interagency colleagues had a general or better 
understanding of the causes of terrorism.  
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 Derived from responses from interviewing participants within the primary U.S. 
counterterrorism policymaking organizations, this finding provided unique research-
based insights into how they view their colleagues understanding of the causes of 
terrorism. These results extend knowledge within the research community interested in 
counterterrorism policy issues and implications. As called for by Kassop (2013) and 
Sageman (2014), the results provide a greater understanding of how U.S. policymakers 
view and interact with their colleagues in developing and implementing counterterrorism 
policy.  
Individual Views Have Minimal Impact on U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 
The fifth research subquestion of this study asked – To what extent do these 
perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. counterterrorism policy? The finding from this 
research indicate policymakers’ individual views do not appear to impact in any 
meaningful way the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
This finding is based on the view by participants that their own organization, as well as 
their partner organizations across the interagency, are constrained, limited, and hindered 
in their ability to address terrorism by existing authorities and available resources. This 
perspective was observed from 83% of participants, making it the predominate 
perspective across the board.  
This finding appears independent of observing elements of both root causes 
theory (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000) and group dynamics 
theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; & Piazza, 2007) in participants’ perspectives on the 
causes of terrorism. The overwhelming view of organizational constraint among 
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participants also reflects key elements fundamental to both the organizational processes 
model (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), and resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 This finding confirmed fundamental elements of both Allison’s (1971) 
organizational processes model and Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependency 
theory, adding unique research-based insights into how counterterrorism policymakers 
view their organizations ability to adequately address terrorism being hindered and 
constrained. The results of this study extend knowledge within the research community 
interested in counterterrorism policy issues and implications.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Two potential limitations that might have impacted the trustworthiness of this 
research were presented in Chapter 1. First was the scope of the participant pool to enable 
a suitable sample from which to determine meaningful perspectives from across the 
primary counterterrorism policymaking organizations in the U.S. government. Second 
was the acknowledged researcher self-perspectives and possible biases on the subject 
being studied.  
The only unexpected limitation to this study was the number of participants 
recruited from NCTC. While generally supportive, none of the NCTC office managers 
contacted were willing to sign a letter of cooperation. Subsequent referrals to the NCTC 
public affairs office ended up with no follow through, despite numerous attempts. As 
subsequently approved by the Walden University IRB, I contacted NCTC employees 
directly outside of business hours in an attempt to get them to volunteer to participate. 
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Eight NCTC employees were individually contacted by phone, but only two were willing 
to volunteer to be participants. Insights provided by these two NCTC volunteers were 
valuable, but the lack of the planned six to eight participants precluded meaningful 
extrapolation of qualitative results for NCTC.  
There were no additional unexpected limitations to the study. I conducted the rest 
of the study recruiting and interviews as planned, and I had no indication of any limits to 
the trustworthiness of the participants. Potential researcher biases were carefully 
managed through the deliberate and structured steps taken in the manner in which 
questions were developed, how interviews were conducted, the process and procedures 
utilized to collect and process the data, and the analytic logic used to analyze the results. 
These steps, and the rigorous analytic development of findings and recommendations, 
sufficiently mitigated the risks of researcher biases from tainting this research.  
Recommendations 
 This study was conducted to fill the gap in knowledge regarding the factors 
influencing the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies 
(Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013; Sageman, 2014). Moving beyond historical archival 
research, this study incorporated qualitative data collected from current government 
counterterrorism officials regarding their perspectives on the causes of terrorism and the 
factors that influence their decision processes regarding counterterrorism policy. Even 
with the analytic findings outlined above, several recommendations for future research 
arise as a result of this study. 
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 First, although this research found a predominance of root cause theory 
perspectives (Betts, 2002; Lake, 2004; Newman, 2006; Tandon, 2000) among the 
counterterrorism policy officials across the four key U.S. executive branch departments 
or agencies, it is recommended that additional qualitative research would expand the 
body of knowledge and provide further insights. Detailed research focusing within each 
of the four organizations that were the focus of this study, including policy professionals 
with other functional or regional expertise, would expand understanding on how 
terrorism and its causes are viewed within and among other offices or bureaus. Particular 
perspectives within the participants from the State Department, namely views aligning 
with group dynamics theory (Berrebi, 2009; Kuzner, 2007; Piazza, 2007), might provide 
further insight into how policy professionals working in the diplomatic service view 
terrorism and its causes. Future researchers might also leverage an expanded data 
sampling approach, using broader quantitative techniques, such as a detailed survey 
instrument to a larger participant pool, to enable deeper statistical and trend analysis. This 
type of expanded research would help broaden academic understanding and confirm the 
research findings made in this study. 
 Second, while this study showed that personal experiences are a dominant 
influence among U.S. counterterrorism policy officials in their views on terrorism, 
findings regarding organizational influence were not as clear. Therefore, additional 
research that specifically focuses on organizational factors, such as described in resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the organizational processes model 
(Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999), might articulate key organizational factors 
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within or between U.S. policymaking organizations. A qualitative approach focusing 
solely on gaining insights into how policymakers are influenced in their views of 
terrorism over time, using either a broader series of interview questions, or even a 
longitudinal study of a selected group of participants within a particular organization over 
a period of time, would provide broader and deeper understanding into the impacts of 
organizations on employees views. Other organizational influence theories might also be 
utilized, such as groupthink theory postulated by Janis (1971, 1972), as highlighted in this 
study, or other relevant theories. Future researchers might also leverage a broader 
quantitative research technique, leveraging a survey instrument to a larger participant 
pool, to provide further statistical and trend analysis. This type of expanded research 
would assist filling the continuing gap in knowledge regarding organizational influence 
on how U.S. policymakers view the causes of terrorism.  
 Third, one of the findings of this study indicated individual views on the causes of 
terrorism have minimal impact on U.S. counterterrorism policy. Participants in this study 
expressed the overwhelming view that their ability to influence their organizations 
policies and programs to counter terrorism are constrained, limited, and hindered by 
existing authorities and available resources. This finding is worthy of additional research 
to confirm its validity. It is recommended that additional qualitative research build upon 
this study in order to further understand these perspectives. Research could focus on a 
deeper understanding of whether these perceived constraints are due to factors related to 
authorities or appropriations. This study used a phenomenological strategy of inquiry to 
gather insights from study participants. Future researchers might leverage a similar 
151 
 
approach, or use other techniques, such as a qualitative case study methodology focused 
on a particular counterterrorism program or activity, or a broader narrative research 
approach, using focus groups to gather deeper insights into how policymakers view 
limitations in developing or implementing counterterrorism programs. Additional data 
collection and research analysis could help shed further insights into this topic.  
 Fourth, one of the acknowledged limitations of this study was the lower number 
than planned of participants from the intelligence community. While the intelligence 
community is not a policymaking organization, it is keenly involved in the policymaking 
process, including for counterterrorism. The views of intelligence analysts, such as those 
who work at NCTC, are important to understanding how counterterrorism policy is 
developed and implemented. It is therefore recommended that further research be 
conducted into the perspectives of NCTC and other intelligence professionals regarding 
how they view the causes of terrorism, and what may or may not influence their 
perspectives. Current or previous government employees of the U.S. intelligence 
community conducting research for higher academic degrees may be better positioned, 
given their placement and access within the intelligence community, to understand both 
the processes required and receive the necessary approvals to collect either qualitative or 
quantitative data and conduct rigorous research to help fill the gap in knowledge in this 
important area of U.S. policy.  
 Fifth and finally, political appointees were specifically excluded from this study 
in order to focus specifically on the perspectives of career U.S. government employees 
working in counterterrorism policy. It is recommended that future research be conducted 
152 
 
into the views and perspective on the causes of terrorism by political appointees in the 
key counterterrorism policymaking departments and agencies, such as the Defense 
Department, State Department, and USAID. This further research, including on how 
individual and organizational factors influence these views, would serve to complement 
this study, and further fill the gap in knowledge outlined by Jackson (2011), Kassop 
(2013), and Sageman (2014).  
Implications 
The insights gained from this study are beneficial to positive social change at the 
national policy level in numerous ways. First, this is a topic of extreme relevance for 
today, having significant ramifications for U.S. foreign policy and relationships with 
foreign countries and international organizations (Jackson, 2011; Kassop, 2013, 
Sageman, 2014). As articulated earlier, using six academic theories regarding the causes 
of terrorism proved a valid lens from which to view and understand U.S. counterterrorism 
policy professionals’ views on the causes of terrorism. At the individual level, root causes 
theory was found to be the predominant view among counterterrorism policymakers as 
the primary cause of terrorism, and participants expressed the view that their personal 
experiences were the dominant influence on these views. These results were found by 
obtaining direct, first-hand perspectives from individual U.S. counterterrorism 
policymakers themselves, using a qualitative methodology. This approach provided more 
detail and nuance than could have been gathered indirectly from analysis of policy 
documents, public statements or pronouncements, or the language from policy speeches.  
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Second, at the organizational level, the role of organizational influence on 
counterterrorism policymakers varied between organizations, although policymakers 
were found to have positive views of their colleagues understanding of the causes of 
terrorism. Since the findings regarding organizational influence was not conclusive, the 
implication is that a more focused qualitative approach is required, possibly augmented 
by interviewing groups of individuals through a focus group setting, along with a more 
detailed survey questionnaire to obtain deeper insights into how organizational factors 
may work with individual factors to influence how terrorism is viewed within U.S. 
policymaking organizations.  
Finally, the qualitative methodology used in this study proved effective in 
exploring and understanding the meaning derived by individuals or groups associated 
with a social or human problem, such as views regarding the causes of terrorism by U.S. 
counterterrorism policymakers. The implications of the approach, method, and process 
used in this study provided a valid template for use by other researchers interested in 
gaining deeper understanding on other significant policy issues effecting U.S. national 
security.  
Reflections 
I was motivated to conduct research into this topic based on a desire to gain 
deeper insights into a subject for which I have a keen personal interest and within which I 
have dedicated almost a third of my professional career. I am a career member of the 
federal civil service and have worked for the U.S. government in various capacities for 
over 32 years, the last 17 years in Washington, D.C., working policy development and 
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implementation, including the last 11 years in the area of counterterrorism. Many of the 
policy discussions in which I’ve participated regarding U.S. policy responses to address 
terrorism were passionate, with organizational positions strenuously stated and defended 
by myself and my interagency colleagues.  
Based on this experience I gathered what I believed was antidotal evidence into 
what I perceived were individual biases aligning within bureaucratic cultures among my 
counterterrorism policy colleagues. Although my research methodology used a 
qualitative versus a quantitative approach, I had a perceived hypothesis going into this 
project that I would observe distinct and different views regarding the causes of terrorism 
from across the four organizations I selected to study. I’d also expected organizational 
culture to be the primary influence on policymakers’ views regarding terrorism. It was to 
gain further insights and understanding into this antidotal evidence that drove me to 
select this topic and subject my own views to the rigors of scholarly research.  
What I found through the course of this study turned out different than my 
personal expectations when I started. The semi-structured conversations I conducted 
during interviews with participants from across the interagency provided much deeper 
insights into individual views and perceptions regarding the causes of terrorism than I’d 
experienced before. I found that my previous experiences in policy discussions and 
debates regarding terrorism were more superficial than I’d believed at the time. The 
structure and rigor of the qualitative process allowed me to move beyond a given policy 
topic or program, with the potential for a particular organizational approach or position 
and dig deeper into participants’ personal views and perspectives. Many of these views 
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were based on deep personal experiences, items that with the clarity of hindsight I’d 
rarely seen arise during policy debates.  
This scholarly process has helped me understand the significant role an 
individual’s life journey can have on one’s views. As I’ve learned through this research, 
personal experiences gained from life’s journey are not always apparent in the 
policymaking process. This research has demonstrated to me how easy it can be absent a 
rigorous approach to superficially extrapolate a policymaker’s stated position on 
terrorism into an erroneous perception of their personal views.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to understand the linkages between theory and 
application, specifically the prevalence of particular worldviews and unique theories 
regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. counterterrorism 
policymaking organizations. The research approach used a qualitative methodology 
through one-on-one interviews and detailed participant questionnaires, analyzing 
individual perspectives within the broader context of both personal experiences and 
organizational cultures, in order to assess impacts on U.S. counterterrorism policy.  
This research helps fill the gap in academic knowledge outlined by Jackson 
(2011), Kassop (2013), Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), and Sageman (2014), who all 
called for scholars to investigate what factors influence the development and 
implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies. Unlike other research on this topic, 
many of which use historical archival research and little analysis of actual field 
interviews, this study involved collecting qualitative data from current government 
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counterterrorism officials to identify their actual views on the causes of terrorism and 
their perceptions on how they’ve been influenced by personal experiences and 
organizational cultures.  
 Five key findings were observed. First, root causes theory was a predominant 
factor in participants’ understanding of the cause of terrorism. Second, personal 
experiences are a dominant influence on these views. Third, organizational influence on 
the views of terrorism varied by organization. Fourth, participants viewed their 
interagency colleagues as well informed regarding the causes of terrorism. Finally, 
individual views among U.S. policymakers have a minimal impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
Interview Questions Deployed to Study Participants 
1. How does the threat of terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security? 
2. What do you feel are the primary causes of terrorism today?  
3. What has had the greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes 
of terrorism? 
4. How could the U.S. best address the threat of terrorism? 
5. How well do you think your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals 
understand the causes of terrorism? 
6. How widely shared is your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others 
across your organization? 
7. Have your own perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your 
organization? 
8. How is your organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources 
in addressing terrorism? 
9. How well do you think counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with 
outside your organization understand the causes of terrorism? 
10. How much common understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do 
you see across the organizations that work counterterrorism policy? 
11. How much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are 
enabled or hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing 
terrorism?   
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Interview Questions (Aligned by Research Subquestions) 
SQ1: To what extent do individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism align 
with existing academic theories?  
2. What do you feel are the primary causes of terrorism today?  
1. How does the threat of terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security?  
SQ2: To what extent can these perspectives on the causes of terrorism be 
understood through individual factors related to personal experience?  
3. What has had the greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes 
of terrorism? 
SQ3: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism influenced 
by existing bureaucratic cultures in specific U.S. counterterrorism policymaking 
organizations?  
7. Have your own perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your 
organization? 
6. How widely shared is your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others 
across your organization? 
SQ4: To what extent are these perspectives on the causes of terrorism reflected 
between and among the key policymaking organizations? 
5. How well do you think your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals 
understand the causes of terrorism? 
9. How well do you think counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with 
outside your organization understand the causes of terrorism? 
10. How much common understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do 
you see across the organizations that work counterterrorism policy? 
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SQ5: To what extent do these perspectives impact the shaping of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy? 
4. How could the U.S. best address the threat of terrorism? 
8. How is your organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources 
in addressing terrorism? 
11. How much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are 
enabled or hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing 
terrorism?  
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Appendix B: Participant Survey Questionnaire 
Circle Answer that Applies: 
Organization: DoD/OSD; DoD/JS; State Dept; USAID; NCTC 
Age Range: 20-30; 30-40; 41-50; 51-60; >60 
Gender: Male; Female 
Marital Status: Single; Married; Separated/Divorced 
 Years Married: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30 
 Do You Have Children: Yes; No 
Education Level: No College; BA/BS; MA/MS; Multiple MA/MS; PhD 
Education Category: International Relations; Political Science; 
Finance/Economics; Social Sciences; Humanities/History; Science/Engineering; Other 
Years of Professional Experience: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30 
Years of Federal Service: 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; >30 
Years in Counterterrorism Policy: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; >20 
Self-Assessed Cultural Awareness: Low; Medium; High; Expert 
Number of Countries Visited: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; >16 
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad: 1-5; 6-10; 11-15; >16 
Language Skills: English Only; 1 Additional; 2+ Additional 
 Additional Language Reading Skills: None; Marginal; Fair; Proficient  
 Additional Language Speaking Skills: None; Marginal; Fair; Proficient 
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Assessed Current Religiosity: None; Low; Medium; High  
Services Attended: Never; 1-3 times/year; 1-3 times/month; 1-3 times/week  
Assessed Religiosity before 25 yrs old: None; Low; Medium; High  
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Appendix C: Pre- and Post-Interview Emails 
Pre-Interview Email 
<Potential Study Participant Name>, 
As I presented recently at your office staff meeting, I am conducting research into 
personal perspectives and organizational factors within the U.S. policy community that 
may impact counterterrorism programs and activities. You indicated that you would 
like to participate in a one-on-one interview to discuss your perspectives on issues 
related to this topic. The interview will between 45-60 minutes and will be conducted 
at your facility to ease your participation. Your participation will also involve filling in 
a 1-page survey questionnaire just prior to the interview to collect information related 
to your personal background, education, and experience, which will provide context to 
your responses and be used for comparison with other study participants.  
The interview discussion will be audio recorded, but no individual will be personally 
identified in the recording, transcripts, on the survey questionnaire, or in the 
subsequent research paper. A consent form will be provided to you and I would require 
your signature prior to participation in the study.  
If you are still interested in participating, please reply in the affirmative to this email. 
Would [insert time] on [insert date Month DD, YYYY] in room [insert building and 
room location] work for your schedule? No response will be interpreted as an 
unwillingness to participate and no further action on your part is required.  
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Should you have any questions or require further information regarding this request, 
please contact me via phone at [insert phone number] or e-mail [insert e-mail 
address].  
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Post-Interview Email 
< Study Participant Name>, 
Thank you for participating in the one-on-one interview with me on [insert date Month 
DD, YYYY]. Your openness during the interview and perspectives that you provided 
were of great assistance to this research project. Your information will provide a 
significant piece of the collected data to help in understanding the prevalence of 
specific theories regarding the causes of terrorism in professionals working in U.S. 
counterterrorism policymaking organizations. Your involvement in this study will 
provide researchers, government entities, organizations, and citizens with insights into 
the perspectives of, and influences on, U.S. counterterrorism policymakers.  
Please let me know if you would like copies of your interview recording and/or 
transcript, which I will provide to you upon request. I will send you via email an 
executive summary of the study’s analytic results following completion of all 
interviews and preliminary analysis of the data.  
As we discussed before and after the interview, your identity will be protected, with 
any information you provided presented as an alias (an assigned number), ensuring the 
anonymity of your responses. I will at no time include your name or anything else that 
could identify you in any reports of this study. 
Should you have any additional questions, or require further information regarding this 
research study, please contact me via phone at [insert phone number] or e-mail [insert 
e-mail address].   
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Appendix D: Study Participant Demographics Data 
Category State USAID NCTC 
DoD TOTAL 
OSD JS # % 
Age Range       
  20 to 30 1 0 0 1 0 2 6.45 
  31 to 40 0 2 1 2 3 8 25.81 
  41 to 50 5 2 1 1 2 11 35.48 
  51 to 60 2 4 0 2 1 9 29.03 
  >60 0 0 0 1 0 1 3.23 
Gender       
  Male 7 4 1 5 6 23 74.19 
  Female 1 4 1 2 0 8 25.81 
Marital Status 
  Single 0 2 0 2 1 5 16.13 
  Married 8 5 2 5 5 25 80.65 
  Separate/Divorced 0 1 0 0 0 1 3.23 
Years Married 
  n/a 0 3 0 2 0 5 16.67 
  1 to 10 3 1 1 1 1 7 23.33 
  11 to 20 3 2 1 2 3 11 36.67 
  21 to 30 2 2 0 2 1 7 23.33 
  >30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Do You Have Children 
  Yes 8 5 2 5 5 25 71.43 
  No 0 3 0 2 5 10 28.57 
Education Level 
  No College 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  BA/BS 2 0 1 1 1 5 16.13 
  MA/MS 2 6 0 6 3 17 54.84 
  Multiple MA/MS 0 1 1 0 2 4 12.90 
  PhD/JD 4 1 0 0 0 5 16.13 
Education Category 
  Int’l Relations 4 2 1 5 2 14 45.16 
  Political Science 2 3 1 0 1 7 22.58 
  Finance/Economics 0 0 0 1 0 1 3.23 
  Social Sciences 0 2 0 0 0 2 6.45 
(Continued) 
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Category State USAID NCTC 
DoD TOTAL 
OSD JS # % 
Education Category 
  Humanities/History 0 1 0 0 0 1 3.23 
  Science/Engineer 1 0 0 1 3 5 16.13 
  Other 1 0 0 0 0 1 3.23 
Years of Professional Experience 
  1 to 10 1 0 1 2 0 4 12.90 
  11 to 20 4 3 0 2 3 12 38.71 
  21 to 30 2 4 1 1 2 10 32.26 
  >30 1 1 0 2 1 5 16.13 
Years of Federal Service 
  1 to 10 1 2 1 3 0 7 22.58 
  11 to 20 4 4 1 1 3 13 41.94 
  21 to 30 3 2 0 0 2 7 22.58 
>30 0 0 0 3 1 4 12.90 
Years in CT Policy 
  1 to 5 1 2 1 4 6 14 45.16 
  6 to 10 4 3 0 1 0 8 25.81 
  11 to 15 2 2 1 1 0 6 19.35 
  16 to 20 1 1 0 1 0 3 9.68 
  >20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Self-Assessed Cultural Awareness 
  Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  Medium 0 1 0 2 2 5 17.24 
  High 5 2 1 4 4 16 55.17 
  Expert 2 4 1 1 0 8 27.59 
Number of Countries Visited 
  0 (None) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  1 to 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  6 to 10 0 0 1 1 1 3 9.68 
  11 to 15 1 0 1 2 1 5 16.13 
  >16 7 8 0 4 4 23 74.19 
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad 
  0 (None) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
  1 to 5 4 4 2 5 2 17 54.84 
  6 to 10 1 2 0 2 3 8 25.81 
(Continued) 
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Category State USAID NCTC 
DoD TOTAL 
OSD JS # % 
Cumulative Years Living/Serving Abroad 
  11 to 15 2 1 0 0 1 4 12.90 
  >16 1 1 0 0 0 2 6.45 
Self-Assessed Language Skills 
  English Only 0 1 1 3 3 8 25.81 
  1+ Language 1 4 1 2 2 10 32.26 
  2+ Languages 7 3 0 2 1 13 41.94 
Additional Language Reading Skills 
  None 0 0 1 3 3 7 22.58 
  Marginal 1 1 0 2 2 6 19.35 
  Fair 3 2 1 1 1 8 25.81 
  Proficient 4 5 0 1 0 10 62.50 
Additional Language Speaking Skills 
  None 0 0 1 3 2 6 19.35 
  Marginal 1 2 0 2 3 8 25.81 
  Fair 2 2 1 1 1 7 22.58 
  Proficient 5 4 0 1 0 10 32.26 
Self-Assessed Current Religiosity 
  None 2 0 0 1 0 3 9.68 
  Low 4 4 0 1 3 12 38.71 
  Medium 2 3 1 3 2 11 35.48 
  High 0 1 1 2 1 5 16.13 
Religious Services Attended 
  Never 2 0 0 3 0 5 16.67 
  1-3 Times/Year 4 4 1 0 4 13 43.33 
  1-3 Times/Month 1 1 0 2 1 5 16.67 
  1-3 Times/Week 1 2 1 2 1 7 23.33 
Self-Assessed Religiosity Before 25-years Old 
  None 2 0 0 2 1 5 16.67 
  Low 3 3 1 2 2 11 36.67 
  Medium 3 2 1 3 3 12 42.86 
  High 0 2 0 0 0 2 6.67 
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Appendix E: Qualitative Categories and Themes 
Interview 
Questions 
1. How does the threat 
of terrorism equate to 
other threats to U.S. 
national security?  
2. What do you feel 
are the primary causes 
of terrorism today?  
3. What has 
had the 
greatest 
influence on 
your own 
understanding 
regarding the 
causes of 
terrorism? 
4. How 
could the 
U.S. best 
address the 
threat of 
terrorism? 
State 
Categories 
Non-existential Complicated Time Focus 
Real Vulnerability Experience Patience 
Number one Complex Living abroad Consistency 
Top tier Depends Reading Depends 
  Complex Reading Consistency 
Important Dissatisfaction Reading Balance 
Medium Depends Living abroad Less tactical 
Important Complex Experience Varied 
Existential    Reading Strategic 
Exaggerated   Experience Discretion 
    Living abroad   
Themes 
Important Complex Reading Consistency 
  Depends Experience   
    Living abroad   
USAID 
Categories 
Top tier Political Reading Justice/Rule 
of Law 
programs 
Overblown West’s war on Islam Experience Deny-
Degrade-
Defeat 
Medium Complex Experience Prevention 
Not biggest Powerlessness Experience Domestic 
terrorism 
Important Inequities Reading Less military 
Medium Deprivation Experience Prevention 
Overblown Frustration Growing up 
poor 
Prevention 
Outsized Isolation Academic 
study 
Off ramp 
programs 
   (Continued) 
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USAID 
  Marginalization Experience Prevention 
  Marginalization 9/11 Lift travel 
ban 
  Repression Experience Messaging 
  Grievances Academic 
study 
Prevention 
    Experience   
Themes 
Medium Marginalization Experience Prevention 
Overblown Grievances Reading   
  Frustration Studying   
NCTC 
Categories 
Medium Personal motivation Religious 
belief 
Not being 
PC 
Not existential Grievances Firsthand 
experience 
Better 
profiling 
Real Ideology (religious) Work 
experience 
Less kinetic 
strikes 
  Deep-seated   Through 
partners 
Themes 
Medium Personal Motivation Experience Less Strikes 
Not existential Individual Factors   Via Partners 
OSD 
Categories 
Not existential  Complex Experience Manage, not 
solve 
Lots of threats Ideology Living abroad Not kinetic 
Pay attention Social media Dad 
(Vietnam vet) 
More 
education 
Mid-tier Lack of education Living abroad Build 
infrastructure 
Not existential  Grievances Experience Punish Saudi 
Arabia 
High (6 of 10) Grievances Living abroad Counter 
ideology 
High Desire utopia (ISIS) Experience Backseat, 
indirect 
At the top Ideology Books (study) More dialog 
  Grievances     
  Repression     
  Youth bulge     
  Need for purpose     
   (Continued) 
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OSD 
  Poor     
  Disenfranchised     
  Lack of education     
  Economics     
Themes 
Not existential Grievances Experience   
Medium Ideology Living 
Abroad 
  
High 
 
    
Joint Staff 
Categories 
Important Narrative Networking Through 
partners 
Not #1 Vulnerability Military 
experience 
Coalitions 
Baseline threat Environment Military 
experience 
Tougher on 
sponsors 
Medium Ideology Military 
experience 
Diplomacy 
5 out of 10 Local group Military 
experience 
Development 
Not existential Poor governance Military 
experience 
Limited 
goals 
5 out of 5 Social inequalities   Longer view 
  Population explosions   Less overt 
  Religious ideology     
  Lack of education     
  Chronic conditions     
  Legacy grievances     
  Disaffected population     
  Radical ideology     
  Social media     
Themes 
Medium Inequities Experience Via Partners 
  Governance   Coalitions 
  Grievances     
  Ideology     
     
   
 
 
 (Continued) 
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Interview 
Questions 
5. How well do you 
think your 
organization’s 
counterterrorism 
policy professionals 
understand the causes 
of terrorism? 
6. How widely shared 
is your view regarding 
the causes of terrorism 
among others across 
your organization? 
7. Have your 
own 
perspectives 
on the causes 
of terrorism 
been 
influenced by 
your 
organization? 
In what 
ways? 
8. How is 
your 
organization 
enabled or 
hindered by 
its existing 
authorities 
and 
resources in 
addressing 
terrorism? 
State 
Categories 
Generally Shared Some Constrained 
Exceptionally Generally Very much Lacking 
Generally Generally Limited Constrained 
Generally Very well Some Limited 
Very well Commonality Less Limited 
Generally Generally Very much Hindered 
Very well   Definitely Lacking 
Varied     Hindered 
Themes 
Generally Generally Somewhat Constrained 
Very well     Limited 
      Hindered 
    
USAID 
Categories 
Very well Somewhat Very much Hindered 
Very well Mostly Very much Hindered 
Very well Very well (career) Very much Hindered 
Very well Somewhat (political) Very much Hindered 
Better than many Generational gap Very much Hindered 
Pretty well Fairly well Very much Enabled 
Very well Pretty well Very much Hindered 
Fairly well Diverse Very much Hindered 
 Good corporate view Very much Hindered 
   Hindered 
   Hindered 
   Hindered 
    (Continued) 
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USAID 
Themes 
Very Well Very/Fairly Well Very Much Hindered 
NCTC 
Categories 
Some (but afraid) Some Not much Adequate 
Incredibly well Somewhat Some Somewhat 
hindered 
      Mostly 
adequate 
Themes 
Somewhat Somewhat Not Much Both 
Adequate 
Incredibly well   Somewhat   
OSD 
Categories 
Fairly well Very well Yes Authorities 
good 
Smart people Fairly well Balanced Limited 
resources 
To quick to kinetic Not sure Not much Very 
understaffed 
Not well Not well Definitely Adequate 
Not well Just fatigue Definitely Hindered 
Pretty well Not sure Definitely Limited 
resources 
Varies Generally Yes Limited 
authorities 
  Somewhat   Both 
Themes 
Very Well Very/Fairly Well Definitely Limited 
Not Much Not Sure     
Joint Staff 
Categories 
Medium Shared Yes Authorities 
good 
Very well Not well No Lack of staff 
Fairly Shared Yes Authorities 
hindered 
Very well Generally No Not hindered 
Not enough Firmly Yes Not hindered 
Pretty well Shared Not really Hindered 
intentionally 
      Not hindered 
Themes 
Very well Generally   Not hindered 
Medium       
    (Continued) 
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Interview 
Questions 
9. How well do you 
think counterterrorism 
policy professionals 
that you work with 
outside your 
organization 
understand the causes 
of terrorism? 
10. How much 
common 
understanding 
regarding the 
underlying causes of 
terrorism do you see 
across the 
organizations that 
work counterterrorism 
policy? 
11. How much do you think 
other organizations working 
counterterrorism policy are 
enabled or hindered by their 
own existing authorities and 
resources in addressing 
terrorism? 
State 
Categories 
Generally Generally Imbalances 
Very well Very much  Adequate 
Generally Depends Overlapping 
Generally Generally Overlapping 
Generally Consensus Imbalances 
Very well Generally Imbalances 
Very well   Imbalances 
Depends   Unbalanced 
    Cumbersome 
Themes 
Generally Generally Imbalances 
Very Well   Overlapping 
USAID 
Categories 
Generally Generally Hindered, prevention 
Less so Generally Hindered, resources 
Don’t know Depends Imbalances, resources 
Varied Somewhat Hindered, authorities 
Improved Very good Hindered, coordination 
Imbalanced Somewhat Imbalances, resources 
Very good   Imbalances, resources 
Uneven     
Themes 
  Generally Hindered 
  Somewhat Imbalances 
   (Continued) 
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NCTC 
Categories 
Good understanding Somewhat Adequate 
General understanding Program focus Adequate 
  Lack of strategic focus Issue is coordination 
Themes 
Good  Somewhat Both Adequate 
Generally     
OSD 
Categories 
Pretty good Generally Hindered by resources 
Good understanding Yes on macro Hindered by resources 
Don’t know No on details Hindered by resources 
Not really Medium Resources constrained 
Adequate Generally Hindered by resources 
Good understanding Somewhat Lack of resources 
Best in IC   Both 
Themes Good Generally Hindered by Resources 
Joint Staff 
Categories 
Impressive knowledge Some divergence Lack of resources 
Generally General understanding Depends 
Very well Commonly Absolutely hindered 
Different perspectives Fatigued Severely limited 
Limited understanding Not well Limited 
Good understanding More cautious Both healthy 
Different perspectives Balanced   
Themes 
Generally Generally Hindered 
Varied  Common View Limited 
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Appendix F: Detailed Analytic Results 
Views Regarding the Seriousness of the Terrorism Threat  
The first interview question to each study participant was How does the threat of 
terrorism equate to other threats to U.S. national security? The common response theme 
observed across respondents from all but one of the organizations were responses of 
terrorism being a medium threat but not existential. Two general discrepancies were 
noted from these primary response themes. Discussions with the State Department 
participants showed they had a variety of views, with only three of the eight expressing a 
common response theme in viewing the threat posed by terrorism as important. The other 
organizational outlier observed from this first question was from the USAID participants, 
where two respondents identified the perceived threat of terrorism as medium, and two 
others expressing it being overblown.  
 The interviews conducted with State Department participants showed they 
generally viewed the threat of terrorism as both real and important. In addition, their 
views indicated the problem posed by terrorism as ongoing. Participant 103 stated their 
view “…that terrorism is a perennial problem. There will always be a terrorism problem. 
There has always been a terrorism problem. It will continue in perpetuity.” This view was 
articulated by several others. Another common view expressed was how the violence of 
terrorism is expressed in general terms. Participant 104 expressed this perspective as 
follows: “Terrorism, to me, is only a tactic. Terrorism is a technique. Terrorism itself 
isn’t a threat, terrorist groups that use terrorism are certainly a threat.”  
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The role of modern media, particularly social media, on how terrorism is viewed 
as a threat was also a common thread in responses from State Department participants. 
Participant 105 stated it as: “Terrorists don’t necessarily want a lot of dead bodies, but a 
lot of people watching.” The impact of the widespread visibility of terrorism through 
modern media also was highlighted by State Department respondents in the response it 
typically elicits. “Participant 101 felt that “…we [Americans] have vastly overreacted and 
over spent money and over committed ourselves to never ending wars overseas, in 
response to a threat that is a nuisance but not existential.” A similar comment from 
Participant 108 was “I think we [Americans] exaggerate the threat of terrorism to…U.S. 
national security. Obviously, it is a threat, but it’s not generally one that poses an 
existential threat to the U.S.” Of those interviewed, only Participant 107 expressed the 
threat of terrorism as “existential,” and only Participant 108 thought the terrorist threat 
was “exaggerated.”  
 Discussions at USAID on this question were the noted outlier from the views 
expressed by participants in the other organizations. While some said the terrorist threat 
is medium, most used language such as overblown or outsized. The following statements 
demonstrate this expressed sentiment. Participant 202 said: “I think it’s been well 
overblown.” In a similar manner, Participant 207 said: “I just don’t assess it to be as 
significant as we’ve allowed it.” Participant 208 expressed a similar view: “I think it has 
an outside impact in the narrative, and on policy, than what the actual threat is...” While 
this type response was observed in some of the State Department participants, the 
responses at USAID were much more pointed. The few at USAID who perceived the 
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threat of terrorism as medium also put this in a broader context of caution, as when 
Participant 203 said that terrorism is “Something to keep an eye on, but not something to 
be so consumed with that all of your resources flow in that direction.” Only Participant 
201 thought the threat of terrorism fell in the ‘top tier’ of threats to U.S. national security.  
 The views on the threat of terrorism expressed by the two NCTC participants 
were that while it remains a real threat, it is overall medium compared to other threats, 
and definitely not existential. The view of the threat of terrorism being a long-term 
challenge as viewed by the NCTC participants was evident in the discussions. Participant 
301 put it this way: “It’s [terrorism] not anything that’s ever going to go away. We may 
be able to put it in a box somewhere or keep it simmering in the back burner… But I 
don’t think we’ll ever stop it or anything like that. I don’t think we’ll ever eradicate 
terrorism.” It is the challenges posed by the U.S. response to acts of terrorism that elicited 
further comment from Participant 301, similar to the views noted by many State 
Department participants, stating: “What makes terrorism a threat…is the reason why 
terrorists exist and use terrorism, it’s a psychological aspect of it, and that I do worry 
about. I do worry about that terrorism, unlike many threats, can make us as an American 
people do things that really are more of a threat to our way of life than any bomb or death 
can be.”  
 Within OSD, the civilian policy side of DoD, responses to this question indicated 
they generally viewed the threat of terrorism as high or medium, but not existential. No 
real divergent categories or themes from the OSD participants on this question were 
noted. Participant 404 put it this way: “I would say in the current security environment, 
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sort of mid-tier, less than it was under prior administrations.” A similar view was 
expressed by Participant 405 as “I think it is the threat closest to us, but it may not be the 
largest. It’s definitely not an existential threat.” While many of the OSD participants 
specifically stated their view that the threat of terrorism is not existential, they also were 
clear in their assessment that a terrorist attack is much more likely to occur than other 
threats to U.S. national security. Participant 401 said: “I think the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack is more likely than the [other] threats.” Participant 405 expressed the likelihood as 
follows: “But if we’re talking about terms of what is the active threat towards U.S. 
citizens or interest abroad, I would say it’s gotta [sic] be terrorism.”  
Most of the OSD participants mentioned the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) when expressing their views regarding the threat posed by terrorism, where threats 
from violent extremist organizations is placed lower than the threats to national security 
posed by nations such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2018b). The views expressed by OSD participants on the threat of terrorism 
tracked with the NDS, demonstrating the influence this document has had on DoD policy 
professionals. Participant 401 said that “There are other threats which actually do pose an 
existential threat to the United States…,” a view shared by Participant 405, as “There’s 
definitely a larger military threat from them [China, Russia, Iran, North Korea].” It is of 
note that the threat rankings outlined in the NDS were also specifically highlighted by 
several study participants at both State Department and USAID as well.  
For the Joint Staff, their participants expressed a common view that the threat of 
terrorism is medium or mid-tier. Participant 505 said: “On a scale of one to ten, I would 
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say terrorism is probably a five…” Others (notably Participants 501 and 506) expressed 
the threat as “5 out of 10” or “5 of 5,” an oblique reference to how terrorism is ranked in 
the NDS (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018b). The threat posed by terrorism was not 
downplayed, however, by the Joint Staff participants. Many talked about its negative 
impacts on U.S. national interests. Participant 501 highlighted its importance: “It’s a key 
threat. It’s a key concern for what we’re working on, not only to our physical homeland, 
but to our equities or our interests abroad.” Whether the threat of terrorism could ever be 
eliminated was also specifically mentioned by several Joint Staff participants, with a 
similar consensus as that expressed by several State Department participants. Participant 
503 said that terrorism is “something to be managed, but never defeated.” Participant 505 
had a similar view: “Terrorism is an enduring threat and it will never be completely 
extinguished…” Of those interviewed, only Participant 505 expressed the threat of 
terrorism as “important,” adding that the threat posed by terrorism is “not existential.”  
Perceptions Regarding the Causes of Terrorism 
The second interview question to each study participant was What do you feel are 
the primary causes of terrorism today? A common theme regarding grievances as a 
primary cause of terrorism was observed in responses from participants from three 
organizations: USAID, OSD, and the Joint Staff. This theme was further amplified in 
these responses for grievances due to perceived inequities, marginalization, frustration, 
and lack of governance as principal causes of terrorism. Responses from State 
Department participants differed from this common theme, with these participants 
resisting naming any one particular cause for terrorism, stressing instead the complexities 
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of the phenomena due to local or regional dependencies. A total of five OSD and Joint 
Staff participants additionally highlighted the role of ideology as a cause for terrorism, 
with the two NCTC participants identifying either personal purposes or individual 
factors as the main causal factor.  
 The interviews conducted with State Department participants showed they as a 
group resisted the identification of a single cause for terrorist violence. Instead, most 
State Department participants stressed the complexity of the problem, with numerous 
dependencies as potential motivators for terrorist violence due to local, tribal, or regional 
dynamics. Views along this line were as follows: “I think it’s a really complicated 
process that involves everything from economics, sociology, political circumstances, 
history. In some cases, it’s not genetic, but family related” (from Participant 101), or “It’s 
not just one or two factors that go into it. It’s more complex than that” (from Participant 
105). Broader complexities due to historical factors, or societal vulnerabilities, were also 
part of the views expressed by State Department participants. Participant 103 sees 
“…more of historical grievances and economic drivers that open the aperture for terrorist 
ideology to take hold.” Participant 102 highlighted the general vulnerability of a 
population as an underlying cause: “It is vulnerability. Social economic drivers, 
opportunists, radicalizers, who are pressing upon those vulnerabilities.” Dissatisfaction 
due to vulnerabilities was also a point made by Participant 108, specifically 
“…dissatisfaction is always there, otherwise you wouldn’t go trying to blow people up.”  
 The common theme emerging from the USAID participants responses to this 
question were overwhelmingly marginalization, grievances, and frustration. Participant 
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206 expressed it as “…a sense of marginalization, lack of inclusion in the political 
system, grievances, whether they be individual or whether it’s a group affinity type 
grievance, seems to be one of the major drivers.” Participant 205 made reference to 
broader forces that precluded normal options, a sense “…that there are forces that they 
can’t change through the current system. The only way to really affect the change is to do 
something drastic.” Two other themes emerging from some USAID participants were 
deprivation and powerlessness. Participant 204 said: “I think it is inequity in perceptions 
of relative deprivation as much as it is or probably more than ideology. This 
susceptibility of terrorism and terrorism is an expression of frustration, of not being able 
to have your voice heard through the normal modalities.” Participant 203 shared a similar 
view: “I think it’s about powerlessness, which I would equate to exclusion and injustice.” 
Two divergent categories were expressed in comments from Participants 202 and 205, 
with Participant 202 citing the “West’s war on Islam” as a primary cause of terrorism, 
and Participant 205 stressing “personal isolation” as a primary driver.  
 The views expressed by the NCTC participants were unique to each respondent. 
Participant 301 was very clear that they believed religious ideology was the primary 
driver of terrorism in the modern age, with simmering hatreds that are “…very deep-
seated and rooted. The deepest one that you’ll find is the religious motivation for 
terrorism.” The other, Participant 302, talked about individual factors and personal 
motivations, as in “…what’s in it for them, what’s in it for the terrorist, what are they 
losing if they do this, do they have the access and the ability and the willingness to 
actually go through with suffering.” Participant 302’s perspective additionally 
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highlighted five factors observed in the radicalization process, being namely 
“personalizer [factors], group factors, community factors, socio political [factors], and 
ideological factors,” with each and every one playing some combined role into why a 
person is radicalized and ultimately commits acts of terrorism. 
 As stated above, the OSD participants’ views aligned with the common theme 
observed across USAID and the Joint Staff, that being grievances as a primary cause of 
terrorism, where “…disenfranchisement and feeling socially excluded, economically 
disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised in your community with no options” (from 
Participant 406) open populations up to recruitment to terrorist groups and organizations. 
Another category noted in the OSD participants that was unique was the desire for 
purpose among young, frustrated populations as a key cause of terrorism, being of 
particular concern as this view is easily exploited by a strong ideology. Participant 405 
expressed this as “A youth bulge that is not gainfully employed that sees itself as not 
having many options and is looking for a sense of belonging to a larger cause.” Only one, 
Participant 401, expressed the view that “there’s no one driver, and consequently, there’s 
no one thing you can fix or take away that would remove terrorism…” One other, 
Participant 402, highlighted that terrorisms “…breeding grounds are centered in 
ignorance, lack of education, [and] lack of resources.” 
 Many of the Joint Staff participants shared the view with USAID and OSD that 
underlying grievances are a primary cause of terrorism. Many of the Joint Staff responses 
further stressed particular areas of grievances, such as from Participant 503, who stated 
that “…poor governance, social inequalities, [and] the population explosions that are 
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occurring.” The views regarding ideology, specifically religious ideology and narratives, 
were also a recurring view as to the causes of terrorism. Participant 504 said: “I think it’s 
religious ideology and lack of education.” Participant 502 had a similar view regarding 
the role of ideology: “They have to have an ideology that supports that [violence].” Only 
a few (namely Participants 502 and 506) expressed other views regarding primary causes 
of terrorism, such as lack of education, local groups, and social media.  
Influences on These Views 
The third interview question to each study participant was What has had the 
greatest influence on your own understanding regarding the causes of terrorism? The 
common themes of experience and living abroad was observed across all five 
organizations. The theme of experience was qualified in numerous ways, including from 
personal experience due to travel overseas as well as professional experience working 
foreign policy related portfolios. Responses from State Department and USAID 
participants both had an additional common theme of reading, with USAID participants 
further adding academic study as a strong influencer on their views regarding terrorism 
and its causes. The responses from all the Joint Staff participants indicate their experience 
in the context of their personal military careers.  
 Almost all the responses to this question from the State Department participants 
highlighted the combined influences of experiences, living abroad, and reading. No 
divergent categories or themes were observed. A common perspective was reflected in 
statements such as that from Participant 104: “For me, the grounding was academic. 
Proving ground was the field experience…” The role of field experience was also 
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highlighted by Participant 108: “Key to my views is the field experience I have had, I 
think…” Statements such as “I read a lot. I read a lot of what other people think and have 
to say about terrorism…” (from Participant 103) was also common in most of the 
responses from the State Department participants. For many, it was also the combinations 
of these factors as overall influencers of their perspectives. The view provided by 
Participant 107 articulated this combination of factors: “It’s a combination of things. It is, 
you know, reading up on what scholars, journalists, others who are smart in the realm of 
counter terrorism, sort of just their analysis, but also combining that with face to face 
interaction that I’ve had with people who have been affected by terrorism, victims of 
terrorism, those who are fighting against terrorism from a criminal justice, law 
enforcement point of view and their insights. So for me it’s the combination.”  
 As with the State Department participants, the common themes of reading and 
experience were predominant in the USAID participants. References to the influence of 
reading was articulated in ways such as doing “…a lot of reading. I think just trying to be 
open to all of the opinions that are out there and being able to assess it together” (from 
Participant 205). The role of reading was also stated in the past tense by Participant 208, 
based on academic foundations: “I guess, I’m a student of history, so that first and 
foremost as an amateur historian, I am able to take a long view where terrorism has 
always been part of the human condition…” The role of experience in the context of 
travel and field work was also seen in most of the responses of the USAID participants to 
this question. Participant 203 said: “Working in the field. I mean, just being, working in 
this area. Reading, talking to people, being in the field, talking to people on the 
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ground…” Participant 208 said: “So, I guess it’s my lived experience. Interacting with 
people, both those on, what I would say are extremist spectrums, or people who have held 
extreme views on either side of it.”  
The one divergent or unique view expressed within the USAID participants came 
from Participant 206, who cited growing up poor in a marginalized area of the United 
States, and how that influenced this individual’s overall view of the terrorism challenge. 
“I grew up in a more economically and socially marginalized part of the United States. 
Where, in that part of the country, there are a number of groups who are anti-government 
associated groups. And so, the mindset [towards using violence against authority] was not 
unfamiliar to me in people that I had grown up around and that I knew, and I could see 
how a sense of marginalization fed into that particular mindset, and I could see how it 
could potentially transition into more radicalized or violent behavior.”  
 Both of the NCTC participants identified the key role of experience having 
particular influence on their views regarding the causes of terrorism. Participant 301 also 
expressed the influence of a personal religious view, specifically articulated as “My own 
personal background, my own personal religious understanding of motivations and my 
family’s life and how we kind of got to where we are.” Like the reference from the one 
USAID participant on the influence of growing up poor, this personal identification from 
Participant 301 on the role their personal religious view influencing how they viewed the 
causes of terrorism was a unique one not expressed in a similar manner by any other 
study participant.  
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 The common themes of experience and living abroad appeared in responses from 
most of the OSD participants. Participant 401 expressed it as: “Professional experience of 
studying terrorists and just being involved in the problem for so long, just that longevity 
of it…” Participant 404 put it this way: “I think hands down, my work here in…policy 
[making]… There was a great deal of exposure to it and various manifestations.” 
Participant 405 talked about the lived experience: “I think it has to be living abroad and 
seeing it, being in these cultures. And living around the people who are fighting it kind of 
on the front lines is the biggest one.”  
One divergent view within the OSD participants, but similar in many respects to 
the preceding divergent views from the one participant from USAID and one from 
NCTC, regarding the effects of childhood experiences on how issues are viewed later in 
life was a statement by Participant 402 in answering this question. “This is gonna [sic] 
sound funny. Probably my dad. My dad served in Vietnam. In working with him, and 
being in contact with all the vets that came back after that war, there was always 
conversations. Most folks don’t realize that we won every single engagement in Vietnam. 
Every one of them. Hands down, they [the Vietcong enemy] were just slaughtered, okay, 
and yet, we lost the war, and we lost the war because of political will, and we lost the war 
because we didn’t understand tribalism, and we didn’t understand insurgencies…”  
The Joint Staff participants also stressed the same theme of experience as having 
the greatest influence on their views of the causes of terrorism. Their references to 
experience, however, was exclusively linked to their military experience in their careers 
and spanning their deployments. Participant 502 said: “I would say just my experience 
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overseas deployed to environments obviously that are ripe for terrorist organizations 
because they lack security, because they lacked any sort of government, and a group.” 
This view was shared by Participant 504: “I think experience. Seeing it firsthand. People 
living in poverty, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a religion that at times can 
be radical…” The only divergent response came from Participant 501, who also 
identified networking as a key influence on their perspectives on terrorism, expressed as 
“By and large it’s the networking, and gaining the perspectives of others.”  
Views on How the Terrorist Threat Should be Addressed 
The fourth interview question to each study participant was How could the U.S. 
best address the threat of terrorism? Responses from participants were extremely varied 
on this question and no common theme emerged across the organizations. Responses to 
this question were extremely varied both within and between organizations. Only within 
USAID was there some internal commonality, with five respondents expressing 
prevention activities being among the best ways to address the threats posed by terrorism.  
 Responses from State Department participants were varied, with no real theme 
emerging. Consistency in approach was mentioned by a few of those interviewed, but this 
response did not occur on a scale to be an observed theme. A few, such as Participant 
101, spoke in generalities: “I think the best way to deal with it, is to be aware that it’s not 
a one size fits all kind of thing.” This view was shared by Participant 104: “One size does 
not fit all for terrorists. It just doesn’t. That’s not an effective way to combat terrorism.” 
One (Participant 106) stressed moving beyond a focus on kinetic strikes: “So, to me, 
you’ve got to be looking beyond the direct-action response.” Others like Participant 102 
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reflected on the need for a long-term approach: “If I were to put into one word it would 
be patience. We have to remain patient; we have to be flexible, and we have to be willing 
to go through the time and the different avenues to combat terrorism.” A similar view 
came from Participant 104: “It is clear, to me at least, we are not going to defeat terrorism 
in those places until there is a political solution that brings stability to the country.”  
 As mentioned above, an emerging theme related to this question was only 
observed from the USAID participants, where prevention was prevalent in their collective 
responses. These types of responses stressed getting out in front of the terrorism problem. 
“I think we need to focus a lot more on looking at the drivers; what causes people to 
participate. I would like to see us to have more of a focus on prevention to the extent that 
we can” (from Participant 206). “I think that we have to find avenues for people who are 
going in those directions. We need to be able to identify them and have outlets for them 
to off-ramp” (from Participant 205). “We also have to take a step back and make sure that 
we are identifying and addressing the condition which are leading people to commit 
terrorist acts” (from Participant 208) A few perspectives, like on from Participant 204, 
took issue with a perceived over-emphasis on a military solution: “Not by military means. 
I think that’s a tool. I think the best way that U.S can address the threat of terrorism is 
looking at the various tools it that has as a toolkit.” Using partnerships and coalitions as 
exhibited in the current ‘defeat ISIS coalition’ was also mentioned by Participant 202 as a 
better approach. “So, I actually think that the overall de-ISIS campaign plan…has it right. 
Roughly, it’s deny them territory, defeat them on the ground. Go for it. It’s prevent them 
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from acting as a global brand. Reduce them to local insurgencies or resistance groups that 
can be handled through the capacity of partnerships.” 
 No theme emerged from the responses of the NCTC participants. Participant 302 
indicated support for limited military strikes, but also limiting expectations for what this 
could achieve: “Accepting that our place in the kinetic world is important and maybe the 
greatest contribution we can have to limiting our expectations…” The other, Participant 
301, didn’t offer a solution but expressed concerns that as society we are overly cautious 
in addressing the terrorism problem head on. Participant 301 stated it this way: “You’re 
not going to do it by not calling things as they are. And what I mean by that is we are too 
politically correct for our own good. And this is as a society. As a culture and as a 
society, we are too scared to call things out because we don’t want to offend or hurt 
anybody. And what ends up happening is we water everything down.”  
 Responses to this question from OSD participants was also varied, with no 
discernable theme emerging from their answers. Participant 401 highlighted terrorism as 
a condition to be managed, not a problem that could ever be solved. “We can get to a 
point where it is a condition we’ve mitigated, it’s a condition that we can live with, 
but…it’s probably not something [we can eliminate completely].” Participant 402 on the 
other hand suggested more investments in education programs: “[Educated] aren’t 
gullible people… Without education, you don’t know any different [way to deal with 
problems]… I think education is huge. I think we’ve missed the boat [in our 
approach]…” Another, Participant 404, suggested rethinking our strategic partnerships, 
especially with countries like Saudi Arabia: “I think we need to take a much more 
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realistic stand with regard to our counter terrorism partners. Particularly those in the 
Middle East where I think it’s a matter of expediency. Some would argue of necessity 
that we’ve engaged with partners and enabled [bad behavior], for example, Saudi 
Arabia…” Participant 404 also suggested a reduction in military response options: “We 
definitely need to dial down our military solutions to problems that are in essence not 
military.” This last view was also articulated by Participant 406, who said: “Maybe we 
should take a more backseat, hands off approach by empowering and supporting the local 
governments… I feel like the U.S. should take a less prominent role in the counter 
terrorism programming that it’s doing, and that’s on all fronts.” 
 Several Joint Staff participants talked about using partners and coalitions, but this 
wasn’t assessed to be an overall theme observed. Participant 501 put it this way: 
“Through our partners, and building, maintaining, not building, but maintaining…a 
global coalition where we leverage everybody else’s capacity, capability and knowledge, 
and especially regional knowledge to address this globally.” One comment, made by 
Participant 502, mirrored the one observed with Participant 404 from OSD about limiting 
our involvement with strategic partners in the Middle East: “There needs to be a stronger 
stance on countries or groups that support the ideology that lends itself to extremism and 
extremist thoughts that lead to a terrorist act.” Another, Participant 504, stressed like 
Participant 402 from OSD the importance of education: “You have to affect the politics 
to incorporate education, to incorporate the reprieve from poverty. So that starts at the 
political level.” Participant 506 worried that we overreact to the terrorism issue: “When 
we respond with so much fear, anger, outrage, and then ultimately disproportionate 
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retaliation in a lot of cases, we just play to their narrative.” A similar comment came from 
Participant 505, who indicated an unrealistic desire to ‘fix the problem’ – “Our current 
policy seems to be we gotta [sic] stay and fix everything. Our inclination is to get 
involved as opposed to our inclination being every opportunity we have, we need to step 
away.” 
Views on Inter-Organizational Understanding on the Causes of Terrorism 
The fifth interview question to each study participant was How well do you think 
your organization’s counterterrorism policy professionals understand the causes of 
terrorism? The common response theme observed from across all five organizations were 
perceptions that their organizations’ counterterrorism policy professionals understand the 
causes of terrorism very well. Two general discrepancies were noted from this primary 
response theme. Discussions with the OSD participants showed two had divergent 
perceptions that their counterterrorism policy colleagues did not well understand the 
causes of terrorism. Three of the Joint Staff participant’s expressed divergent 
perspectives that their military colleagues had only a medium understanding of the causes 
of terrorism.  
 Two themes in answer to this question was evident in responses from the State 
Department participants. On one hand, many had perceptions that their diplomatic 
colleagues working in counterterrorism policy understand the causes of terrorism very 
well. Participant 102 had a view shared by many at the State Department: “I think if any 
entity understands the nuances [regarding terrorism] it is the State Department because of 
their experiences as well their access to information.” However, there were also many of 
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the State Department participants, like Participant 103, who expressed their view that 
their State Department counterterrorism colleagues generally understood the causes of 
terrorism: “I think that it is a sliding scale. On the whole, I think that we are generally an 
organization that generally understands drivers of violent extremism.” Similar to this 
view, Participant 108 expressed it as “I think it varies. I think that, likewise, across the 
interagency, it’s kind of hit and miss.”  
 The common theme emerging from the USAID participants responses to this 
question were overwhelmingly very well. “I think actually pretty well…” (Participant 
201). “I think pretty well, [as] it’s a small handful of people that have really worked in 
depth on this, but I think most of us have worked on it for a number of years now. We’ve 
worked seamlessly together” (Participant 206). There were some noted caveats, however. 
Participant 203 said: “At the technical level, fairly well. At the policy level, mixed.” This 
‘technical’ caveat was stated in the context of those who work predominately in the field, 
as opposed to the ‘policy level,’ which seemed to imply those spending most of their time 
and effort within the USAID headquarters in Washington. Another nuance was expressed 
by Participant 205 as follows: “I think better than many. I don’t think that they 
understand as well the structures of terrorist groups, but I think they have a better sense 
of what is drawing people in than most other government organizations. This is because 
we [USAID] have more people on the ground.” Beyond these nuances, no real divergent 
categories or themes were observed.  
 The responses to this question by the two NCTC participants did not result in a 
common theme. Participant 302’s views regarding colleagues understanding was 
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“Incredibly well, as this community is frankly been together, it’s actually not as big as, 
it’s not that big of a community. [Many in the] CT [counterterrorism] community have 
been around and most of us have grown up professionally together…” The view 
expressed by Participant 301 was starkly different, however – “They understand the real 
causes and motivations behind terrorism that we’re trying to counter and fight. But for 
political reasons… they will not call it as it is. …Behind the curtain they will speak one 
certain way and they know what the actual cause is on, what the reality is on. But you’d 
never get them to own up to that on a TV camera…” 
Two common themes appeared in responses from the OSD participants, that of 
well and not well, which was interesting. Participants from two separate counterterrorism 
offices within OSD were interviewed, but these different themes were not aligned to 
either office. On the one side were perspectives like “I think fairly well…” (from 
Participant 401) and “Certainly well above average across the board” (from Participant 
402). However, the corresponding theme of not well was also expressed by many 
participants, like the comment from Participant 404: “I think there’s some understanding. 
I don’t know that the depth is there…” This last view regarding perceived ‘depth’ of 
understanding was expressed in the context of the fast pace of the workload. Another way 
this view was expressed was by Participant 405, who said “I actually don’t think we do 
because I don’t think we spend as much time in counterterrorism policy contemplating or 
analyzing the causes as much as we do how to fix the immediate problem, which is 
protect the homeland, protect U.S. interests now.” There was one divergent view 
expressed by Participant 403, who articulated a standard tendency for their OSD 
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colleagues being “…to quick to go kinetic…” rather than spending the necessary time 
trying to understand the underlying causes of terrorism.  
The Joint Staff participants also stressed the theme of very well in their responses 
to this question, but medium was also a noted theme. “I think they understand well, yeah 
very well...” (from Participant 502). “I think we’re fairly clear on most of it” (from 
Participant 503). “I think we understand it well, but that’s all we’ve been doing for 18 
years…” (from Participant 504). One interesting aspect in this view, however, was 
expressed by Participant 505 as a caveat to this perspective: “I think they understand the 
underlying, very high strategic level causes. What I don’t think that they understand 
firmly enough is how the tactical aspect of it and our engagements on the ground either 
inflate or deflate the underlying disgruntlement of our opposing force.” In this context the 
term ‘opposing force’ was meant to mean the terrorist group we are fighting. Only 
Participant 506 expressed the divergent view that their military colleagues understanding 
the causes of terrorism was not enough.  
Individual Views Within Organizations  
The sixth interview question to each study participant was How widely shared is 
your view regarding the causes of terrorism among others across your organization? 
There were two themes noted in responses to this question. Participants from the State 
Department, NCTC, and the Joint Staff had perceptions their individual views on the 
causes of terrorism were somewhat or generally shared among their colleagues. The 
response theme noted from participants from USAID and OSD was their personal views 
were shared within their organizations very well. However, three OSD participants 
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expressed the divergent perspective that they were not sure whether their own views 
regarding the causes of terrorism were shared among their colleagues.  
 The perspectives from State Department participants were consistent with the 
theme that their coworkers generally shared their views regarding the causes of terrorism. 
Participant 102 said “I think it’s a shared understanding,” and Participant 105 agreed: “I 
think so. I don’t get any indication that it’s not.” Participant 107 said something similar: 
“I think we do have a commonality of perspective.” A deeper assessment was provided 
by Participant 104, whose perspective as that “I think we’re all within sort of one 
standard deviation from the norm on this. No one would take a violent exception to what 
I’ve said in regarding drivers and stuff because we do study the problem.” 
 USAID participants perspectives were that their own views regarding the causes 
of terrorism were shared across their organization very well. “I think fairly well” (from 
Participant 205). “I think we all are on the same page, to greater or lesser extent. Not 
everybody looks at it through the same, exactly the same lens. I think we generally sort of 
get how these things play out” (from Participant 203). “I think in USAID there’s a whole 
that is definitely the corporate view. People see terrorism as a problem, many of the 
countries in which we’ve worked are impacted by terrorism” (from Participant 208). 
Participant 201 stated their own views were somewhat shared with their coworkers, and 
Participant 207 said the understanding of the causes of terrorism across USAID policy 
professionals was diverse.  
 Both NCTC participants had perspectives that their own views on the causes of 
terrorism were somewhat shared with their colleagues in NCTC. However, Participant 
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301 was very clear that they didn’t feel the broader nuance they had regarding the 
religious motivations to violence was a common perspective, stating: “I do not believe 
they share my view very much [regarding religious motivations].”  
 Two countering themes were noted in the responses from participants from OSD. 
For many, their perspective was a common understanding on the causes of terrorism was 
well shared. “I think fairly well” (from Participant 401). “I would say yeah, by and large. 
I mean, we’ve been at this [a long time]... Most everybody that’s active duty right now 
have grown up with the challenge in the desert and the counter-terrorism challenge. It’s 
pervasive. They’ve grown up with it” (from Participant 402). However, there were also 
several OSD participants that also expressed the perspective that they were not sure of 
their coworkers’ views. Participant 405 said: “I would like to think that we all kind of 
share that same view, but I’m not sure. It’s not something that we’ve discussed.” One 
divergent perspective expressed by Participant 404, whose view was that their coworkers 
were just fatigued with the issue: “Most people have the view and attitude that they’re 
kind of done with this, and we’ve done what needed to be done, and its time to move on.” 
 The view that their individual perspectives on the causes of terrorism was 
generally shared among their coworkers was the common theme among the Joint Staff 
participants. Participant 505 said: “I think that’s very, very, a very common theme, if you 
will, maintaining a coalition, sharing of information, is really the best way for us to get at 
this.” Participant 505 went on to say: “I think we firmly understand this. We’re engaging 
with our counterparts in the field regularly… We’ve lived it recently [on deployment].” 
Participant 503 agreed: “I think it’s fairly well understood.” Only Participant 502 
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expressed a divergent perspective that their own view was not well shared across the 
organization.  
Organizational Influences on Individual Views 
The seventh interview question to each study participant was Have your own 
perspectives on the causes of terrorism been influenced by your organization? There 
were two themes noted in responses to this question. Participants from USAID and OSD 
had similar perceptions of very much and definitely for whether they felt their 
organizations had influenced their views on the causes of terrorism. In contrast, 
participants from State Department and NCTC shared response themes of somewhat or 
not much as to whether they perceived being influenced in their views by their 
organizations. The Joint Staff participants were evenly split, with three each way, 
between perceptions of yes and no regarding this question.,  
 State Department participants shared the general theme of somewhat regarding 
whether they perceived their views regarding the causes of terrorism were influenced by 
their organization. Several expressed the nuance that external influences weighted more 
in their perceptions. Participant 101 said: “I think to some extent. When you’re working 
within a bureaucracy on these very big and complicated issues, you really get a sense of 
what’s possible and what’s not possible.” Participant 105 though external factors were 
more important: “My initial reaction would be to say, it’s probably more shaped by 
external factors than internal factors.” A limited divergent view felt that their perceptions 
were very much or definitely influenced by the State Department organization. Participant 
107 put it this way in response: “I’d say yes because it exposes you to different trains of 
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thought as to what the roots are, and you have some people who are very knowledgeable 
of what they are…”  
 Responses from USAID participants perceptions to this question were strongly 
aligned with the theme that their organization had very much influenced their views on 
the causes of terrorism. Participant 204 put it this way: “Yeah, I think how it got framed 
in my head with drivers, etc. It was definitely influenced by the agency because that was 
sort of the framework through which to process. So, I think that did influence it a lot.” 
Participant 204 further clarified the importance of their organization on their view of 
terrorism: “What the agency did is really kind of help crystallize and formulate how to 
process that and articulate some of that…” No divergent views from this response theme 
were noted among the other USAID participants.  
 The responses from the two NCTC participants were consistent, which was the 
perception that their organization had not much or just some influence on their views. 
Participant 301 answered this question with: “Not much. No. I feel I actually brought 
more from the outside based on my personal experience than what I gained from the 
bureaucratic experience.” Participant 302 wasn’t sure: “I can’t tell, I’ve been in this 
business for so long I can’t tell. I can’t remember a time you know, I don’t feel like I’ve 
changed…” 
 The theme of definitely was a consistent view from the OSD participants on this 
question. “Yeah. I think to a very, very large degree…” (from Participant 404). “Yes, 
definitely…” (from Participants 405, 406, and 407). There was one divergent view 
expressed, however, where Participant 403’s perception regarding how the organization 
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influenced their individual view was very low: “I’m thinking really hard, because I don’t 
think so. I think that as I described to you, my experience overseas was [much more] 
foundational.” 
 The Joint Staff participants were almost exactly split, with half saying yes, 
definitely they had been definitely influenced by their organization. Participant 501 said: 
“Oh, absolutely, to the extent that I believe what I believe is by and large not only driven 
by our network of interagency and coalition colleagues, but based on the experience of 
my direct leaders.” Participant 502 agreed, but with a slight caveat: “Yeah, but I’d also 
like to say or think that I can step back from that and look at a broader picture…” The 
other stated perception was the opposite vew, saying no, not really, expressed such as the 
response from Participant 504: “I would say everybody comes in with their own 
perspective… My perspective’s pretty solidified. For me, it’s only reinforced that 
perspective.” One interesting nuance was stated by Participant 505 as follows: “It [the 
organization] has changed how I viewed the problem, but out of necessity in order to get 
the solutions that the war fighter needs.”  
Perspectives on Organizational Empowerment in Counterterrorism Efforts 
The eighth interview question to each study participant was How is your 
organization enabled or hindered by its existing authorities and resources in addressing 
terrorism? The principal theme noted for this question were from the State, USAID, and 
OSD participants, who expressed the shared perception that their respective organizations 
were constrained, limited, and hindered, by their existing authorities and available 
resources in their ability to address terrorism. Both NCTC participants had a differing 
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view, that their organizations authorities and resources were adequate. The Joint Staff 
was the noted divergent view from the other organizations, with four respondents 
reflecting that they are not hindered in their efforts to address terrorism.  
The State Department participants all expressed the common theme that their 
organization is constrained, limited, and hindered by existing authorities or resources. 
Regarding authority limitations, Participant 106 said: “Absolutely, confronting authorities 
and everything else and jumping through hoops and the lack of flexibility because 
congressional oversight for the department is increasingly high.” Participant 102 pointed 
out similarly: “I think an issue might be that everybody else has similar authorities. So 
there isn’t a really clear line of effort whose got what…” Other views, like that of 
Participant 103, stressed the issue being more a lack of resources rather than authorities: 
“I think, for the most part, there are very few things that I’m aware of that we have really 
wanted to do that we’ve run into a problem of authority. It’s mostly a lack of resources.” 
A similar view was “I think the resourcing is difficult” (from Participant 106). Participant 
104 said if they could “…wave a magic wand, I would make money more flexible...” 
Beyond just authorities and resources, Participant 104 also highlighted the limitations and 
constraints due to working processes across the organization – “Coordination, that is like 
a chronic problem across everything I’ve ever worked on in the State department. We 
have a lot of cooks in the kitchen.”  
 USAID participants shared a common theme in their responses to this question in 
that their perspectives indicated their organization is hindered, primarily regarding 
resources. “Resourcing is a challenge, I’ll be honest, because so much of USAID money 
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is earmarked and it’s earmarked for the traditional sectors” (from Participant 201). “So, 
[resources are] totally inadequate to take anything to scale…” (from Participant 202). 
“But you know, you can always do more with more…” (from Participant 203). 
Participant 208 felt USAID’s full potential is hindered: “So it means that we’re never 
able to truly meet our potential in this space because it’s under resourced.” There were 
many shared clarification views by the USAID participants as to earmarks being the 
principal limiting factor in resourcing. “Because everyone is constrained by earmarks, 
constrained by the flavor of money they have, how discretionary it is or not” (from 
Participant 206). “Our budget and the earmarks, and the authorities for the different 
flavors of money, is driving the programming that is possible, as opposed to, you know, 
what we really need to do…” (from Participant 207). Another view, this time from 
Participant 203, stressed the need for more people as the limiting resource: “I would say, 
we’re hindered by it in a sense of, we don’t have enough people, we never have enough 
people to execute programs.”  
 Both NCTC participants had views that their organizations authorities and 
resources were adequate. Participant 301 expressed the view as: “I bet the resources that 
I see even in the current organization [under Trump administration] is not resourced to 
the level I think it was back then [under Obama administration] in terms of resourcing.” 
Participant 302 was more circumspect: “I’m probably committing a bureaucratic sin, 
[but] it would be inappropriate for me to say that anywhere in the CT [counterterrorism] 
community, we deserve or need more resources. That’s just not reality, even if true, the 
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reality is we have been invested in heavily over the years, and appropriately. We should 
not be asking for more…”  
 While a common response them of being generally limited was expressed by 
many OSD participants, there were other views. Several were regarding limitations due to 
lack of authorities Participant 404 said: “I think we’re largely hindered from engaging 
effectively.” Participant 405 made a similar observation: “I think we have the proper 
amount of resources. I’m not sure we have the proper authorities, broadly.” Other 
comments reflected perspectives that the limitations were due to lack of resources, such 
as that by Participant 401: “Resources, we could always use more resources.” Participant 
402 specifically highlighted the resource limitations was specific to staffing challenges, 
stating: “From a personnel standpoint, it’s ridiculously understaffed for what we’re 
expected to do.” There were some divergent views, however, like that from Participant 
403: “We have enough resources and we have enough authority.”  
The Joint Staff participants had general responses reflecting that they are not 
hindered in their efforts to address terrorism. Participant 503 put it this way: “I don’t 
think we are [hindered]… I don’t think people actually know all the authorities that are 
out there, and don’t know how to apply the existing authorities that we have with it.” 
Participant 504 agreed, saying: “I think we have enough resources… I wouldn’t say 
we’re hindered.” However, there were some divergent views. “You always will be 
limited by resources. You always will to some sense” (from Participant 502). “I think 
you’re definitely hindered by authorities, but that’s a good thing…” (from Participant 
506). An interesting reflection on ‘hinderances’ was made by Participant 505: “The 
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hinder part is, I think, [is] put there intentionally. I hope it’s put there intentionally. 
Because otherwise we’d use force to answer almost any problem when we might not 
always be the right answer.” 
Insights into Interagency Understanding on the Causes of Terrorism 
The ninth interview question to each study participant was How well do you think 
counterterrorism policy professionals that you work with outside your organization 
understand the causes of terrorism? The common response theme observed from across 
four of the five organizations were perceptions that their counterterrorism policy 
colleagues across the interagency understand the causes of terrorism generally, good, and 
very well. Responses to this question from USAID participants were the divergent view. 
However, this divergence was not in the form of a common theme, but their perspectives 
on this question varied broadly. Two of the Joint Staff participants also expressed a 
different perspective, namely expressing the view that their interagency counterterrorism 
policy colleagues had differing perspectives regarding their understanding of the causes 
of terrorism.  
 The State Department participants expressed the common theme in response to 
this question, with perspectives that their interagency counterterrorism colleagues 
generally or very well understand the causes of terrorism. Participant 101 said: “You 
know…, I think that people understand it, but there are so many different cross-cutting ... 
I think the more people know about it, the more complicated they think that it is.” 
Participant 102 agreed: “From an interagency perspective, and what we’ve seen in the 
academic community, I think they have a very good understand of the drivers of 
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terrorism.” A few State Department participants had more nuance in their perspectives of 
their interagency counterterrorism policy colleagues, with concerns expressed about 
bureaucratic stovepipes. Participant 103 expressed it as: “I think that we are very stove-
piped and very narrow, sometimes, in our focus. Unfortunately, a lot of us have been 
socialized within our own agencies and not socialized to other agencies on their views. I 
see that come across very often when I work with counter-terrorism professionals from 
other agencies.” Participant 105 sees more reaction than true understanding: “I would 
say, if I had to give a report card approach, just on our broad USG understanding, I think 
we’ve been quick to react and assume, without clearly understanding all the drivers.” 
Participant 108’s view highlighted the potential impact due to organizational culture, 
stating: “It depends. It depends on what agency you’re talking about. It depends on 
whether you’re talking about analysts or sort of action guys. It depends.”  
 The perspectives on this question from the USAID participants was varied, with 
no noted theme emerging from their responses. Some like Participant 207 expressed 
perspectives that their interagency colleagues had extensive understanding on the causes 
of terrorism – “The level of knowledge, expertise, and also tolerance in the community is 
really striking, and I think is underappreciated outside of the community.” Others like 
Participants 201 and 206 expressed more moderate views, but still with a positive 
perspective regarding their interagency colleagues understanding. “I think for the most 
part there is people who’ve been doing it for a while, I think it generally pretty 
consistent” (from Participant 201). “You know, I think it’s improved over the years. Had 
you asked me that same question ten years ago, I would have said there’s a real lack of 
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understanding in terms of who causes. I do think we’re getting better as a community, an 
interagency community, and understanding the nuances” (from Participant 206). A few 
like Participant 202 expressed perspectives that their colleagues had less understanding: 
“I think probably less so because they often lack what we have, which is missions on the 
ground. Most of our people are forward deployed, they’re in missions, they’re doing 
other things in these countries. So, we’ve got that.” Participant 205 agreed with this view: 
“I haven’t seen a lot. I see occasionally some. But I think it’s not great.” 
 Both NCTC participants had perspectives that were consistent with the common 
response theme noted, that being their interagency colleagues had a general or good 
understanding of the causes of terrorism. Participant 301 felt “…they [have] a very good 
understanding of just their slice of the pie of how it touches terrorism or what they can 
do.” Participant 302 expressed the more detailed view that organizational biases 
influenced the level of understanding, saying: “I think you see natural understandable and 
predictable biases, organizational cultural biases in the approaches. I see less interagency 
cohesion on trying to do things together in that space, than in the past. But I think that’s 
probably replicated on everything.” The lack of workable policy processes was also 
highlighted by Participant 301 as having a negative impact: “Yeah, I mean [the] 
interagency processes hasn’t been working, that’s not just this [CT] mission. We’ve been 
on…a 5-6 year kind of downward trend on how I think, from my perspective, on how the 
interagency’s process been working.” 
 The OSD participants responses to this question also showed the prevalent theme 
that their interagency colleagues have a good understanding of the causes of terrorism. 
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Participant 406 said: “I mean, people who work on CT [counterterrorism] issues, I think 
they also have a good understanding of CT [counterterrorism] causes, effects, 
approaches, that kind of thing, but I think that their focus is on different aspects of it…” 
Participant 407 agreed: “I think there’s a lot of folks that do have a good understanding.” 
One perspective from Participant 401 expressed it as follows: “I think sort of the 
bureaucratic truism of where you stand depends on where you sit is especially evident 
within the inner agency and CT [counterterrorism], and the causes of terrorism and what 
to do to address those in order to reduce the problem set and/or mitigate the conditions of 
terrorism are based on the tool sets that your agency works with. That said, I mean, I 
think there is a pretty good understanding writ large across the interagency colored by the 
bureaucratic/organizational biases of where people work towards solving the CT 
[counterterrorism] problem.” There were two divergent perspectives expressed, however, 
by Participants 403 and 404. Participant 404 had the perspective that there wasn’t a good 
understanding of the causes among their interagency colleagues: “No, I don’t think by in 
large they do. They tend to think that the organization you’re apart of eventually tends to 
be the lens through which you view all these problems.” The other, Participant 403, 
expressed it a bit differently, stressing the challenges of working within bureaucracies. “It 
sounds so terrible, but I feel like most of the time we’re stuck in the bureaucracy and that 
we’re working bureaucratically.”  
 The perspectives of several of the Joint Staff participants aligned with the noted 
theme that their interagency colleagues generally or very well understood the causes of 
terrorism. “I think they understand very well” (from Participant 503). “I think there’s an 
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incredible and impressive amount of education and knowledge” (from Participant 501). 
Many others, however, expressed the view that their interagency colleagues had different 
perspectives, particularly in how terrorist groups are defined and prioritized. Participant 
502 put it this way: “I think they do as well, but I think where people differ, again we’re 
talking extremes of opinions, is what they believe a terrorist group would be.” Participant 
503’s view was: “Where people potentially differ is what the prioritization of those 
terrorist groups are and what we can do against them.” Participant 501 had the view that 
colleagues understanding are stove piped within organizations: “I think it would depend 
on one department or agency versus another… But…it may be very kind of stove piped 
within their lane.”  
Insights into Commonality of Views Across Interagency Regarding Terrorism 
The tenth interview question to each study participant was How much common 
understanding regarding the underlying causes of terrorism do you see across the 
organizations that work counterterrorism policy? The common response theme observed 
from across all five organizations were perceptions that there is generally a common 
understanding across the interagency regarding the causes of terrorism. Participants from 
USAID and NCTC also expressed the perspective that there was somewhat of a common 
understanding across the interagency. The noted divergent views were from Joint Staff 
participants, three of whom also expressed perspectives that a common understanding is 
not there, or that counterterrorism policy professionals are just fatigued after dealing with 
the challenge for 18 years.  
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State Department participants had perspectives that there generally is a common 
understanding on the causes of terrorism across the interagency counterterrorism policy 
professionals. However, there were several noted nuances in responses. Participant 101 
had concerns that overall understanding was overshadowed by the day-to-day taskings: 
“While we’re looking at sort of the background noise of what is causing this [terrorism] 
over the long run, there’s much more of a focus on the day-to-day [situation].” They went 
on to highlight perspectives on root cause theory. “I think there’s a lot of discussion of 
the root cause, we’re not supposed to use that phrase, or we weren’t for a while, root 
causes of terrorism” (from Participant 101). Similar to perspectives expressed by OSD 
participants to the previous question, many State Department participants had views that 
organizational structures and processes get in the way of a common understanding. “I 
would say we get ... once we get up to a certain level, we get a lack of synchronization 
because people need to own things. To some degree, we’re all serving different masters” 
(from Participant 106). “Where it gets a little more complicated in terms of interagency 
coordination, is that you have multiple agencies with very similar authorities…” (from 
Participant 107).  
 The USAID participants expressed the common theme in response to this 
question, that there is generally or somewhat of an understanding of the causes of 
terrorism across the interagency. Their views stressed this in more of a negative way than 
being positive. Participant 202 said: “I think we tend to have the same conversations over 
and over again, we tend to do the same superficial assessments over and over again.” 
Participant 203 said: “I think it comes to where you stand and depends on where you sit, 
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right?” Participant 208 felt “…there is still a long way to go…” Two USAID participants 
noted the challenge of the time necessary to achieve understanding of terrorism’s causes. 
One, Participant 203, reflected that: “There is not necessarily enough time…bringing 
everybody up to the same level so that we have a greater understanding…before we sit 
down and try to come up with things collectively. There is a lot of educating each other 
as we go.” The other, Participant 208, felt that: “Our attention spans are short, 
and…people don’t have the inclination to really want to understand the complex dynamic 
that...our own actions and the reaction that those create.”  
 Both NCTC participants had the view that there is somewhat of a common 
understanding of the causes of terrorism across the interagency. Participant 301 felt it is 
less so, as “…maybe that’s why things ended up being ineffective because we didn’t all 
have the synergy and the understanding of the cause…” The other, Participant 302, was 
also skeptical regarding a common understanding, expressing the view that the 
commonality was more due to common effort, driving a common understanding. “There 
is synergy, in that everybody that touches [particular] lines of effort knew what they had 
to do, and we have to work together because we have a common goal… So there is 
synergy in that. But that’s again to doing an action or an outcome, not in the 
understanding.” Participant 301 also highlighted organizational challenges impacting a 
common understanding. “I don’t think so. And the reason why is again very political 
because it goes back to the organization and the framework…”  
 The OSD participants responses to this question also reflected the common theme 
with perspectives that their interagency colleagues generally had a common 
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understanding of the causes of terrorism. “I think there’s symmetry, it’s not bad” (from 
Participant 401). “I mean I think on a macro level, yeah, I mean people realize that these 
are incredibly complex problem sets…” (from Participant 404). “In some regards, yes. 
But also, in some ways, no…” (Participant 405). Participant 407 expressed the 
perspective that a common understanding appeared to be superficial. “I think on the 
surface it would seem like there is some alignment but as soon as you get past that there’s 
a lot of cases where you’re getting right back into the individual atmosphere and the 
culture within or among agencies and departments, which can be disabling.”  
 The Joint Staff participants also expressed the common theme that their 
interagency colleagues generally had a common understanding of the causes of terrorism. 
Participant 502 expressed it as: “I think there’s a common understanding…” Participant 
503’s view was: “Actually, I think compared to other functional issues, we’re fairly flat, 
fairly dynamic.” However, some Joint Staff participants also expressed a variety of 
nuances in their perceptions. Participant 501 noted the organizational divergences: 
“Based on the many different discussions, I would think there’s some divergence from 
one department or agency to another.” Participant 505 felt a common view wasn’t that 
prevalent: “I think the understanding of it is not really well understood commonly…” 
The view expressed by Participant 504 attributed a possible lack of a common 
understanding to fatigue with the terrorism challenge: “I think it’s changed. Again, I 
think 18 years has gotten mundane. I think people are at fatigue. I’m not sure there’s 
much else we can do that we aren’t already doing. The areas that we talked about, that 
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what drives terrorism, we could absolutely do more, but those that we would like to do 
more just aren’t there.”  
Perspectives on Interagency Empowerment in Counterterrorism Efforts 
The eleventh and final interview question to each study participant was How 
much do you think other organizations working counterterrorism policy are enabled or 
hindered by their own existing authorities and resources in addressing terrorism? The 
common response theme observed across four of the five organizations were perceptions 
that other organizations are hindered, principally due to a lack of or imbalances in 
resources, in addressing terrorism. The noted divergent view was from NCTC, where 
both participants had perspectives that other organizations authorities and resources are 
adequate, with one additionally noting some hinderances due to coordination issues.  
State Department participants expressed a common theme in their responses to 
this question, with perspectives that their partner interagency organizations suffer from a 
resource imbalance hindering their ability to address terrorism. “If we had clear 
authorities as to who owns what and then the resources that matched that policy then I 
think we would have a little bit easier time” (from Participant 102). “I think we’re 
absolutely under resourced in the long term goals that require patience…” “I think there 
is a, largely, an imbalance of resources right now for counter-terrorism professionals 
across the space” (from Participant 103). “I don’t see a graded balance [in resourcing]…” 
(from Participant 105). Another perspective expressed by Participant 101 was that partner 
organizations working counterterrorism are not hindered by authorities or resources, but 
have challenges with scope of their required efforts – “I think that’s one of the problems 
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that you run into, and it’s not necessarily an inhibition by authorities, or an enabling by 
authorities, it’s just that whatever you’re doing has to somehow be looked at in the 
broadest possible sense and that doesn’t always happen.”  
 The USAID participants also expressed the common theme that interagency 
partner organizations working counterterrorism are hindered in addressing terrorism, with 
several particularly noting the imbalances in the allocation of resources. Participant 207 
noted the broader challenges posed by the bureaucracy: “Something that I do think is a 
significant hindrance is the [bureaucratic] turf battles…” Participant 207 further reflected 
that the primary hinderance was a lack of leadership: “There’s no coming together of a 
few, not everyone, a few important leaders to decide what do we want to do about this 
problem set…” Participant 205 shared the perspective that resourcing of counterterrorism 
programs was fine, with more of an imbalance in the seemingly default to use military 
options – “No, we’re not [hindered]. But I do think that it was too easy to take people out 
[i.e., via drone strikes] and take people off the battlefield in a way that I think upended 
the balance, sort of overstepped. So, a phrase I used all the time…is our analysis cannot 
stop at dead.” 
 Both NCTC participants had perspectives that both the authorities and resources 
available to their interagency partner organization to address terrorism is adequate. 
Participant 301 expressed the view that they really didn’t know. “You know, I don’t 
know. I honestly don’t know if I have an answer to that… I don’t get a sense that a lot of 
things are authorities, I think that some people blame authorities for things… I sort of 
think people hide behind that sometimes…” The other, Participant 302, didn’t really 
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think authorities or resources were a key factor in addressing terrorism. “I don’t think it 
matters. I don’t think it matters how much authority or funding or whatever that they 
actually have. I think what matters most is that [departments and agencies] agree on [and 
work towards] a particular goal…” 
 The common theme that interagency partner organizations are hindered by 
resources in addressing terrorism was predominate in responses from the OSD 
participants. “Resources in that they are hindered” (from Participant 407). “State 
[Department] is definitely hindered by their resources for sure. I don’t know that intel 
[i.e., intelligence] agencies are hindered so much by their resources or their authorities, 
from my perspective… But I’m not sure that they are asking for more or they want 
more…” (from Participant 405). “I do think that on the development side they don’t have 
as many resources…” (from Participant 406).  
 Many of the Joint Staff participants also shared the perspective that interagency 
partner organizations are hindered by resources in addressing terrorism. Participant 506 
said: “Absolutely. They are hindered. I don’t think within DOD we are... Most of it’s not 
even necessarily authorities, it’s resources.” Another, Participant 504, stressed the 
limitations in resources was more due to the lack of personnel or staff, not just a lack of 
program resources: “Yeah…I think they are severely limited. Where the Department of 
Defense writ large, we’re pretty unlimited in what we can do in the counter-terrorism 
space, especially when it comes to direct action piece. [But] compared with our 
interagency partners, I mean, we’re talking people. We’re talking horsepower, money, 
resources. They just can’t keep up, and the demand for their capabilities is that much 
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higher.” There were also several divergent views expressed by a few Joint Staff 
participants, such as Participant 502 feeling that the situation differed across 
organizations, and Participant 506 having the perspective that authorities and resources 
were healthy among interagency partners working counterterrorism programs.  
 
